

Andalas Journal of International Studies



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Preface

First of all, citing the presence of Almighty God, Andalas Journal of International Studies (AJIS) presents the Third Volume, No. 1, May 2014. Our goal in published this journal is to disseminate the results of the researchers' works with various topics and approaches in order to contribute to the development of International Studies both theoretically and practically.

Entering the third year of the publication of this journal, we are grateful and appreciate the interest and delivery of incoming papers. At this volume, there are five papers which is a major theme in volume 3 number 1 is more emphasis on policy issues, especially issues related to the Chinese government's policy in dealing with disputes such as that written by Kevin Ramadan Sandy, entitled Solving the South China Sea Crisis: A Recommendation for Indonesia and by Trio Sirmareza by lifting the title Popular Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy towards Japan in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute.

In the next paper, Maksum Ali elaborated on The Free Press in Indonesia as Human Security: A Preliminary Analysis. Then Sofia Trisni entitled by the performance of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) as a Ruling Government 2007-2012. And the last written by Muhammad Syaban with title Disaster Governance in South-East Asia.

With the biggest gratitude, we would also like to thank the editorial board, who has worked hard in the preparation of these papers, so in the end it can come up to be a printed journal.

Editorial Team

Solving the South China Sea Crisis: A Recommendation for Indonesia

Kevin Ramadhan Sandy

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to recommend to Indonesia to maintain its national interest of a unified ASEAN on the South China Sea disputes with four policy recommendations. The failure of the 2012 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting was observed as many analysts as the start of a crack in ASEAN as a regional group. With Cambodia's acting as China's proxy in the meeting, ASEAN failed to address the issue and to put it in the Joint Communiqué, although Vietnam and Philippines have insisted the chair to do so. This event led to the rise of suspicions from ASEAN claimant states towards Cambodia and China's intention. Furthermore, this becomes a proof that ASEAN could no longer be independent as a regional group as China has increased its economic leverage on Cambodia. At the same time, Philippines and Vietnam have increased their bilateral ties with the United States, hoping to increase their leverage and capability vis-à-vis China. Thus, ASEAN is in an unstable state with high possibility of it to be divided into two blocs with the South China Sea still unresolved. One of Indonesia's main foreign policy interests is a unified, centralized and independent ASEAN as a regional bloc. President Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister Natalegawa reflected this by underscoring the importance of ASEAN and the need to resolve the dispute as soon as possible before further tension occurred. In this case, Indonesia should try to act as the mediator to solve this issue as a neutral player.

Keywords: *Indonesia, ASEAN, China, South China Sea, Diplomacy*

ASEAN's unity, solidarity and centrality are threatened by a possible intervention by greater powers due to the conflict in South China Sea. On July 2012, for the first time in its history, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting had failed to issue a Joint Communiqué, a set of statements that point out a set of collective cooperation which ASEAN member states have been working together in order to achieve a common ground and goal.

Cambodia, accused of being a proxy to China, rejected to mention the South China Sea dispute in the communiqué, although the Philippines insisted that the communiqué should reflect the ministers discussion of the confrontation between the Philippines and China at Scarborough Shoal and Vietnam wanted the declaration to address the Exclusive Economic Zones

(EEZ).¹ Cambodia, rejecting references to South China Sea and EEZ, argued that those issues are bilateral issues which could not be discussed in an ASEAN joint statement.² In the end, the forum concluded that there would be no Joint Communique following the meeting.

The result of the meeting clearly showed that China has influenced last year's ASEAN agenda through its growing influence in Cambodia. China favoured bilateral negotiations with Southeast Asian claimants, while the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei preferred multilateral negotiation through the ASEAN Regional Forum.³ China's soft power in Cambodia has undermined ASEAN's unity as Phnom Penh tilted to Beijing. Not only in Cambodia, China – through its diplomatic efforts and economic assistance in trade

and investment – has also drawn Burma and Laos into its orbit.⁴ This threatened the unity and centrality of ASEAN, with the Philippines and Vietnam are tightening their relationship with the United States.⁵ This paper will provide an analysis of the crisis of trust in ASEAN and the crisis of ASEAN-China relations. Moreover, this paper will provide a critical background of ASEAN's significance to Indonesia. Lastly, it will provide four policy recommendations for Indonesia to help resolve the dispute on the South China Sea.

What's in the South China Sea?

South China Sea has great economic stakes. It is a rich fishing grounds and a potential source of hydrocarbons, particularly natural gas.⁶ Moreover, it has become one of the busiest sea lanes in the

¹ Ernest Bower, 'China reveals its hand on ASEAN in Phnom Penh', East Asia Forum, (2012): <<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/07/28/china-reveals-its-hand-on-asean-in-phnom-penh/>> (accessed on 20 December 2013).

² *Ibid.*

³ Khean Un, 'Cambodia in 2012: Beyond the Crossroads?', Asian Survey 53, No. 1 (2013): 147.

⁴ Khean Un, p. 147.

⁵ Michael Wesley, 'What's at stake in the South China Sea?', Lowy Institute for International Policy, Strategic Snapshot 11 (2012): 3.

⁶ US Energy Information Administration, 'South China Sea', (2013): <<http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=SCS>> (accessed on 28 December 2013).

world, with more than a quarter of the world's trade pass through the lane each year.⁷ Furthermore, according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), it is estimated that the possible oil reserves in the area is as high as 213 billion barrels.⁸ The EIA also estimates that the area may also contain natural gas reserves about 900 trillion cubic ft. which is the same as the proven reserves in Qatar.⁹

With great economic stakes in South China Sea, no wonder that China, in the age of growing need of resources demand and scarcity, is drawing the biggest lane to claim the sea. As China is now importing 58 per cent of its oil and 22 per cent of its gas, China feels the need to secure its energy demands.¹⁰ Since 2007, China has taken a number of action to assert its

claim: increasing seizures of Vietnamese fishing boats, warning Western energy companies not to work with Vietnam in exploring or drilling the disputed waters, announcing plan to develop the disputed islands as tourist destinations, and skirmishes with the Philippines, Vietnamese and Malaysian forces.¹¹

ASEAN between China and the United States

When China reveals its hand on ASEAN in Phnom Penh last year, there is concerns that ASEAN will be divided into two blocs between the US and China. In 2011, the confrontation between Philippines and Chinese vessels in the South China led to a greater Philippines-US military cooperation and lent urgency to Armed Forces of Philippines (AFP) naval upgrades.¹² Furthermore Vietnamese

⁷ Alice Ba, 'Staking Claims and Making Waves in the South China Sea: How Troubled Are the Waters?', *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 33, No. 3 (2011): 170.

⁸ US Energy Information Administration, 'South China Sea', (2013): <<http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=SCS>> (accessed on 28 December 2013).

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Lowell Dittmer, 'Asia in 2012: The Best of a Bad Year?', *Asian Survey* 53, No. 1 (2013): 7.

¹¹ BBC, 'Q&A: South China Sea dispute', BBC Website, (2013): <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349>> (accessed on 24 December 2013).

¹² Thomas Lum, 'The Republic of the Philippines and US Interests', Congressional Research Service (2012),

leaders have sought to upgrade relations with the United States due to the desire for continued access to the US market and the worries about China's expanding influence in Southeast Asia and China's call for international bid for oil exploration in the disputed area.¹³ Vietnam also convened and secured a seat for US representative in the first ever ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting +8, where US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, reiterated US concerns about China's actions in the South China Sea.¹⁴ However, Vietnam is also being careful in choosing its foreign policy, because its relation with China is also one of its most important bilateral relations.¹⁵

As mentioned before, while the Philippines and Vietnam are tightening their relationship with the United States,

<<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33233.pdf>> (accessed on 28 December 2013): 24.

¹³ Mark Manyin, 'US-Vietnam Relations in 2013: Current Issues and Implications for US Policy', Congressional Research Service (2014),

<<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40208.pdf>> (accessed on 26 December 2013): 2.

¹⁴ Manyin, p. 7.

¹⁵ Manyin, p. 2.

China is spreading its soft power on Cambodia. Since 1997, China has offered \$10 billion in loans and grants to Cambodia, compared to a total of around \$12 billion from Cambodia's other development partners.¹⁶ In September 2012, two months after the failure of Joint Communiqué in the 2012 ASEAN meeting, the Chinese government offered \$523 million in loans and grants to Cambodia, which is described by Khean Un as "helping Beijing maintain friendly relations with ASEAN".¹⁷ Also in the same year, Cambodia hosted former President Hu Jintao and premier Wen Jiabao to pronounce a new trade and aid agreements.¹⁸ In the future, it is very likely that Cambodia would become more tilted towards Beijing as it offered extensive economic and political aids without demanding any costly prerequisite. The loans and grants from China earned the ruling party in Cambodia, the CPP, to earn

¹⁶ Khean Un, pp. 147-148.

¹⁷ Khean Un, p. 148.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

much credibility the many infrastructural projects are made possible by Chinese aid.¹⁹ Ciorciari also added that Cambodia's elites also enjoy an influx of resources that facilitate personal enrichment and near-term political entrenchment.²⁰

The unity, solidarity and centrality of ASEAN are threatened in front of external power. Cambodia's political and economic structures evolve in a way that renders the country to be the target to Chinese pressure. The division in ASEAN external position will make ASEAN weaker in front of China. The US, with its plan to re-pivot to Asia, continues to stress that the South China Sea dispute is one of its interests, although it doesn't recognize the sovereignty of the disputed area.²¹ At the

same time, Beijing has been suspicious of what it perceives as Washington's interference in this dispute. Military conflict between claimants is often ruled out as an option by local policy-makers as well as analysts and experts.²² However, by analysing the last disputes in the region, it is obvious that there is absolutely a lack of options as how to solve the problem and prevent future's conflict. Since November 2012, there has not been a single reported incident in the South China.²³ However, this doesn't prove that there will be no more incidents in the future which could lead to a higher height of tensions than before. The same could be said when the issue of South China Sea didn't appear to be the headline since 2002, but it did in early 2012 when China and Philippines

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ John Ciorciari, 'China and Cambodia: Patron and Client?', International Policy Centre, Working Paper Series No. 121 (2013), <<http://ipc.umich.edu/working-papers/pdfs/ipc-121-ciorciari-china-cambodia-patron-client.pdf>> (accessed on 29 December 2013): 38.

²¹ Munir Majid, 'Southeast Asia between China and the United States', London School of Economic and Political Science, IDEAS report No. 15 (2012), <<http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/rep>

orts/pdf/SR015/SR015Majid-China-vs-US.pdf> (accessed on 23 December 2013): 27.

²² Richard Turcsanyi, 'The Long Term Perspective of the South China Sea Dispute', Institute of Asian Studies Policy Paper (2013), <<http://cenaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Policy-Paper-IAS-Turcsanyi.pdf>> (accessed on 24 December 2013): 1.

²³ BBC, 'Q&A: South China Sea dispute', BBC (2013), <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349>> (accessed on 24 December 2013).

engaged in a maritime standoff.²⁴ Therefore, while the tensions have stopped for now, it is by no means the end of the rows. Michael Wesley argues that, 'if left unaddressed, the dynamics in the South China Sea could return Southeast Asia to the bad old days of inter-state divisions, domestic instability and competitive great-power interventions'.²⁵

The Significance of ASEAN to Indonesia

ASEAN has always been very important to Indonesia. Thus, ASEAN's centrality, solidarity and unity have always been one of Indonesia's main interests. Indonesia has always regard ASEAN as the main pillar for its foreign policy. The President of Indonesia Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and foreign affairs minister Marty Natalegawa emphasized this by underlining Indonesia's commitment to position ASEAN as the country's main

venue for foreign policy.²⁶ In regard to the South China Sea, President Yudhoyono has stated that it is Indonesia's priority to make progress to resolve the issue.²⁷ The principle of 'ASEAN Centrality' has also been consistently applied by Indonesia in the light of China's economic and political rising.²⁸ Of course, the principle of ASEAN Centrality is reflected in Indonesia 'free and active' foreign policy and the so-called 'Natalegawa Doctrine', which sees the international politics with the concept of 'dynamic equilibrium'.²⁹ Dynamic equilibrium is of course marked by the absence of domination of any single great power, where countries engage with one another in a mutually beneficial and

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Wesley, p. 3.

²⁶ Syamsul Hadi, 'Indonesia, ASEAN, and the Rise of China: Indonesia in the Midst of East Asia's Dynamics in the Post-Global Crisis World', *International Journal of China Studies* 3, No. 2 (2012): 155.

²⁷ Hadi, p. 159.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Ahmad Umar, 'A critical reading of 'Natalegawa doctrine'', *Jakarta Post* (2011), <<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/01/07/a-critical-reading-%E2%80%98natalegawa-doctrine%E2%80%99.html>> (accessed on 25 December 2013).

peaceful way.³⁰ Therefore, Indonesia always pursues regionalism with ASEAN as its core. Bantaro Bandoro, the editor of *Indonesia Quarterly*, wrote:

‘Indonesia burst forth as a strategic regional player more than 40 years ago when the region saw the establishment of ASEAN. Our influence touched almost every aspect of the region. Southeast Asia was and continued to be on the radar of the Indonesian foreign policy. ASEAN was seen as the main venue where Indonesia articulated its foreign policy interests.’³¹

Thus, Indonesia should mediate the issue of the South China Sea between claimants so that it could be resolved peacefully to prevent division between ASEAN member states as soon as possible. Mediating the South China Sea dispute can benefit

Indonesia’s reputation greatly as a growing regional power. Furthermore, Indonesia had already done enough to have the integrity and credibility as a mediator to solve the South China Sea dispute. The perception of Indonesia as one of the regional leader has been there the whole time. For example, in September 2010, Malaysian authorities detained three Indonesian civilian officials in Bintan waters.³² Rather than showing hard action, Indonesian government only sent a mere diplomatic note to protest the action in the midst of parliament and public anger.³³

President Yudhoyono stated that Indonesia should be an example for the rest of ASEAN members. Moreover, Indonesia has helped a lot to defuse the tension with a series of informal negotiations among South China Sea claimants for more than two decades since the 1990s, although it is

³⁰ Syamsul Hadi, ‘Defending ASEAN’s “Centrality”: Indonesia and the Politics of East Asian Regional Architecture in the Post-American Financial Crisis Era’, in *China and East Asia: After the Wall Street Crisis*, eds. Peng er Lam, Yaqing Qin, Mu Yang, Series on Contemporary China Vol. 33 (Singapore: World Scientific, 2013), p. 195.

³¹ Bantaro Bandoro, ‘Indonesian Foreign Policy 2008 and beyond’, *Indonesia Quarterly* 35, No. 4 (2007): 327.

³² Lilian Budianto, ‘Malaysia ‘violates Indonesia territory, sovereignty’’, *Jakarta Post* (2010), <<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/08/19/malaysia-%E2%80%98violates-indonesian-territory-sovereignty%E2%80%99.html>> (accessed on 26 December 2013).

³³ Hadi, ‘Indonesia, ASEAN, and the Rise of China’, p. 155.

all no to its avail. This includes Indonesia's 'shuttle diplomacy', thanks to Foreign Minister Natalegawa, which resulted in a face-saving 'common position' that reiterated ASEAN's adherence to the declaration of conduct in South China and UNCLOS by visiting five capital cities (Manila, Hanoi, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and Singapore) over two days period.³⁴ Furthermore, Indonesia's 'free and active' policy, ASEAN's 'Centrality', and the Natalegawa's doctrine are the principles of Indonesia's foreign policy, which would not let itself to become a proxy to external pressure and power. Therefore, Indonesia is the perfect mediator between the claimant states in the South China Sea dispute.

³⁴ Bagus Saragih, 'RI finds Common ASEAN ground in sea dispute', Jakarta Post (2012), <<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/23/ri-finds-common-asean-ground-sea-dispute.html>> (accessed on 24 December 2013).

Towards a Solution? Policy

Recommendations

Although since 1990s Indonesia has not been able to mediate the issue in South China Sea, a new opportunity has come. Since the election of Xi Jinping as president by the National People's Congress in March, there has been a re-evaluation of Beijing's counter-productive policy towards the South China Sea. Moreover, China's new Foreign minister, Wang Yi, a veteran diplomat with extensive experience in Southeast Asia, seems eager to revitalize the relation between China and ASEAN.³⁵ Xi Jinping visits to Southeast Asian countries shoed the willingness of China to settle the dispute peacefully though talks. Xi stated in his speech during Indonesia's visit that China and the 10-member of ASEAN nations should settle territorial and

³⁵ Charlyle Thayer, 'New Commitment to a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea?', The National Bureau of Asian Research Website (2013), <<http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=360#.UnEeZflmh8E>> (accessed on 28 December 2013).

maritime disputes ‘in a peaceful manner so as to safeguard regional stability and peace.’³⁶ He further added that ‘China attaches great importance to Indonesia’s role in ASEAN and is ready to work together with Indonesia and other ASEAN countries to make the two sides share the same prosperity’.³⁷ Li Mingjiang, analyst at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, said that Xi’s tone was one of openness, reinforcing his more accommodative and relaxed attitude to the dispute.³⁸ He further noted, ‘This shift is already taking place – we haven’t seen any aggressive patrolling in the South China Sea since Xi took the leadership’.³⁹ Furthermore, Hung and Lee has argued that regarding the dispute in the South China Sea, China has adopted the policy of ‘leaving conflicts aside and jointly

develop’ as a way for resolving conflict’ with three main goals: (i) reduce great power influence in the region; (ii) maintain a stable neighbourhood; and (iii) protect Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea.⁴⁰

The wind has also change within ASEAN. The 2013 ASEAN meeting started with discussion with China on a Code of Conduct with Brunei assuming the ASEAN chair and Vietnamese diplomat Le Luong Minh as the new ASEAN secretary general.⁴¹ Wisdom believes that the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia have been particularly keen to use ASEAN-derived regional diplomacy to embed China in a regional multilateral maritime consensus.⁴² Importantly, Cambodia has ceased its obstruction of

³⁶ Yahoo News, ‘China’s Xi urges improved SEAsia ties in Indonesia speech’, Yahoo (2013), <<http://au.news.yahoo.com/world/a/19235547/chinas-xi-urges-improved-seasia-ties-in-indonesia-speech/>> (accessed on 25 December 2013)

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Hung Ming-Te and Lee Mei-Hsien, ‘China’s Relations with Southeast Asia (ASEAN)’, in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Chinese Foreign Policy*, ed. Emilian Kavalski (Burlington: Ashgate, 2012), p. 254.

⁴¹ Thayer, ‘New Commitment to a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea?’.

⁴² Sheldon Simon, ‘Conflict and Diplomacy in the South China Sea: The View from Washington’, *Asian Survey* 52, No. 6 (2012): 1000.

ASEAN effort to maintain unified position on the issue.⁴³ Thus, Indonesia should use this momentum as an opportunity to engage in a proactive diplomacy in settling the issue.

It is Indonesia's top and foremost priority to maintain a united ASEAN and prevent further regional conflicts. It is also within Indonesia's main interest to prevent further tension in the South China Sea with China. In achieving this condition, this paper will propose the following recommendations.

Firstly, talks should be intensified between ASEAN and China through formal or informal meetings. However, the problem is China want to solve the issue bilaterally. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu stressed the PRC's 'great concern about any possible announcement made by ASEAN countries . . . we oppose the internationalization and multilateralization, or expansion of the

issue'.⁴⁴ This is a great obstacle in achieving a united ASEAN position on the issue. Therefore, Indonesia and ASEAN should assure China that ASEAN is a coalition which goal is to create stability and peace in the region. The same should be one to every ASEAN member states. Indonesia should always remind ASEAN claimant states that there is a need to accept that China's military growth is natural, legitimate outcome of its growing economy. Thus, by doing this, Indonesia should ease the tension in the region and achieves what Phillips said as 'stable security architecture with the participation and support of Asia's increasingly assertive middle-power'.⁴⁵ Through these intensified talks, hopefully there will be more cooperative activities and confidence-building measures which would create a more comfortable environment to conclude a Code of

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ David Scott, 'Conflict Irresolution in the South China Sea, *Asian Survey* 52, No. 6 (2012): 1023.

⁴⁵ Andrew Phillips, 'From the Age of Asymmetry to the Great Reconvergence: Securing Order in the Asian Century', *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 65, No. 1 (2011): 96.

Conduct on the sea. As argued by Mikael Weissmann, 'the proliferation of elite interactions, in particular track two diplomacy and personal networks, has been important for peace building and conflict prevention in the South China Sea'.⁴⁶

Aside from talks between states elites, Indonesia should encourage more frequent talks on conflict and maritime management by experts. In Indonesia, the talk was first initiated when former Ambassador Hasjim Djalal initiated Indonesian-sponsored 'Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea'.⁴⁷ This workshop has also spawned a number of environmental projects looking at ecosystem monitoring, biodiversity, sea level, tide monitoring, as well as maritime matters such as safety of

navigation, shipping and communication.⁴⁸

Across Southeast Asia, Singapore, Malaysia and China has done conferences since 2007, all on the topics of marine biodiversity, environmental change, and maritime communities on the South China Sea.⁴⁹

Secondly, Indonesia should encourage a unified ASEAN position on this issue, particularly against China whose power is chasing that of the US. Small- and middle-powers occupy a secondary, subordinate position on the international stage; if they are to exercise influence at all, it is by forming a coalition of like-minded states to pursue common goals.⁵⁰ This point should be underscored to prevent divided positions within ASEAN. Furthermore, Indonesia should always put forward the ASEAN's Six-Point principles on the South China Sea and the commitment to the full implementation of Declaration of

⁴⁶ Mikael Weissmann, *Understanding the East Asian Peace: Informal and Formal Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in the Taiwan Strait, The Korean Peninsula, and the South China Sea 1990-2008* (Sweden: University of Gothenburg Press, 2009), p. 127.

⁴⁷ Scott, p. 1021.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Michael Wesley, *There Goes the Neighbourhood: Australian and the Rise of Asia* (Sydney: New South, 2011), p. 169.

Conduct. Again, Indonesia should assure China not to worry too much if ASEAN is united on the issue of South China Sea, by reminding China that a unified ASEAN will not be a disadvantage. Kishore Mahbubani, a former Singaporean diplomat, stated 'China's previous leaders had always calculated that a strong and unified ASEAN is a valuable buffer against possible US containment strategy. By dividing ASEAN, China has provided America with the best possible geopolitical opportunity in the region'.⁵¹

Thirdly, a new dialogue mechanism is also worth to be considered. For example, Bonnie Glaser recommended a South China Sea Coast Guard Forum, modelled after the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, which cooperates on a multitude of maritime security and legal issues and could enhance cooperation through

information-sharing.⁵² This would provide a platform which could improve awareness and communication between claimant states. Indonesia should put this forward on the next ASEAN multilateral meeting with China and make a supporting case to gain approval from all parties.

Fourthly, Indonesia should remind the United States not to encourage the claimants to engage in confrontational behaviour through a provocative response. For example, when former Secretary of States in 2011 unintentionally refer the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea which consequently embolden Manila to antagonize China rather than seeking a peaceful mechanism to settle the differences.⁵³ Indonesia should remind the US that China has been very sensitive to US involvement on every regional dispute that China has at the moment with its

⁵¹ Kishore Mahbubani, 'Is China Losing the Diplomatic Plot', Project Syndicate website (2012), <<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/is-china-losing-the-diplomatic-plot>> (accessed on 24 December 2013)

⁵² Bonnie Glaser, 'Armed Clash in the South China Sea', Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14, Council on Foreign Relations (2012): 6, downloadable at <<http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883>>.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

neighbours. Moreover, Indonesia should assure the United States that Indonesia and ASEAN will prioritise the implementation of resolution on the dispute and ask it to be an observer, not a player, on the dispute and restrain itself from making negative sentiments that could disturb the regional efforts towards a solution which could be done through bilateral meeting, diplomatic letter or private diplomatic channel.

Finally, this paper has provided an analysis of South China Sea dispute which has created a crack to the unity of ASEAN. The great economic stake in the South China Sea has made neighbouring countries to compete to get the resources in the disputed area. The centrality and unity of ASEAN is threatened by foreign power's intervention. Further tension in South China Sea could spark a possible conflict in the area. Therefore, Indonesia should act as a mediating country to solve the dispute as soon as possible. These four policy recommendation would hopefully help to solve the dispute in the South

China Sea. They will serve Indonesia's interest in maintaining a stable regional order in Southeast Asia and future conflict with China. These recommendations emphasize greatly on the measure of confidence-building and the realization of Code of Conduct. It is very possible for Indonesia to lead ASEAN to maintain stability as long as diplomacy and talks comes first rather than showing muscles and Indonesia's supportive role as a mediator is very important in achieving this. If dispute in the South China Sea can be settled peacefully with Indonesia as the mediator, we would achieve high credibility in front of international community, which is needed as Indonesia is a country with large population and rapidly growing economy. Furthermore, consequently ASEAN will also take credit as a model regional bloc that successfully put their differences aside to settle a regional dispute with greater power. Moreover, ASEAN will become more

unified after this issue, which very much suit Indonesia's foreign policy interest.

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Buku

Dua Penulis

N 1. Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin, *American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), 52.

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Bentuk Singkat dari Satu karya yang sebelumnya sudah pernah dikutip

Ketika satu karya yang dikutip telah dikutip sebelumnya dan langsung pada satu halaman berikutnya dikutip.

N 20. Philip Ball, *Bright Earth: Art and the Invention of Color* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 140.

N 21. *Ibid.*, 145.

Jika karya yang dikutip sudah pernah dikutip sebelumnya, tapi tidak langsung pada satu halaman yang sama dan hanya satu karya dari penulis yang sama pernah dikutip

N 22. Ball, 204.

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N 23. Ball, *Bright Earth*, 204.

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