Andalas Journal of International Studies

Conflict Management as Everyday Governance: The Case of Yemen's Protracted War

Osid Ahmed Abdullah Hageb[1], Bachtiar Dwi Kurniawan[2*], Norma Sartika Dewi[3]
[1,2,3] Department of Government Affairs and Administration, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

ARTICLE INFO

Date received: 03 June 2026
Revision date: 23 September 2026
Date published: 26 October 2026

Keywords
conflict management;
everyday governance;
protracted conflict;
hybrid political order;
Yemen

Correspondence
Email:
bachtiar_dk@umy.ac.id

*Corresponding author

ABSTRACT

This study examines conflict management as a form of durable governance in Yemen's protracted war (2015–2025), challenging approaches that equate effective conflict management with political resolution. Yemen provides a relevant case because prolonged conflict has produced fragmented authority while governance, service provision, customary dispute resolution, and economic networks have continued to operate without a comprehensive political settlement. Drawing on conflict-management theory and related perspectives on everyday peace, hybrid political orders, and post-liberal peace, the study combines a bibliometric review of 5,047 international articles with an interpretive synthesis of 81 studies, comprising 55 Yemen-focused empirical studies and 26 theoretical studies. The findings identify conflict-management practices across four interconnected governance levels: international mediation that maintains procedural continuity without settlement; fragmented national authorities that regulate political and territorial competition; customary institutions that resolve disputes outside formal state systems; and household networks that sustain livelihoods through adaptive strategies. Water and energy infrastructure, health coordination, and cross-frontline markets further function as mechanisms through which social and economic activity is maintained under conflict conditions. The study contributes by reconceptualizing conflict management as durable governance rather than a transitional stage toward resolution, developing a multi-level framework for analysing management across different governance domains, and positioning Yemen as a theory-building case for examining the limitations of resolution-centred approaches to protracted conflict.

INTRODUCTION

The Yemeni conflict since 2015 has been one of the world's most protracted armed conflicts. The war involves many leading actors such as the internationally recognized government, Houthi forces, the Southern Transitional Council, and external powers including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran (Barltrop, 2025). The United Nations estimated by 2021 that the conflict caused the deaths of 377,000, with about 60% resulting from indirect causes such as hunger and disease, at the same time, more than 24 million people needed humanitarian assistance (Arana-Catania, van Lier and Procter, 2022). Yet a paradox persists; although there is the absence of political settlement, social order, basic services, and livelihoods continue through fragmented and informal arrangements. The collapse of infrastructure was met by expansions of decentralized water and energy systems (Al-Saidi, Roach and Al-Saeedi, 2020); moreover, in many areas, customary and tribal dispute-resolution mechanisms continue to be at the center of managing everyday conflicts (Bawazir, 2017); and micro, small, and medium enterprises, accounting for approximately 97% of the business sector in Yemen, survive

through informal economic networks (Alshebami, 2024). These dynamics make Yemen analytically significant for examining conflict management beyond political settlement. The combination of prolonged armed conflict, fragmented authority, and the continued operation of local, customary, and informal governance arrangements provides a case in which conflict management can be examined through the practices that sustain social order and everyday functioning despite the absence of a comprehensive political settlement (Almaweri and Al‐Awami, 2025; Elayah, 2025; Lackner, 2025). Rather than signaling mere failure or collapse, these patterns suggest that conflict in Yemen is actively managed as a relatively stable condition, challenging resolution-centric understandings of conflict management.

This continues to be challenging to explain in the current literature because existing studies examine different dimensions of conflict management. Clayton and Dorussen (2022) find that mediation is more effective than peacekeeping in halting hostilities, although transformative peacekeeping can strengthen mediation. Hegre, Hultman and Nygård (2019) find that UN peacekeeping reduces major armed conflict by affecting its onset, escalation, continuation, and recurrence. Mac Ginty (2014) identifies bottom-up practices through which individuals and groups navigate everyday life in conflict-affected societies. Krampe, Hegazi and VanDeveer (2021) identify intergroup contact, diffusion of norms, and state service provision as mechanisms through which environmental governance can contribute to sustaining peace. In Yemen, Almaweri and Al‐Awami (2025) find that local service provision varies according to governance capacity, resources, political leadership and stability, proximity to conflict, and international support. These findings indicate that conflict management can involve formal interventions as well as local and everyday practices, but these dimensions have rarely been examined as an integrated form of conflict management during protracted war.

The gap this study seeks to address is conceptual rather than empirical. Yemen is somehow empirically rich, with research documenting how social order persists through local authorities maintaining service delivery, decentralized infrastructure providing continuity, and tribal dispute resolution handling legal cases (Rodionov, 2019; Al-Saidi, Roach and Al-Saeedi, 2020; Almaweri and Al‐Awami, 2025). Yet the existing frameworks show partiality towards resolution-oriented, elite-centric approaches that minimally or do not recognize at all everyday governance practices as conflict management, keeping the country theoretically marginalized.

As it is known, conflict management is defined as limiting conflict to reduce destructive effects without solving the underlying causes (Hamad, 2005; Tint, 2011; Lundy and Njonguo, 2019; Muriuki, 2022). This is associated with negative peace, the absence of direct violence, rather than positive peace, addressing structural inequalities (Putri, 2022). Conflict resolution aims to end disputes through agreements that satisfy parties and address root issues (Coy, 2009; Qasaye, 2023). The literature shows asymmetry, management is positioned as subsidiary to resolution, treated as either a pathway toward resolution or evidence of failure (Lebow, 2022; Putri, 2022), therefore, creating analytical difficulties in understanding conflicts where management operates as a stable, long-term condition.

International mediation, peacekeeping, sanctions, and negotiations dominate the discussion of conflict management as primary mechanisms (Diehl, Owsiak and Goertz, 2021; Welz, 2021; Clayton and Dorussen, 2022). This elite-centric focus creates blind spots, treating ongoing conflict as analytical failure, missing out governance practices operating independently of peace processes, and marginalizing cases where management takes unrecognized forms. Non-state actors, rebel

groups, civil society, and tribal authorities are analyzed as spoilers or auxiliary implementers rather than primary managers in their own (Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012; Irrera, 2021).

Yemen always appears as a failed peace process or humanitarian crisis within the conflict management studies (Beal, 2020; Dureab et al., 2021; Barltrop, 2025). This portrayal obscures reality, as empirical research shows broad management through local authorities maintaining services by hybrid arrangements, decentralized infrastructure providing continuity, and tribal dispute resolution providing social order parallel to the state (Rodionov, 2019; Al-Saidi, Roach and Al-Saeedi, 2020; Almaweri and Al‐Awami, 2025).

Some critical academic work challenges resolution-centric frameworks through hybrid political orders, illiberal peace, and everyday peace (Boege et al., 2009; Mac Ginty, 2014; Lewis, Heathershaw and Megoran, 2018), recognizing that peace and conflict management could occur through informal, non-state, locally embedded practices. However, this work has not been systematically integrated into conflict management theory, and Yemen has not been theorized as a site of conflict management through everyday governance, despite empirical documentation. In this study, everyday governance refers to the routine practices through which actors exercise authority, manage resources, resolve disputes, and sustain everyday activities during prolonged conflict. It includes formal, informal, and hybrid arrangements that operate alongside or beyond formal peace processes.

Building on this understanding and the literature on everyday peace and hybrid political orders (Boege et al., 2009; Mac Ginty, 2014; Lewis, Heathershaw and Megoran, 2018) , this study proposes a reconceptualization of conflict management in protracted conflicts as durable everyday governance, centering practices over outcomes and recognizing management as potentially constituting an equilibrium operating simultaneously at international, national, local, and everyday levels. The central question of the study asks: How are conflict management practices documented across multiple governance levels in Yemen during the 2015–2025 conflict period, and what do these practices reveal about conflict management as everyday governance in the absence of political resolution? Accordingly, the study does not estimate national prevalence rates but synthesizes how conflict management practices are documented and interpreted across existing empirical studies. This study does not treat Yemen as a single, uniform national unit. Instead, its unit of analysis is the set of conflict management practices documented across multiple sectors, governance levels, and geographic contexts in Yemen during the period 2015–2025, as reported in existing empirical literature.

Conflict management has been defined in different ways. It may refer to the limitation and containment of violent conflict (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2005) , the process through which disputants and third parties manage conflict (Wall and Callister, 1995) , or efforts to influence conflict without necessarily resolving its underlying causes (Sumita, 2011). In this study, conflict management refers to practices that regulate violence, maintain social order, and sustain everyday functioning without necessarily resolving the underlying political conflict. Empirically, this includes international mediation that sustains dialogue without resolution, fragmented governance arrangements, decentralized service provision, customary and tribal mediation, and household-level economic and social adaptation. Dispute resolution is used in a narrower analytical sense to refer to the handling of civil, commercial, family, and land disputes through non-state or hybrid mechanisms, particularly tribal arbitration and customary law, rather than criminal justice or battlefield violence (Al-Zwaini, 2006; Bawazir, 2017). The study makes three contributions: first, reconceptualizing conflict management as durable governance rather than transitional failure. Second, demonstrating

empirically how conflict is managed across four levels by synthesizing 55 Yemen-focused studies. Finally, challenging resolution-centric frameworks by using Yemen as a theory-building case that exposes blind spots in existing scholarship and proposes alternative analytical approaches for protracted conflicts where management, not resolution, defines political life.

RESEARCH METHOD

Research Design and Analytical Approach

This study employs a qualitative research design combining bibliometric analysis with interpretive synthesis of empirical literature. The research uses bibliometric mapping to identify conceptual gaps in global conflict management scholarship and qualitative synthesis to interpret how conflict management operates as everyday governance in Yemen's protracted conflict (2015-2025). The analysis integrates evidence from peer-reviewed academic articles, policy reports, and empirical case studies published during this period. Research was conducted entirely through digital databases and AI-assisted literature search tools, reflecting both access constraints in conflict zones and methodological advantages of comprehensive literature coverage.

Data Collection and Literature Identification

Data collection proceeded through two complementary strategies. First, bibliometric mapping employed Scopus searches to identify global conflict management literature (Search 1) and Yemen-specific studies (Search 2). Search 1 used the query TITLE-ABS-KEY("conflict management" OR "peace management" OR "conflict mediation" OR "peace mediation" OR "everyday peace" OR "local peacebuilding" OR "community conflict management" OR "informal mediation" OR "customary law" OR "hybrid peace") AND PUBYEAR > 2014 AND PUBYEAR < 2026, limited to social sciences, articles and reviews, and English language, yielding 5,047 papers. Search 2 added TITLE-ABS-KEY(Yemen) to identical parameters, returning 24 papers, of which eight proved relevant after screening. Both searches were analyzed using VOSviewer 1.6.20 to generate keyword co-occurrence networks visualizing dominant theoretical clusters and Yemen's positioning. Second, Consensus AI, an artificial intelligence-powered research tool, expanded the empirical corpus beyond Scopus coverage. Consensus AI was used solely for literature identification; the author verified credibility and relevance through manual screening, with all coding and analysis conducted manually. For Yemen empirical studies, 25 queries covering conflict management dimensions (local authority service delivery, customary law, household economic adaptation, etc.) returned approximately 89 peer-reviewed papers across sectors, including health systems, water and energy infrastructure, customary law, gender, livelihoods, and humanitarian coordination. For the analytical framework, 19 queries on conflict management theory generated approximately 198 papers providing conceptual definitions and theoretical frameworks for interpreting Yemen's empirical patterns.


Table 1. Summarizes the data collection strategy
Source: author's bibliometric mapping and thematic analysis

Literature Category	Source	Papers Identified	Papers Used in Analysis	Role in Study	Analytical Use

Global conflict management literature	Scopus (Search 1)	5,047	0 (used as aggregate)	Bibliometric mapping	VOSviewer network analysis to identify dominant concepts, theoretical clusters, and conceptual gaps in the field
Yemen conflict management (Scopus)	Scopus (Search 2)	24 → 8 relevant	7	Core empirical data	Qualitative analysis of conflict management practices, governance arrangements, and institutional mechanisms
Yemen empirical studies	Consensus AI	89	48	Core empirical data	Synthesis of evidence on service provision, customary law, livelihoods, health systems, gender, and coordination
Conflict theory literature	Consensus AI	198	26	Analytical framework	Conceptual definitions, theoretical positioning, and comparative frameworks for interpreting findings
Total		—	**81**		

Keyword co-occurrence analysis using VOSviewer 1.6.20 identifies three main clusters in the global conflict-management literature. The largest and most central cluster is organized around "conflict management" and is closely connected to "conflict resolution," "mediation," "peacekeeping," "peacebuilding," and "war." A second cluster includes governance-related concepts such as "governance approach," "institutional framework," "participatory approach," and "sustainable development," while a third cluster contains human and behavioral concepts such as "psychology," "communication," and "questionnaire." The stronger connectivity of resolution- and mediation-related terms to the central "conflict management" node indicates their prominence in the mapped literature, whereas governance-related concepts appear less centrally connected. This pattern provides the basis for examining governance practices as a less prominent dimension of conflict management.

Figure 1. Keyword Co-occurrence Network in Global Conflict Management Literature
Source: authors' analysis using VOSviewer 1.6.20 based on Scopus data



Qualitative Analysis and Limitations

Consensus AI was used to identify relevant literature, while the author manually verified, coded, and analyzed the selected studies. The analysis was conducted in three stages. First, the conceptual gap was identified through bibliometric analysis, which showed weak clustering between Yemen-related research and prevailing conflict-management concepts. Second, the 81 studies included in the final analytical corpus were coded according to governance level (international, national, local, and everyday), conflict-management mechanisms (service provision, customary law, economic networks, and mediation), authoritative actors, and mechanisms that support stability without political resolution. Third, the empirical findings were interpreted through the analytical lens of conflict-management theory to examine the limitations of resolution-centred approaches in understanding protracted conflict.


This research is limited by its reliance on secondary sources in an active conflict setting. Accessibility biases the empirical corpus, with many studies focusing on northern governorates and urban centres, while remote tribal and southern areas are less represented. Quantitative claims in the literature are also sometimes based on expert judgement rather than systematic measurement, reflecting the challenges of data collection in conflict zones. Published literature may further exclude unpublished local documents and grey literature produced by Yemeni organisations. These limitations constrain the geographical and empirical coverage of the analysis. Nevertheless, the 81-study corpus supports the identification of recurring conflict-management practices across different governance levels and provides a basis for examining conflict management as analytically distinct from political resolution. The bibliometric findings further indicate weak connections between Yemen-related research and dominant conflict-management concepts, pointing to a gap in the application of conflict-management theory to protracted conflict settings.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The conflict management in Yemen demonstrates the dynamics that are mostly overlooked by the conventional frameworks. What seems to be failure, ten years of no peace deals, divided power, and endemic violence, is also a working governance. The state has not fallen into complete anarchy and neither has it reached formal peace. Rather, conflict is handled in everyday life in the form of layered practices that control violence, allocate power, and maintain social life without the need to settle it politically. These practices work on various levels of governance and undermine assumptions of resolution that reduce the lack of peace agreements to the lack of order.

Understanding conflict management as everyday governance is therefore essential to explaining how protracted conflicts persist without either resolution or collapse. The analysis develops four analytical propositions. First, Decentralization-Violence Reduction: Decentralized service delivery lowers the incentives to engage in large-scale violence by enhancing interdependence among actors and stabilizing access to vital resources, as seen in 5,000% growth in solar PV consumption (9 to 458 ktoe, 2014-2018) and 40% of urban populations served by private water vendors (Al-Saidi, Roach and Al-Saeedi, 2020). Second, Fragmentation-Constraint: Fragmented authority limits escalation and not collapse since no one actor can monopolize power, as three proto-states have defined territorial control and health cluster coordination functioning within competing ministry structures (Carboni, 2025). Third, Customary Law as Primary Institution: Customary legal mechanisms constitute primary conflict management institutions, not residual practices, supported by 80% of civil disputes resolved through tribal mechanisms and 420+ documented conflict management instruments in the al-Mukalla Archives (Rodionov, 2019). Finally, Everyday Governance as Equilibrium: Everyday governance practices constitute a stable equilibrium rather than transitional coping, shown by 97% of businesses operating as MSMEs through informal networks and 10-year institutional continuity of health cluster coordination (Alshebami, 2024).

Figure 2. Conceptual Framework: Actors, Mechanisms, and Outcomes in Yemen's Conflict Management
Source: author's synthesis



Territorial Fragmentation and the Constraint on Violence


Testing the Fragmentation-Constraint Proposition Through Spatial Analysis

The fragmentation-constraint proposition requires empirical verification: does territorial division constrain violence, or does it simply reflect military stalemate? Figure 3's spatial analysis provides three forms of evidence that fragmentation actively manages conflict rather than passively resulting from it. First, territorial division creates mutual vulnerability that constrains escalation. Houthis control the highlands of the north such as Sanaa; the government and allies control central Marib and eastern regions; the Southern Transitional Council controls Aden and the southern coast; and the Hadramawt Elite Forces and Joint Resistance Forces control localized power. The geographical division has not remained purely fluid. Research on Yemen indicates that territorial control and major frontlines became relatively stable after 2015, despite continued fighting (Salisbury, 2017; Al-Deen, 2019; Schillinger and Özerol, 2023). This territorial stability was particularly evident in Houthi-controlled northern and western Yemen, where frontlines remained largely unchanged after 2016 and the Houthis developed governance practices within areas under their control (Mutschler, Bales and Meininghaus, 2024). Available conflict data also indicate an association between periods of greater frontline stability and lower levels of battle activity. ACLED recorded a 27% decline in political violence in Yemen in 2021 and attributed part of this reduction to the relative freezing of several Houthi–anti-Houthi fronts; battle events declined by 66% in Ad Dali, 53% in Sadah, and 49% in Al Jawf compared with 2020 (d'Hauthuille, 2022). This pattern is consistent with the Fragmentation-Constraint Proposition, although it does not by itself establish that territorial fragmentation was the sole cause of reduced violence.

Second, territorial fragmentation produces differentiated governance and economic arrangements across Yemen's territorial divisions. The map shows areas of competing political and military control, including Houthi- and government-aligned territories and areas influenced by southern actors. Empirical research demonstrates that these differences in territorial and political control are reflected in local governance and service provision. Almaweri and Al‑Awami (2025) , based on 27 interviews across Marib, Sana'a, Aden, Hodeidah, and Hadramaut, find significant variation in local service provision according to governance capacity and resources, political leadership and stability, proximity to conflict zones, and international support. Elayah (2025) , based on 40 interviews, similarly identifies fragmented and externally influenced administration in southern Yemen alongside a different governance pattern in the north. Economic fragmentation is also documented at the national level: the World Bank Group (2025) reports that Yemen has developed two economic zones with separate institutions, monetary authorities, and exchange rates, producing significant economic disparities and limiting coordinated policymaking. These findings indicate that territorial fragmentation is associated with differentiated governance, service provision, and economic institutions across Yemen.

Three scope conditions warrant acknowledgment. Temporally, this spatial logic operates most effectively during the 2017-2023 stabilization period; earlier territorial fluidity (2015-2016) correlated with higher violence levels, suggesting that boundary recognition requires time to develop. Geographically, terrain matters: flat coastal areas permit easier territorial consolidation than mountainous highlands, meaning fragmentation may be more durable in some regions than others. Most critically, fragmentation constrains violence but does not eliminate it—the red dots on Figure 3 represent ongoing human suffering. The analytical claim is not that fragmentation produces peace, but that it creates structured conflict where violence follows territorial logic rather than escalating toward total war.

Figure 3. Territorial Fragmentation and Areas of Control in Yemen (2020). Crisis Group database; Violence heat map. Source: International group crisis (2020)




This spatial evidence supports reconceptualizing conflict management as durable territorial governance. Figure 3 shows the territorial fragmentation of Yemen in 2020 and the distribution of reported conflict events across areas controlled by different actors. The map identifies approximately five areas of political and military control, including Houthi-controlled northern areas, government-aligned areas in the centre and east, Southern Transitional Council-controlled areas in the south, and more localized areas controlled by the Hadramawt Elite Forces and Joint Resistance Forces. The red points indicate reported conflict events, which appear particularly concentrated around contested territorial boundaries rather than being evenly distributed across the country. This spatial pattern is consistent with the Fragmentation-Constraint Proposition because it shows how violence remains concentrated around areas of territorial contestation while relatively established areas of control persist.

Multi-Level Conflict Management as Governance

Multi-Level Architecture of Conflict Management

Governance and conflict management are related but distinct concepts in this study. Governance refers to the arrangements through which actors exercise authority, allocate resources, resolve disputes, and sustain everyday activities, while conflict management refers to the functions through which conflict is regulated without necessarily resolving its underlying political causes. In Yemen, governance arrangements at the international, national, local, and household levels perform different conflict-management functions through distinct mechanisms. These levels are interconnected, but they do not form a purely top-down hierarchy.

Figure 4: Multi-Level Conflict Management Governance in Yemen (2015–2025)
Source: Compiled and synthesized by the author from (Bawazir, 2017; Rodionov, 2019; Al-Saidi, Roach and Al-Saeedi, 2020; Arana-Catania, van Lier and Procter, 2022; Alshebami, 2024; Barltrop, 2025)



CONFLICT MANAGEMENT THROUGH MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE
Governance arrangements perform conflict-management functions across levels, regulating conflict and sustaining everyday functioning without political settlement.

At the international level, the principal governance arrangements involve UN mediation, ceasefire monitoring, and aid coordination. Their primary function is to maintain procedural dialogue and facilitate interaction among conflict parties. The mechanism is sustained negotiation that allows

political engagement to continue without requiring immediate political settlement. UN mediation has operated continuously since 2015, although no comprehensive peace agreement has been reached. The dominant framework continues to revolve around UNSC Resolution 2216, which assumes that Yemen's conflict can be resolved through the restoration of a unified government. According to Barltrop (2025), this assumption has lost touch with political reality. The analysis of 14 UN-mediated dialogue sessions conducted in 2018-2019 through machine learning shows something interesting: mediation processes are more focused on ensuring that the talks continue than on resolving sovereignty and governance problems (Arana-Catania, van Lier and Procter, 2022). International mediation therefore functions primarily as a mechanism for maintaining negotiation and managing the conflict as an ongoing condition rather than resolving it through a comprehensive settlement.

There were structural limitations to international approaches. The intervention by the Saudi led to the conversion of domestic crisis into regional proxy war (Beal, 2020), as the Gulf Cooperation Council aimed at negative peace, or simply ceasing violence, and the member states had opposing goals. COVID-19 interfered with mediation procedures (Bruggeman, 2025), Western-dominated support networks struggled with coordination (Dudouet et al., 2018), and the UN Mediation Support Unit budget experienced funding gaps despite increasing to $35.9 million (2020) after being 12.3 million (2011) (Cho and Landau, 2023). Formal processes concentrate resources and everyday management mechanisms are run with little external assistance.

At the national level, governance is organized through fragmented and competing authorities, including the Houthis, the internationally recognized government, the Southern Transitional Council, and other localized authorities. Their governance function includes territorial control and resource allocation. These arrangements contribute to conflict management by regulating political and territorial competition without producing political unification. Three rival proto-states exercise localized governance without comprehensive legitimacy. The Houthis control northern highlands and manage instability through co-opting elites, selective repression, and institutional engineering (Carboni, 2025), continuously negotiating with tribal confederations and managing military commanders. The Southern Transitional Council emerged in May 2017 as UAE-backed authority in Aden (Forster, 2017; Day, 2020). The Riyadh Agreement (2019) brought the STC into power-sharing with the internationally recognized government (Palik, 2021). These arrangements allow competing authorities to exercise territorial and institutional control without producing a unified national authority. Conflict management therefore occurs through the regulation of political and territorial competition rather than through political unification.

Yemen has split into an "archipelago of proto-states" where authority over institutions depends on territorial control (AlKarim, Abbara and Attal, 2021). Health governance shows this fragmentation: rival northern and southern Ministry structures operate alongside 20 international partners coordinated through WHO-led clusters (Qirbi and Ismail, 2017; Dureab et al., 2021). Multiple armed groups compete over territory, producing attacks and checkpoint harassment (Elnakib et al., 2021), yet this coexists with pragmatic cooperation. Local authorities use varying arrangements from NGO partnerships to revenue-sharing deals (Al Waziza et al., 2023; Almaweri and Al‐Awami, 2025). At the national level, therefore, conflict management does not depend on institutional unity; it operates through negotiated, selective, and sometimes parallel arrangements among competing authorities.

At the local level, governance arrangements include tribal councils, customary law institutions, and local organizations. Their primary function is everyday dispute resolution, particularly in areas where formal state institutions have limited reach. The mechanism is customary

mediation through respected arbitrators, negotiated compensation, and locally recognized rules rather than reliance exclusively on formal courts and police. Legal-anthropological research on Yemen suggests that informal justice mechanisms, particularly tribal arbitration and customary law, handle the majority of civil and land disputes in tribal-dominated areas, with expert assessments estimating coverage of up to 80% of cases; however, this figure is derived from qualitative field-based analysis and institutional observation rather than statistical surveys and reflects pre-war patterns rather than a precise or nationally representative measurement (Al-Zwaini, 2006). Subsequent studies continue to document the centrality of customary mediation in local governance during the conflict period, though without providing systematic quantitative measurement (Bawazir, 2017).

These arrangements provide a locally legitimate mechanism for managing disputes outside formal state structures. The al-Mukalla Archives contain over 420 tribal documents dating from the early nineteenth to mid-twentieth century, revealing eight distinct types of conflict management instruments, including armistice agreements, peace settlements, and mediation records. A 1790 treaty guaranteed market security through inter-tribal cooperation, and an 1843 defensive union formed among four tribal groups against external threats (Rodionov, 2019). These are not historical relics but institutional templates that continue to carry social legitimacy independent of state authority.

Arab-Islamic ideas of sulh and musalaha provide culturally relevant alternatives to Western models and can be more convincing to most Yemenis than secular international strategies (Dosari and George, 2023). Women can be involved in tribal mediation despite the patriarchal norms, and women can be involved as guarantors, witnesses, and even mediators (Adra, 2016). In the 2011 uprising, the tribal dialogue traditions were scaled to national talk models (Elayah et al., 2020). The importance of these deep structures is that they help to understand how conflict is perpetuated and how it is managed at the local level because tribal systems have long operated in parallel or in place of state power (Kuznetsov, 2019; Dresch, 2020).

At the household level, governance is expressed through informal economic networks, household coping strategies, and adaptive practices that sustain livelihoods under conflict conditions. Their conflict-management contribution lies in maintaining everyday economic interaction and access to livelihoods despite disruptions to formal institutions. Micro, small, and medium enterprises (97% of the business sector in Yemen) are surviving on informal contacts in the face of institutional collapse. The war closed a quarter of businesses (two-thirds of them female-owned), but the majority survived despite the destruction of $16 billion in agriculture and 660 water facilities, and network connections played a key role in survival (Alshebami, 2024). “Functional markets” persist across frontlines, creating interdependencies that discourage violence (Huddleston and Wood, 2021). Community health workers adapt travel and services to violence patterns (Miller et al., 2020), and households manage the vulnerabilities intensified by conflicts through informal networks (Shreedhar et al., 2024; Zaid et al., 2024; Al-Zumair et al., 2025).

The UN estimated the conflict would cause 377,000 deaths by late 2021, with 60% from indirect causes, while 24.1 million needed aid (Arana-Catania, van Lier and Procter, 2022). Population displacement has been extensive (Checchi and Koum Besson, 2022), with 60% of deaths from disease and malnutrition rather than violence (Guha Sapir et al., 2022), corroborated by diaspora mortality patterns (McGowan et al., 2023). This immense suffering coexists with continued economic activity, functioning customary law, and household survival strategies that constitute governance, contradicting linear models. It shows conflict can be managed as a stable condition through multi-level arrangements that reduce violence incentives by making survival dependent on cross-line interaction.

Mechanisms of Practical Conflict Management

Infrastructure as Governance: Water and Energy

Water and energy infrastructure function as primary conflict management mechanisms, not just services, providing legitimacy for competing authorities. Centralized systems collapsed: fuel imports dropped to 1% of monthly requirements (September 2016), electricity consumption fell from 3,609 to 2,192 ktoe (2014-2018). Decentralized alternatives exploded: solar panel sales increased over 2000% (2015-2016), solar PV consumption jumped from 9 to 458 ktoe (2014-2018). National water coverage dropped from 68% to 59%, leaving 18 million without safe water, with private supply now covering 40% of urban populations (Al-Saidi, Roach and Al-Saeedi, 2020).

These decentralized systems reduce competition over scarce resources and defuse grievances. Control over water and energy becomes a governance mechanism regulating behavior (Krampe, Hegazi and VanDeveer, 2021), with systems targeted strategically, worsening crises while creating governance opportunities (Sowers, Weinthal and Zawahri, 2017). Infrastructure failure produces deadly consequences. Wastewater plant damage contributed to 1.2 million cholera cases and 2,500+ deaths (December 2018) (Krakow, 2020), the largest documented epidemic, eventually contained through coordination between rival authorities, agencies, and workers (Federspiel and Ali, 2018). Private water costs 10-20 times utility prices, reinforcing inequality (Krakow, 2020)

Health Systems and Humanitarian Coordination

Health systems show conflict management through service provision. Yemen’s pre-conflict health system was weak; conflict caused deterioration through facility attacks, worker displacement, and fragmentation (Qirbi and Ismail, 2017). Yet services continued through adaptive mechanisms coordinated across authorities via cluster systems bringing rival ministries and international partners under WHO facilitation (Dureab et al., 2021; Al Waziza et al., 2023). With no nationwide emergency system, victims transport informally, coexisting with community-based mechanisms (Alsabri et al., 2021). Telemedicine enables continuity when access is blocked (Parkes et al., 2022).

Protection Mechanisms and Social Services

Protection mechanisms and social services targeted at vulnerable populations also manage conflict. Women have taken on new roles as mediators, service providers, and community leaders in the absence of men who were killed, displaced, or recruited to fight (Abohajeb, Abdo and Mohsen, 2021). Women navigate multiple forms of insecurity and develop survival strategies managing household-level conflicts (Gressmann, 2016). Conflict has both constrained women's rights and created new spaces for agency as traditional authority structures get disrupted (Al-Sakkaf, 2020). Women's peace activism organizes across frontlines to advocate for inclusion and provide local conflict resolution services (Al Naami and Moodley, 2017). Gender issues intersect with conflict management at multiple levels as midwives develop strategies to provide support despite constraints (Christiansen, 2019; Al-Zumair et al., 2025).

Digital Technologies and Legal Frameworks

Digital technologies represent emerging mechanisms. Tools used in Yemen's CMI workshops let participants identify roughly 20 factors blocking peace through prioritization exercises, with women stakeholders using results to draft policy recommendations (Hirblinger, Brummer and

Kufus, 2024). Natural language processing applied to dialogue data using topic modeling and argument mining identified latent negotiation issues and mapped convergence between parties (Arana-Catania, van Lier and Procter, 2022). Formal legal frameworks provide another dimension, though effectiveness stays limited. International humanitarian law provides normative standards that humanitarian actors invoke to negotiate access despite extensive violations (Khan and Ullah, 2020). Cultural heritage protection frameworks enable limited cooperation between warring parties around preserving sites like Old Sana'a (Meskell and Isakhan, 2020).

These mechanisms occupy marginal positions in dominant conflict management theory despite being central in practice. Service provision, customary mediation, livelihood networks, and process-oriented negotiation typically get analyzed as humanitarian coping strategies or development adaptations rather than core instruments of conflict management. Quantitative mediation studies grew 90.9% between 2000-2009 and 2010-2019, while qualitative studies grew 48.5%, but studies on internal process design increased from 11 articles in 1998-2002 to 46 in 2018-2022, while studies on context and spoilers grew more slowly from 7 to 14 (Cho and Landau, 2023). The mechanisms that most effectively stabilize conflict-affected societies are precisely those least theorized as conflict management.

Fragmented Authority and Governance Practices

Conflict management in Yemen runs on fragmented authority, where no single actor has comprehensive control, yet multiple actors perform governance functions. Authority disperses among international organizations, de facto national authorities, tribal leaders, local councils, and economic intermediaries, each operating in specific domains. De facto authorities get legitimacy less from legal recognition than from performance and resource control. Populations engage with the Houthis, STC, or remnants of the internationally recognized government based on their ability to provide security, services, or economic access rather than ideology (Almaweri and Al ‑ Awami, 2025). Authority is contingent and is negotiated in the daily life and not institutionalized in the formal structures. This allows conflict to be handled in a pragmatic manner since compliance is achieved by service delivery and negotiated accommodation and not coercion. Formal state bodies, STC structures, security forces, and informal networks all work in parallel in STC areas. (Forster, 2017; Day, 2020).

Local and customary authorities possess social legitimacy rooted in lineage, reputation, and communal trust, letting them enforce agreements through social pressure and collective sanctioning (Bawazir, 2017; Rodionov, 2019). Compensation, public guarantees, and reputational consequences are often more effective than formal legal sanctions in conflict. Informal enforcement is in economic and service spheres. The leverage of control over water, energy, aid, and trade routes gives actors the power to control compliance (Al-Saidi, Roach and Al-Saeedi, 2020; Krampe, Hegazi and VanDeveer, 2021). Community health workers in Aden were suspected of terrorism, and households occasionally refused to open doors (Miller et al., 2020). These enforcement forms are ambiguous in terms of governance and conflict management because power is enforced by controlling daily needs.

Theoretical Reconceptualization: From Resolution to Governance

The empirical patterns require fundamental rethinking of how conflict management gets conceptualized.

Table 2. Comparison of Conflict Management Frameworks


Source: Author's synthesis based on (Lederach and Washington, 1997; Boege et al., 2009; Richmond, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2014; Putri, 2022).

Framework	Resolution Status	Role of Management	Informal Mechanisms	Primary Focus	Application to Yemen
Liberal Peacebuilding	Primary goal	Bridge to settlement	Transitional, to be replaced	Elite negotiations and institutions	Poor fit: no peace process
Everyday Peace (Mac Ginty)	Implicit goal	Resistance to formal peace	Parallel to formal processes	Daily practices	Partial fit: captures practices
Hybrid Political Orders (Boege et al.)	Eventual state	Temporary cohabitation	Co-existence problem	State–custom interface	Partial fit: transitional logic
Management-as-Governance (this study)	Not assumed necessary	**Primary governance form**	**Primary governance sites**	**Multi-scalar mechanisms**	**Strong fit: protracted management**
Conflict Transformation	Primary goal	Transitional mechanism	Supporting role	Structural change	Poor fit: no transformation pathway

In contrast to the everyday peace or hybrid political order strategies, the management-as-governance approach does not consider informal practices as transitional or resistant, but as the main organizing logic of conflict itself. Dominating paradigms identify successful conflict management with successful resolution or movement towards settlement, and unresolved conflict as failure. Yemen is a direct challenge to this. Although there are no overall peace agreements and armed confrontation persists, conflict is actively controlled by governance practices that maintain social order and prevent escalation. War management here does not indicate disintegration or change. It is a long-term form of governance that is adjusted to long-term violence. The ceasefire monitoring of the Stockholm Agreement was hindered and not followed, yet these challenges do not eliminate regulatory impacts of continued monitoring presence (Palik, 2021).

Understanding conflict management as governance requires shifting analytical focus from outcomes to practices. In Yemen, management embeds in everyday arrangements regulating resource access, mediating disputes, and structuring interaction. International mediation maintains procedural continuity without settlement. Decentralized services stabilize livelihoods despite renewable water resources of only 81 cubic meters per person per year (Al-Saidi, Roach and Al-Saeedi, 2020). Customary law resolves disputes through mechanisms demonstrating historical continuity (Rodionov, 2019). Informal economic networks incentivize restraint through business continuity, despite 26% of enterprises closing (Alshebami, 2024). These practices govern conflict by making it more livable, predictable, and containable.

Figure 5. How Conflict Management Functions Without Resolution in Yemen
Source: Author's synthesis based on (Lederach and Washington, 1997; Boege *et al.*, 2009; Richmond, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2014; Putri, 2022)



Yemen makes it hard to assume that conflict management is transitional in nature. Instead of moving towards peace, the management has been routinized in various fields. Since 2015, health cluster coordination has been functioning, which has institutionalized fragmentation instead of addressing it (Qirbi and Ismail, 2017; Dureab et al., 2021). This implies that conflict management can create a balance and not a road to peace. Reform in the security sector and transitional justice are frequently suggested as the path to positive peace (Duran & Garcia Suarez, 2025),yet these solutions presuppose resolution as the final destination. Likewise, RAND studies focus on institutional growth and economic rebound in peacebuilding (Egel, Taft and Efron, 2021). If management-oriented solutions assume that the conditions are not possible in the short term.

The implications of this reframing are wider. First, it highlights the constraints of assessment measures that emphasize peace settlements and institutionalization. Second, it emphasizes the necessity of practice-based frameworks that focus on everyday governance and informal institutions as the main conflict management locations. The fact that 80 percent of conflicts are solved by tribal means demonstrates the point of conflict management (Bawazir, 2017). The 97% of enterprises operating as MSMEs demonstrate an informal economic governance scale (Alshebami, 2024). The increase in solar PV use between 9 ktoe and 458 ktoe embodies infrastructure governance that is not under state control (Al-Saidi, Roach and Al-Saeedi, 2020). Third, it highlights the political implications of management itself, such as how the lack of resolution can reinforce power asymmetries. The prices of water sold by the private resellers are 10-20 times higher than utility prices, which strengthens inequality (Krakow, 2020), and the fact that the closure rate of women-owned businesses is higher than the average indicates that management mechanisms generate unequal results (Alshebami, 2024).

Yemen is not an anomalous or failed case but rather a theory-building case that highlights blind spots in the existing scholarship. It shows how conflict can be managed as a stable condition through governance practices operating independently of peace processes. The characteristics that render Yemen a difficult case for the current theory-protracted stalemate, fragmented authority,

hybrid governance, and multi-scalar mechanisms-may increasingly characterize contemporary conflicts from Syria to Libya to Sudan. Developing theoretical frameworks that adequately account for the dynamics of conflict management in Yemen is not simply a matter of filling a geographic gap but about building a theory that can analyze a broader class of conflicts that the existing frameworks poorly address.

Recognizing conflict management as a normal governance does not justify violence or the rejection of peace efforts. Rather, it elucidates the political and institutional circumstances under which peace efforts have to work, without suggesting normative acceptance of long-term violence. This view provides a more realistic approach to the explanation of how societies cope with prolonged conflict, in which management instead of resolution tends to dominate political life. Although humanitarian suffering is enormous, it also represents the populations that are going through conflict by means of governance that does not lead to complete breakdown.

CONCLUSION

This study examined conflict management as everyday governance in Yemen's protracted war through a qualitative research design combining bibliometric analysis of the global conflict-management literature with an interpretive synthesis of empirical studies on Yemen and relevant conflict-management theory. The analysis identifies conflict-management practices across four interconnected governance levels: international mediation that maintains political dialogue without comprehensive settlement, fragmented national authorities that regulate territorial and political competition, customary institutions that manage everyday disputes, and household economic networks that sustain livelihoods under conflict conditions. Across these levels, governance arrangements perform conflict-management functions through mechanisms including mediation, territorial and resource regulation, customary dispute resolution, decentralized service provision, and informal economic adaptation. The findings therefore support a conceptualization of conflict management as an ongoing governance process rather than only a transitional pathway toward political resolution. Yemen demonstrates how governance arrangements can maintain social and economic functioning under prolonged conflict without resolving its underlying political divisions, while also producing unequal outcomes such as differences in access to services and economic opportunities. The study is limited by its reliance on published literature and the uneven geographical and empirical coverage of existing studies, which constrain assessment of local implementation and long-term sustainability. Future research should therefore examine these mechanisms through comparative, longitudinal, and primary empirical research, particularly with greater attention to how authority and benefits are distributed across different groups and territories.

DECLARATION OF GENERATIVE AI AND AI-ASSISTED TECHNOLOGIES

The authors used Consensus AI to identify potentially relevant peer-reviewed literature, with all results manually verified. ChatGPT (OpenAI) was used for manuscript organization, keyword exploration relevant to VOSviewer analysis, and improving grammar, language, and phrasing. Claude (Anthropic) assisted with structuring the analysis and refining wording. AI tools were not used to generate data, conduct analysis, or produce conclusions. All data extraction, verification, analysis, interpretation, and final content decisions were made by the authors, who reviewed all AI-assisted text and take full responsibility for the published work.

REFERENCES

Abohajeb, A., Abdo, B. and Mohsen, A. (2021) "Young women's involvement in the Yemeni conflict," Youth Civic Engagement and Local Peacebuilding in the Middle East and North Africa. New York: Routledge, 2021. | Series: Routledge explorations in development studies: Routledge, pp. 72–83. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003183747-7.

Adra, N. (2016) "Tribal Mediation and Empowered Women: Potential Contributions of Heritage to National Development in Yemen," International Journal of Islamic Architecture, 5(2), pp. 301–337. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1386/ijia.5.2.301_1.

Al-Deen, M.S. (2019) "Federalism in Yemen: A Catalyst for War, the Present Reality, and the Inevitable Future," Sanaacenter [Preprint]. Sanaacenter. Available at: https://sanaacenter.org/files/Federalism_in_Yemen.pdf (Accessed: September 8, 2025).

AlKarim, T., Abbara, A. and Attal, B. (2021) "Armed conflict alone does not explain the devastation of Yemen's health system," BMJ Global Health, 6(2), p. e004740. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2020-004740.

Almaweri, A. and Al‐Awami, H. (2025) "Local Service Provision During War‐A Case Study of Yemen," Public Administration and Development, 45(3), pp. 187‐200. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.2097.

Al Naami, A. and Moodley, S. (2017) We Won't Wait: As war ravages Yemen, its women strive to build peace. Available at: www.oxfam.org.

Alsabri, M. et al. (2021) "Conflict and COVID-19 in Yemen: beyond the humanitarian crisis," Globalization and Health, 17(1), p. 83. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-021-00732-1.

Al-Saidi, M., Roach, E.L. and Al-Saeedi, B.A.H. (2020) "Conflict Resilience of Water and Energy Supply Infrastructure: Insights from Yemen," Water, 12(11), p. 3269. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3390/w12113269.

Al-Sakkaf, Dr.N. (2020) "The Politics of Women's Empowerment in Yemen," Advances in Social Science and Culture, 2(4), p. p102. Available at: https://doi.org/10.22158/assc.v2n4p102.

Alshebami, A.S. (2024) "Surviving the Storm: The Vital Role of Entrepreneurs' Network Ties and Recovering Capabilities in Supporting the Intention to Sustain Micro and Small Enterprises," Sustainability, 16(19), p. 8474. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3390/su16198474.

Al Waziza, R. et al. (2023) "Analyzing Yemen's health system at the governorate level amid the ongoing conflict: a case of Al Hodeida governorate," Discover Health Systems, 2(1), p. 15. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s44250-023-00026-w.

Al-Zumair, Marwah et al. (2025) "Midwives' experiences working with women and girls surviving violence in Yemen: a qualitative study," Frontiers in Global Women's Health, 6. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3389/fgwh.2025.1450053.

Al-Zwaini, L. (2006) "State and Non-State Justice in Yemen," United States Institute of Peace (USIP) [Preprint]. Kabul: Conference on the Relationship between State and Non-State Justice Systems in Afghanistan.

Arana-Catania, M., van Lier, F.-A. and Procter, R. (2022) "Supporting peace negotiations in the Yemen war through machine learning," Data & Policy, 4, p. e28. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/dap.2022.19.

Barltrop, R. (2025) "Yemen's peace process: the need to change the international vision and framework," International Affairs, 101(3), pp. 1119–1131. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaf019.

Bawazir, Omar. (2017) "The tribal dispute resolution mechanism in Yemen." intok International Conference on Social Science and Management.

Beal, J. (2020) "Managing multi-sided conflicts: Failed military intervention and mediation in Yemen," Houghton St Press. Houghton St Press.

Boege, V. et al. (2009) "Building Peace and Political Community in Hybrid Political Orders," International Peacekeeping, 16(5), pp. 599–615. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310903303248.

Bruggeman, B.O. (2025) "Barriers for Peace Mediators when shifting to an online environment: A Case Study of The UN in Yemen," Derecho en Sociedad, 19(1), pp. 49–77. Available at: https://doi.org/10.63058/des.v19i1.309.

Carboni, A. (2025) "The Houthi Movement and the Management of Instability in Wartime Yemen," Civil Wars, pp. 1–25. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2024.2347144.

Checchi, F. and Koum Besson, E.S. (2022) "Reconstructing subdistrict-level population denominators in Yemen after six years of armed conflict and forced displacement," Journal of Migration and Health, 5, p. 100105. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmh.2022.100105.

Cho, J. and Landau, D.M. (2023) "In Search of the Golden Formula: Trends in Peace Mediation Research and Practice," Civil Wars, 25(2–3), pp. 317–340. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2023.2249326.

Christiansen, C.C. (2019) "Gender, Development and Security in Yemen's Transition Process," Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 13(2), pp. 197–215. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2018.1452392.

Clayton, G. and Dorussen, H. (2022) "The effectiveness of mediation and peacekeeping for ending conflict," Journal of Peace Research, 59(2), pp. 150–165. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343321990076.

Coy, P.G. (2009) Conflict Resolution, Conflict Transformation, and Peacebuilding. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Available at: http://www.nafcm.org/.

Day, S.W. (2020) "The Role of Hirak and the Southern Transitional Council," Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis. Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 253–270. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35578-4_16.

d'Hauthuille, V. (2022) 10 Conflicts to Worry About in 2022: Yemen. Available at: https://acleddata.com/report/10-conflicts-worry-about-2022-yemen (Accessed: September 27, 2026).

Diehl, P.F., Owsiak, A.P. and Goertz, G. (2021) "Managing International - Civil Militarized Conflicts (I-CMC): Empirical Patterns," Civil Wars, 23(3), pp. 343–370. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2021.1921501.

Dosari, A. Al and George, M. (2023) "An Alternative to the Use of Force in International Law and Arab-Islamic Sulh for the Yemen Armed Conflict," Journal of Politics and Law, 16(2), p. 23. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v16n2p23.

Dresch, P. (2020) "Tribal Relations and Political History In Upper Yemen," Contemporary Yemen. Routledge, pp. 154–174. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003074700-11.

Dudouet, V. et al. (2018) "From policy to action: assessing the European Union's approach to inclusive mediation and dialogue support in Georgia and Yemen," Peacebuilding, 6(3), pp. 183–200. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2018.1491279.

Duran, F. and Garcia Suarez, M.A. (2025) "SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND PEACEBUILDING," AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations, 13(26). Available at: https://doi.org/10.22456/2238-6912.139268.

Dureab, F. et al. (2021) "Forms of Health System Fragmentation During Conflict: The Case of Yemen," Frontiers in Public Health, 9. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2021.659980.

Egel, D., Taft, V. and Efron, S. (2021) Building an Enduring Peace in Yemen: Lessons from Five Years of RAND Research. RAND Corporation. Available at: https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA733-1.

Elayah, M. et al. (2020) "National dialogues as an interruption of civil war – the case of Yemen," Peacebuilding, 8(1), pp. 98–117. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2018.1517964.

Elayah, M. (2025) "The Empty State: Governing the Voids in a Projected Conflict‐Torn Yemen," Politics & Policy, 53(5). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.70088.

Elnakib, S. et al. (2021) "Providing care under extreme adversity: The impact of the Yemen conflict on the personal and professional lives of health workers," Social Science & Medicine, 272, p. 113751. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2021.113751.

Federspiel, F. and Ali, M. (2018) "The cholera outbreak in Yemen: lessons learned and way forward," BMC Public Health, 18(1), p. 1338. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-018-6227-6.

Forster, R. (2017) "The Southern Transitional Council: Implications for Yemen's Peace Process," Middle East Policy, 24(3), pp. 133–144. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12295.

Gressmann, W. (2016) From the Ground Up: Gender and conflict analysis in Yemen. Available at: https://doi.org/10.21201/2016.620112.

Guha Sapir, D. et al. (2022) "Civil war and death in Yemen: Analysis of SMART survey and ACLED data, 2012–2019," PLOS Global Public Health, 2(8), p. e0000581. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pgph.0000581.

Hamad, A.A. (2005) "The Reconceptualisation of Conflict Management," Peace, Conflict and Development: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 7. Available at: http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk. (Accessed: January 12, 2026).

Hegre, H., Hultman, L. and Nygård, H.M. (2019) "Evaluating the Conflict-Reducing Effect of UN Peacekeeping Operations," The Journal of Politics, 81(1), pp. 215–232. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1086/700203.

Hirblinger, A.T., Brummer, V. and Kufus, F. (2024) "Leveraging digital methods in the quest for peaceful futures: the interplay of sincere and subjunctive technology affordances in peace mediation," Information, Communication & Society, 27(11), pp. 2039–2058. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2023.2247070.

Huddleston, R.J. and Wood, D. (2021) "Functional Markets in Yemen's War Economy," Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 2(2), p. 204. Available at: https://doi.org/10.31389/jied.71.

International group crisis (2020) How Yemen's War Economy Undermines Peace Efforts,

International group crisis. Available at: https://yemenconflict.crisisgroup.org/ (Accessed: January 20, 2026).

Irrera, D. (2021) "Non-State Actors and Conflict Management in Proxy Wars," Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies. Oxford University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.641.

Khan, M. and Ullah, Z. (2020) "The Yemen Armed Conflict in the Perspective of International Humanitarian Law," Global Legal Studies Review, V(II), pp. 11–23. Available at: https://doi.org/10.31703/glsr.2020(V-II).02.

Krakow, C.A. (2020) "The International Law and Politics of Water Access: Experiences of Displacement, Statelessness, and Armed Conflict," Water, 12(2), p. 340. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3390/w12020340.

Krampe, F., Hegazi, F. and VanDeveer, S.D. (2021) "Sustaining peace through better resource governance: Three potential mechanisms for environmental peacebuilding," World Development, 144, p. 105508. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105508.

Kuznetsov, A.A. (2019) "Religious and Tribal Background of the Military-Political Conflict in Yemen," Islamovedenie, 10(1), pp. 17–26. Available at: https://doi.org/10.21779/2077-8155-2019-10-1-17-26.

Lackner, H. (2025) From Local Governance to Constitution Building: Yemen after 10 Years of Conflict. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). Available at: https://doi.org/10.31752/idea.2025.14.

Lebow, R.N. (2022) "Rethinking conflict management," China International Strategy Review, 4(1), pp. 1–20. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-022-00104-3.

Lederach, J.P. and Washington, D.C. (1997) SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES.

Lewis, D., Heathershaw, J. and Megoran, N. (2018) "Illiberal peace? Authoritarian modes of conflict management," Cooperation and Conflict, 53(4), pp. 486–506. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836718765902.

Lundy, B.D. and Njonguo, E. (2019) "Conflict Management and Resolution," African Studies. Oxford University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199846733-0207.

Mac Ginty, R. (2014) "Everyday peace: Bottom-up and local agency in conflict-affected societies," Security Dialogue, 45(6), pp. 548–564. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010614550899.

McGowan, C.R. et al. (2023) "Adult mortality patterns in Yemen before and during armed conflict: evidence from a web survey of the global diaspora," Conflict and Health, 17(1), p. 36. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1186/s13031-023-00535-8.

Meskell, L. and Isakhan, B. (2020) "UNESCO, world heritage and the gridlock over Yemen," Third World Quarterly, 41(10), pp. 1776–1791. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1784000.

Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (2005) Contemporary conflict resolution : the prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts. 2nd ed. Polity, Cambridge, 2005.

Miller, N.P. et al. (2020) "Assessing community health worker service delivery in humanitarian settings," Journal of Global Health, 10(1). Available at:

https://doi.org/10.7189/jogh.10.010307.

Muriuki, C. (2022) "Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution," Journal of Developing Country Studies, 1(1), pp. 25–36. Available at: https://doi.org/10.47604/jdcs.1716.

Mutschler, M., Bales, M. and Meininghaus, E. (2024) "The impact of precision strike technology on the warfare of non-state armed groups: case studies on Daesh and the Houthis," Small Wars & Insurgencies, 35(7), pp. 1123–1150. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2024.2319216.

Palik, J. (2021) "Watchdogs of Pause: The Challenges of Ceasefire Monitoring in Yemen," International Peacekeeping, 28(3), pp. 444–469. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2021.1918004.

Parkes, P. et al. (2022) "Telemedicine interventions in six conflict-affected countries in the WHO Eastern Mediterranean region: a systematic review," Conflict and Health, 16(1), p. 64. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1186/s13031-022-00493-7.

Pearlman, W. and Cunningham, K.G. (2012) "Nonstate Actors, Fragmentation, and Conflict Processes," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56(1), pp. 3–15. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002711429669.

Putri, P.K. (2022) "Manajemen Konflik dan Resolusi Konflik: Sebuah Pendekatan Terhadap Perdamaian," Papua Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 2(1), pp. 16–34. Available at: https://doi.org/10.31957/pjdir.v2i1.1945.

Qasaye, O.A.M. (2023) "Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in International Development," International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR), 12(12), pp. 333–338. Available at: https://doi.org/10.21275/SR231203104158.

Qirbi, N. and Ismail, S.A. (2017) "Health system functionality in a low-income country in the midst of conflict: the case of Yemen," Health Policy and Planning, 32(6), pp. 911–922. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/heapol/czx031.

Richmond, O. (2012) A Post-Liberal Peace. Routledge. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203810262.

Rodionov, M. (2019) "Customary Laws in Hadramawt (South Arabia). Between the Past and the Future," Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Asian and African Studies, 11(3), pp. 371–378. Available at: https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu13.2019.309.

Salisbury, P. (2017) "Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order," Chatham House [Preprint]. Chatham House. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2017/12/yemen-national-chaos-local-order (Accessed: April 17, 2026).

Schillinger, J. and Özerol, G. (2023) "Non-state armed groups with territorial control as emergent actors of wartime water governance," Environment and Security, 1(3–4), pp. 163–186. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/27538796231204761.

Shreedhar, S. et al. (2024) "Violence against women and children in Yemen: A mixed-methods systematic review." Available at: https://doi.org/10.1101/2024.08.01.24310001.

Sowers, J.L., Weinthal, E. and Zawahri, N. (2017) "Targeting environmental infrastructures, international law, and civilians in the new Middle Eastern wars," Security Dialogue, 48(5), pp. 410–430. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010617716615.

Sumita, B. (2011) "Conflict Management," Oxford Bibliographies in International Relations. Oxford University PressNew York, NY. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199743292-0004.

Tint, B.S. (2011) “Conflict Management, Resolution, and Transformation,” The Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology. Wiley. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470672532.wbepp046.

Wall, J.A. and Callister, R.R. (1995) “Conflict and Its Management,” Journal of Management, 21(3), pp. 515–558. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/014920639502100306.

Welz, M. (2021) “International Conflict Management,” Africa since Decolonization. Cambridge University Press, pp. 237–263. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108599566.012.

World Bank Group (2025) “Economic Fragmentation and External Shocks Hamper Yemen’s Recovery Path,” World Bank Group [Preprint]. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/06/02/economic-fragmentation-and-external-shocks-hamper-yemen-s-recovery-path (Accessed: September 27, 2026).

Zaid, S.M. et al. (2024) “Psychologists’ perspective of mental health in Yemen during the civil war and COVID-19: a qualitative inquiry,” Current Psychology, 43(16), pp. 14774–14785. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-022-03617-7.

Copyright holder:
Bachtiar Dwi Kurniawan (2026)
First publication right:
Andalas Journal of International Studies
This article is licensed under:

