

Andalas Journal of International Studies



Sian Troth

Prospects for Australian-Led Regional Cooperation on Asylum Seeker and Refugee Issues

Sofia Trisni, Apriwan, Poppy Irawan

Strategi Indonesia dalam Merespon Kebangkitan Tiongkok
Pada Masa Kepemimpinan Presiden SBY : Studi Kasus Konflik Laut Tiongkok Selatan

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PREFACE

First of all, we would like to express our gratitude toward God the Almighty for the chances to present the readers our second edition of the Fifth Volume. Our goal in publishing this journal is to disseminate the results of the researchers' works with various topics and approaches in order to contribute to the development of International Studies both theoretically and practically.

Entering the fifth year of the publication of this journal, we are grateful and appreciate the interest and delivery of incoming papers. At this volume, there are six papers which have various subject matters. The first paper is written by Sian Troath about Prospects for Australian-Led Regional Cooperation on Asylum Seeker and Refugee Issues, While second paper was written by Sofia Trisni, Apriwan and Poppy Irawan attempts to explain Indonesia's strategy in response the rise of China during SBY tenure. Furthermore, Rika Isnarti's work entitled a comparison of neoliberalism, liberalism, and constructivism in analyzing cyber war come as the third article. The next paper is Beche Bt Mamma who explains decentralization in Indonesia based on laws 22 and 25 1999. Next is talking about Cooperation between South Korea and Indonesia in regard to Disaster Management written by Ady Muzwardi and lastly Naldo Helmys, explains the reason of the export of Iran's Islamic Revolution throughout Middle East during Ayatollah Khomeini's era (1979-1989).

Finally, all constructive criticism and suggestion are really welcome and highly appreciated so that we can improve the quality of our journal for the upcoming edition. Thank you for the insightful thought and the generosity to care to share the knowledge. The journal is continuing to receive very interesting and high quality manuscripts from all over the world.

Editorial Team

Prospects for Australian-Led Regional Cooperation On Asylum Seeker and Refugee Issues

Sian Troath*
troa0001@flinders.edu.au

Abstract

The nomination of former Refugee High Commissioner Antonio Guterres for Secretary-General, the ongoing and intensifying condemnations of Australia's offshore detention centres on human rights grounds, and the ruling of the Papua New Guinea Supreme Court regarding detention centres on Manus Island, indicate that the Australian government needs a new policy on asylum-seekers. The domestic political demand for a deterrence-based, "no advantage", tough on borders approach means that the only way to achieve this would be through regional cooperation, which would be impossible without the cooperation of Indonesia. Analysing why there is such strong involvement of domestic politics on this issue, even to the detriment of the bilateral relationship with Indonesia, is vital to understanding how to improve the relationship and foster regional cooperation on asylum seekers. While reaching a broad cooperative agreement on asylum seekers in general would be far too difficult, the Rohingya refugee crisis presents a specific case on which regional cooperation could be built. If successful, this would serve as a building-block for deeper and more sustained regional cooperation on asylum seekers..

Keyword:Key Words: Australia, Indonesia, asylum seekers, cooperation

*Flinders University

Introduction

There is a number of refugee crises taking place across the world, and yet cooperation on such issues remains fraught with difficulties. The most notable, of course, is the Syrian refugee crisis, which is a point of concern for states all the way through from neighbouring Middle Eastern states to Europe, the United States, and even Australia. The Syrian case is a perfect example of how enmeshed refugee issues are with both domestic and international politics, well beyond any humanitarian or resource-based concerns. Despite an increasingly intertwined and globalised world, refugees and asylum seekers remain one of the key transnational issues states struggle to resolve through cooperative means. As Alexander Betts points out, examining why this is the case is not only important for the protection of human rights, it also presents an interesting area of study for international relations.¹ This essay will focus on Australia's position on refugees and in particular asylum-seeker arrivals by boat, examining how this position impacts on the possibilities for regional cooperation. In particular, this essay will explore the prospects for cooperation between Australia and

Indonesia, and the potential for the Rohingya refugee issue to serve as a building-block in fostering broader cooperation on asylum seekers. Australia and Indonesia are two of the most significant middle powers in the region, which means they are the states with the greatest means to play leading roles on regional issues. This is particularly fortuitous given their complementary roles within the refugee regime, with Australia being a traditional refugee recipient, and Indonesia being a traditional transit country for asylum seekers attempting to reach Australia. As Betts argues, refugee issues can often be framed in terms of a North-South impasse,² which is certainly the case in this scenario. This argument is strengthened by Susan Kneebone, who discusses the unlikelihood of Southeast Asian states taking the lead on cooperation regarding refugee and asylum seeker issues.³ With regards to the recent Rohingya refugee crisis, she argues that "either ASEAN collectively needs to act decisively to tackle the source of the Rohingya issue, and/or Australia needs to 'step up to the mark' and accept its ethical responsibility, something which could also

¹Alexander Betts, *Protection by Persuasion: International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime*, (USA: Cornell University Press, 2009), 2.

²Betts, 3.

³Susan Kneebone, "Comparative Regional Protection Frameworks for Refugees: Norms and Norm Entrepreneurs" *The International Journal of Human Rights* 20, no. 2(2016): 166.

be applied to Australia's responsibility towards asylum seekers in general.⁴ As Indonesia is the "engine of ASEAN",⁵ clearly Indonesia and Australia are the two key states to focus on when discussing the potential for regional cooperation on refugee and asylum seeker matters, and the Australia-Indonesia bilateral relationship is one of the utmost importance. As Hunt argues, there is no regional solution that is possible without the support of Indonesia.⁶ While the Indonesia-Australia relationship is clearly the primary bilateral relationship to focus on and grounds exist on which cooperation can be built, beginning with any kind of broad-based, generalised agreement on asylum seekers would be a big ask. This is where the Rohingya case could be used as a building block on which further cooperation could be built, centred around the Australia-Indonesia bilateral relationship but also capable of drawing in other ASEAN states. Amidst growing condemnations of Australia's offshore detention policy due to human rights concerns, and the ongoing disintegration of the use of Manus Island as an offshore detention location, the Australian government desperately needs a change in

policy which can be marketed simultaneously as a win for human rights and as a continuation of a deterrence-based, "no-advantage", tough on borders approach. The only way to achieve such a goal is through regional cooperation. This paper will explore the domestic context for Australia's need for this type of policy, the effect the domestic political needs for such a policy has had on Australia's relationship with Indonesia, and the possibilities for establishing regional cooperation on asylum seeker and refugee issues in the future, with particular reference to the potential the Rohingya refugee crisis has to serve as a building block for further cooperation.

What Promotes International Cooperation on Asylum Seekers?

Alexander Betts discusses the factors which have promoted key instances of past cooperation on refugee and asylum seeker issues, which provide a valuable starting point for understanding the context in which cooperation is likely. In his book *Protection by Persuasion: International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime* Betts provides a number of useful arguments. Most notably he argues that there needs to be more to a state's commitment to cooperation on asylum seeker policy than pure humanitarian concerns, that individuals in positions of power can play

⁴Ibid.

⁵BrunoHellendorff and Manuel Schmitz, "Indonesia: From Regional to Global Power?", *GRIP Analysis* (7 May 2014): 2.

⁶ LukeHunt, 'Indonesia Watch', *The Diplomat* (May 17 2011): <http://thediplomat.com/2011/05/indonesia-watch/> (accessed 28/02/2015).

key roles in promoting cooperation, and that states need to be sure that the burden-sharing they are taking place in will be reciprocated to a satisfactory degree.⁷ The first is apparent in the case of Australia, as the widespread concern regarding irregular maritime arrivals means that Australia should have an interest in seeking an effective burden-sharing arrangement and promoting regional cooperation on asylum seekers. Given the domestic salience of the issue and the potential collapse of the offshore detention arrangement with Papua New Guinea, there is perhaps more incentive at present to find alternatives to the current policy. Similarly regarding the prospects for key individuals to promote cooperation through individual agency, the appointment of Antonio Guterres as United Nations Secretary General, known for his ten-year stint as Refugee High Commissioner,⁸ certainly holds promise. One of the key difficulties, therefore, is the need for states to have confidence that burden-sharing will be reciprocal to the degree they require. This is due to fear and uncertainty regarding other states' intentions which results in concerns that burden-sharing will not be reciprocated. Consequently, bilateral and regional

relationships need to be improved before wide-scale cooperation can take place. A building-block approach to furthering trust and cooperation is of particular use here.⁹ A building-block approach involves understanding that cooperating on low-level issues helps to build confidence and trust between states, creating a basis on which further cooperation on higher-level issues can be undertaken. Although broad regional cooperation on asylum seeker issues would be most beneficial to Australia, this article will focus primarily on the prospects for building such cooperation with Indonesia, and specifically with regards to the Rohingya refugee crisis. This will also serve to illustrate the importance of understanding the particularities of a bilateral relationship when seeking to promote cooperation between those states.

Australia's Approach to Asylum Seekers

In recent years Australia's policies of offshore detention and third-party settlement have become problematic thorns in its regional relationships. It is therefore important to understand why Australia has proceeded with policies

⁷Betts.30, 46.

⁸Author not specified, "Who is Antonio Guterres? Meet the UN's Next Secretary-General", *BBC News* (6 October 2016): www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37565570 (accessed 19 October 2016).

⁹An approach most often used with regards to Maritime Confidence Building Measures. See, for example, Sam Bateman 'Maritime Confidence Building Measures - An Overview', in *Maritime Confidence Building Measures in the South China Sea*, ASPI Special Report (September 2013): 7-13.

which cause such unrest with its neighbours, as well as drawing condemnation from the United Nations.¹⁰ This section will explore the driving factors behind Australia's policies toward asylum seekers, beginning with the Howard government.

Asylum seeker policies underwent a significant change during the Howard era as the issue gained prominence in the public eye following the arrival of higher numbers of asylum seekers within the context of the War on Terror. Beginning with this "third wave" of asylum seekers to Australia hailing primarily from the Middle East, there was a clear increase in hostility toward asylum seekers by the media, politicians, and the public.¹¹ Linked with this has been the overwhelming domination of asylum seeker policy by domestic political concerns. The international context following the September 11 terrorist attacks was undeniably a considerable factor in this process, but the key element to these changes has been how this event and the

subsequent war on terror have been absorbed and understood domestically. McKay argues that the September 11 terrorist attacks led to a conflation of people smuggling and terrorism, and the xenophobia this inflamed was then able to be manipulated by the media and by politicians.¹² As argued by Burke, conflating the issues of terrorism and asylum seekers "was central to a domestic politics of identity and intimidation designed to transform Western societies in ways that encourages xenophobia and consent for coercive and extra-legal policy approaches".¹³ In fact, Perera goes so far as to describe this as the space where the "'war on terrorism' meets the 'war at home'".¹⁴ This process by which asylum-seeker policies became so high profile and so intrinsically linked to domestic politics created a situation in which effective deterrence-based asylum-seeker policies became one of the main measures of the competence of the Australian government.¹⁵ As a consequence of this

¹⁰Author not specified, "Who is Antonio Guterres? Meet the UN's Next Secretary-General", *BBC News* (6 October 2016): www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37565570 (accessed 19 October 2016).

¹¹Fiona H. McKay, Samantha L. Thomas, and Warwick Blood, "'Any One of These Boat People Could Be A Terrorist For All We Know!' Media Representations and Public Perceptions of 'Boat People' Arrivals in Australia", *Journalism* 12, no. 5(2011): 609.

¹²See Fiona McKay, 'A Return to the 'Pacific Solution'', *Forced Migration Review* 44 (2013): 24-26.

¹³Anthony Burke, *Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 177.

¹⁴Suvendrini Perera, "What is a Camp?", *Borderlands E-journal* 1, no. 1(2002). http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol1_no1_2002/perera_camp.html (accessed 28/02/2015).

¹⁵Michael Grewcock, "Back to the Future: Australian Border Policing Under Labor,

process by which asylum seeker policies became increasingly embedded in domestic politics, foreign policy interests, and in particular good relations with Indonesia, were often sacrificed for the purpose of domestic political gain.

A number of policy changes took place over the course of the Rudd-Gillard government, in no small part fueled by the domestic response to growing arrival numbers of asylum seekers reaching Australia by boat. While the Rudd government began to dismantle the Pacific Solution following their election in 2007, the rise in asylum seeker arrival numbers following this policy change brought the issue back into the public spotlight.¹⁶ Consequently, by the time Julia Gillard had taken over leadership of the Labour Party in 2010, asylum seekers had become a major electoral issue, in a way that had not been seen since 2001.¹⁷ Despite the initial shift in 2007 which involved the dismantling of the Howard government's Pacific Solution, under Gillard asylum seeker policy became increasingly harsh as

the domestic focus of the issue once again meant that the competence of the government was measured by their ability to control irregular maritime arrivals. This meant that by the time the 2013 election took place, Woolner argues that the Liberal policy to turn boats back to Indonesia was the only significant policy difference between the two major parties.¹⁸ Although under Gillard there was an attempt to shift the discourse on asylum seekers from demonising asylum seekers to demonising people smugglers, Pickering and Weber argue that many politicians continued to focus on asylum seekers as a source of threat to Australian national identity.¹⁹ Once again as during the Howard era, and as continues today, "the Australian identity . . . constructed as dominant and 'good', contrasted against the foreign and 'bad other', the asylum seeker arriving by boat".²⁰ Due to the strong domestic demands for action on this issue Gillard needed to simultaneously meet these expectations and justify the

2007-2013", *State Crime Journal* 3, no. 1(2014): 103.

¹⁶With numbers jumping from 161 in 2008, to 2849 in 2009 and 6879 in 2010. See Janet Phillips and Harriet Spinks, "Boat Arrivals in Australia Since 1976", *Australian Parliamentary Library* (2013): 18.

¹⁷ Matt McDonald, "Deliberation and Resecuritization: Australia, Asylum-Seekers and the Normative Limits of the Copenhagen School", *Australian Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 2(2011): 281.

¹⁸Derek Woolner, "When No Means No: Indonesia and Tony Abbott's Asylum Boat Policy", *Dissent* (Spring 2013): 28.

¹⁹ Sharon Pickering, and Leanne Weber, "New Deterrence Scripts in Australia's Rejuvenated Offshore Detention regime for Asylum Seekers", *Law & Social Inquiry* 39, no. 4(2014): 1009.

²⁰Elizabeth Rowe and Erin O'Brien, "'Genuine' Refugees or Illegitimate 'Boat People': Political Constructions of Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the Malaysia Deal Debate", *Australian Journal of Social Science* 49, no. 2(2014): 176.

need for having such expectations. This process, fueled by portrayals of asylum seekers both by the media and politicians, meant that the way in which the asylum seeker issue was framed resulted in a legitimisation of public fears that asylum seekers posed a genuine threat to Australian national identity and security.²¹ This is seen, for example, in her statement that “expressing a desire for a clear and firm policy to deal with a very difficult problem does not make you a racist”.²² Justifying the need for asylum seekers to be discussed in terms of national security contributes to the nature of nationalistic concerns regarding asylum seekers, heightening the importance of the issue and resulting in a prioritisation of populist domestic policies over foreign policy considerations.

The Abbott period saw an intensification of the harshness of asylum seeker policy take place, as the conflation of asylum seekers and terrorism continued and fear and xenophobia were exacerbated. The election of the Abbott government in 2013 was in no small part due to Abbott’s

platform and rhetoric on asylum seekers,²³ most notably his ‘turn back the boats’ policy.²⁴ As the September 11 terrorist attacks and the U.S. led War on Terror played a significant role in the discourse on asylum seekers during the Howard period, so too did the growth of ISIS play a significant role during the Abbott government. Subsequently, during the Abbott government period asylum seekers were at various times explicitly linked to potential threats of terrorism, and as had been seen throughout previous governments the willingness of asylum seekers to effectively integrate in Australia and uphold Australian values was questioned.²⁵ These portrayals and understandings of asylum seekers are hardly new. Although the particulars have changed with the times, Burke argues that the securitization of asylum seekers under the Abbott government was merely “the latest reiteration of overarching security discourses that have long defined modern Australia”.²⁶ Understanding the deeper historical context of Australian asylum seeker policies is important, as it allows us

²¹McDonald, 290.

²² Author not specified, “Julia Gillard's Speech to the Lowy Institute on Labor's New Asylum-Seeker Policy for Australia”, *The Australian* (July 72010) :<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/archive/politics/julia-gillards-speech-to-the-lowy-institute-on-labors-new-asylum-seeker-policy-for-australia/story-e6frgczf-1225888445622>(accessed 28/02/2015).

²³Christopher C. White, “Australia's Boatpeople Policy: Regional Cooperation or Passing the Buck?”, *Cultural Encounters, Conflicts, and Resolutions* 1, no. 1(2014): 14.

²⁴ Jim Della-Giacoma, “Different Pond, Different Fish: Crossed Wires in Australian-Indonesian Relations”, *Kill Your Darlings* 17 (2014): 9.

²⁵McDonald, 288.

²⁶Burke, quoted in McDonald, 284.

to take into account long-standing understandings and experiences of Australian sovereignty and national identity and how they play out in the current context. This again highlights the extent to which government policies toward asylum seekers have been motivated by their domestic audience, and explains why policies have been enacted which are problematic for foreign policy concerns, and in particular regional bilateral relationships.

The Australia-Indonesia Relationship in the Context of Asylum Seekers

The issue of asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat has, at various times, become a significant issue for the Australia-Indonesia relationship, given that such boat arrivals often use Indonesia as a transit country. For the Australia-Indonesia relationship, the issue of asylum seekers highlights a number of factors which often impede good relations between the two states, including state identity, sovereignty, and domestic politics. This section will discuss how these factors affect the bilateral relationship by examining key incidents of cooperation and key incidents of tension.

Responses to asylum seekers during the Howard era began a trend of pushing responsibility for asylum seekers onto Indonesia, a trend which has

continued through to the present day and on a number of occasions has extended to a blatant disregard for Indonesian sovereignty. Under the Howard government, the most notable incident to take place in the context of Australia-Indonesia relations was the *Tampa* affair. This incident involved the arrival of a Norwegian freighter, the *MV Tampa*, in August 2001, following its rescue of 438 asylum seekers from a sinking ship seeking to land at Christmas Island.²⁷ The government, backed by the Labour opposition, refused Captain Rinnan and the *Tampa* entry.²⁸ As the sinking ship had embarked from Indonesia, the government viewed its passengers as Indonesia's responsibility, as illustrated by John Howard's failed attempt to contact Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri regarding the incident.²⁹ Woolner argues that it has been apparent since this incident that Australian politicians generally do not show sensitivity toward Indonesian views, and that this lack of sensitivity has negative consequences for Australia's capability to

²⁷McKay, Thomas, and Blood, 609.

²⁸Katharine Betts, "Boatpeople and Public Opinion in Australia", *People and Place* 9, no. 4(2001): 39.

²⁹Susan Kneebone, and Sharon Pickering, "Australia, Indonesia and the Pacific Plan", in *New Regionalism and Asylum Seekers: Challenges Ahead*, ed. Susan Kneebone and Felicity Rawlings-Sanei(Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 173-4.

foster regional cooperation on asylum seeker policies.³⁰ Despite the unease this lack of sensitivity has caused on various occasions, Indonesia is aware of the high priority the Australian government places on asylum seeker policies, and has been willing to cooperate on the issue in the past in order to maintain a good bilateral relationship.³¹ What was required for such cooperation to take place was the provision of capacity building assistance to Indonesia, and Australian respect for Indonesian sovereignty.³² This is seen, for example, in the two bilateral agreements made between Indonesia in 2000 and 2007, the Regional Cooperation Arrangement, and the Management and Care of Irregular Immigrants Project.³³ The first was an arrangement under which Indonesia would intercept asylum seekers and refer them to the IOM, while the second included measures such as the renovation of Immigration Detention Houses in Indonesia.³⁴ These agreements provide a perfect example of building-blocks which had the potential to lead to further cooperation, had such cooperation been prioritised. Significant cooperation

also took place regarding combating people smuggling syndicates, and it was cooperation on this issue which led to the establishment of the Bali Process on Asia-Pacific Coordination Against People Smuggling and Trafficking in 2002 (the Bali Process).³⁵ The Bali Process now forms the most useful multilateral forum for promoting cooperation on asylum seekers, argues Taylor,³⁶ although according to Woolner the Bali Process has received only intermittent attention from Australia.³⁷ While cooperation between Australia and Indonesia took place during this period, the tendency to prioritise domestic politics over the bilateral relationship and avoid responsibility for asylum seekers traveling to Australia by boat is certainly apparent.

Under the Rudd government a strong effort to cooperate with Indonesia on the issue of asylum seekers was undertaken, however (,) a continuation of the previous trends of disregarding Indonesian sensitivities and avoiding responsibility for asylum seekers made this difficult. Rudd's approach to asylum

³⁰Woolner, 29.

³¹ Amy Nethery, Brynna Rafferty-Brown, and Savitri Taylor, "Exporting Detention: Australia-Funded Immigration Detention in Indonesia", *Journal of Refugee Studies* 26, no. 1 (2012): 94.

³² Ibid.

³³Nethery, Rafferty-Brown, and Taylor, 95.

³⁴Nethery, Rafferty-Brown, and Taylor, 95-6.

³⁵Woolner, 30.

³⁶ Savitri Taylor, "Sharing Responsibility for Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the Asia Pacific Region" in *Migration: The Ashgate Research Companion to Migration Law, Theory and Policy*, ed. Satvinder S. Juss (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013): 252.

³⁷Woolner, 30.

seekers was so heavily focused on Indonesia it led Woolner to argue that “the Rudd government sought to restrict to Indonesian territory so much of the problem that his approach was labelled ‘Rudd’s Indonesian solution’”.³⁸ However, all hopes for any kind of “Indonesian solution” were dashed following the *Oceanic Viking* incident.³⁹ This incident involved the rescue of asylum seekers from the *Oceanic Viking* from international waters within Indonesia’s search and rescue area.⁴⁰ Australia wished to return the asylum seekers to Indonesia, something which Taylor and Rafferty-Brown argue highlighted the extent to which the benefits of border control cooperation were asymmetrically tilted in Australia’s favour.⁴¹ Although this incident was tentatively resolved with the creation of a framework⁴² highlighting how to manage such situations,⁴³ the trend of Australia deflecting responsibility for asylum seekers through the use of methods which, at best, upset Indonesian sensibilities, and at worst actively violated

Indonesian sovereignty, continued. To begin with, the shift of the Rudd-Gillard government toward focusing primarily on people smugglers led to the detention of Indonesian boat crews.⁴⁴ Concerns were raised by an Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman with regards to the delays in the trials of these individuals, and whether or not Australia was capable of differentiating between “the mostly impoverished fisherman who crewed the boats and the organisers of the people smuggling rings”.⁴⁵ Following this, further concerns were raised regarding Australia’s respect for Indonesian sovereignty when Gillard proposed the creation of a regional processing centre in East Timor without consulting Indonesia on the matter prior to the announcement.⁴⁶ This was particularly provocative given Australia’s involvement in the independence of East Timor. Grewcock argues that such attempts as the East Timor regional processing centre, as well as the successful creation of agreements with Papua New Guinea and Nauru, can be seen as a form of neo-colonialism.⁴⁷ This is particularly true with regards to Papua New Guinea and Nauru given Australia’s historical control or influence over the two states, and their

³⁸Woolner, 29.

³⁹Woolner, 29.

⁴⁰ Savitri Taylor and Brynna Rafferty-Brown, “Waiting for Life to Begin: the Plight of Asylum Seekers Caught by Australia’s Indonesian Solution”, *International Journal of Refugee Law* 22, no. 4(2010): 560.

⁴¹Taylor and Rafferty-Brown, 560-1.

⁴² The Implementation Framework on People Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons, signed 9 March 2010.

⁴³Taylor and Rafferty-Brown, 590.

⁴⁴Woolner, 30.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷Michael Grewcock, “Australian Border Policing: Regional ‘Solutions’ and Neocolonialism”, *Race and Class* 55, no. 3(2014): 75.

dependence on Australian development aid.⁴⁸ It is apparent that perceptions of Australia as an entitled developed country enacting policies which could easily be described as neo-colonial have greatly harmed Australia's reputation in the region, particularly with the nearby neighbours who would need to be key participants in any form of regional cooperation on asylum seekers and refugees.

The situation worsened under the leadership of the Abbott government, as the prioritisation of domestic politics and disregard for Indonesian sovereignty intensified. Perhaps more than those preceding him, Abbott's leadership was heavily reliant on his ability to prevent the arrival of asylum seekers by boat, given the extent to which his election campaign focused on the issue. The relationship with Indonesia was already tense during this period, following revelations that Australia had been spying on Indonesia,⁴⁹ and Abbott's refusal to apologise.⁵⁰ The policy

to turn back boats to Indonesia once again placed responsibility on Indonesia for the issue, however the willingness to violate Indonesian sovereignty to achieve this and the ironic naming of the policy Operation Sovereign Borders served only to exacerbate bilateral tensions.⁵¹ Indonesian sovereignty was violated not only in the turning back of asylum seeker boats, but also through the addition of three passengers on one of the boats,⁵² and a number of accidental incursions of Indonesian territorial waters by Australian naval and customs vessels.⁵³ Kevin argues that Australia pushed Indonesia to such a point where they felt it was necessary to state "we will not tolerate this any longer",⁵⁴ following a diplomatic standoff over 56 asylum seekers in November 2013

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Michael Bachelard, and David Wroe, "Indonesia Recalls Ambassador to Australia Over Spying Claim", *The Age* (November 18 2013): <http://www.theage.com.au/world/indonesia-recalls-ambassador-to-australia-over-spying-claim-20131118-2xrem.html> (accessed 28/02/2015).

⁵⁰ Author not provided, "Abbott belittles Spying Row: SBY", *The Jakarta Post* (November 19 2013): <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/1>

1/19/abbott-belittles-spying-row-sby.html (accessed 28/02/2015).

⁵¹ Della-Giacoma, 10-12.

⁵² Emma Griffiths, "Indonesia Says Australia Allegedly Adding Passenger to Asylum Seeker Boat a 'Serious Development'", *ABC News* (May 7 2014): <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-05-06/marty-natalegawa-on-boat-extra-passengers-serious-development/5434540> (accessed 28/02/2015).

⁵³ Latika Bourke, "Navy Breached Indonesian waters Six Times Under Operation Sovereign Borders, Review Finds", *ABC News* (20 February 2014): <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-02-19/navy-breached-indonesian-waters-six-times-review-finds/5270478> (accessed 28/02/2015).

⁵⁴ Tony Kevin, "Mishandling Indonesia", *Eureka Street* 23, no. 22 (2013): 16.

during which Agus Barnas⁵⁵ stated that Indonesia should not be a ‘dumping ground’ for asylum seekers.⁵⁶ Despite Abbott’s stated desire that he wanted his foreign policy to be ‘more Jakarta and less Geneva’,⁵⁷ the nature of his domestic political campaign and the response this generated among voters meant that an increasingly stringent policy toward asylum seekers attempting to reach Australia by boat was the only viable domestic political policy position he could take, regardless of the consequences for Australia-Indonesia relations. As ASEAN Chief Surin Pitsuwan stated, it was clear that many of Abbott’s comments on the issue could only be seen as “internal rhetoric for internal consumption”.⁵⁸ Pitsuwan also warned that Abbott’s ‘turn back the boats’ policy was “counterproductive”, and that pushing the responsibility for such issues onto Southeast Asian states was unwise, as such inherently transnational issues cannot be solved unilaterally.⁵⁹ A vital step in

seeking a regional multilateral approach to asylum seeker and refugee issues will be ensuring a strong bilateral relationship between Australia and Indonesia.

The Case of the Rohingya: A Building Block for Further Regional Cooperation?

Establishing cooperation on asylum seekers broadly is likely too ambitious a starting point without some significant change in circumstances. A better approach would be a limited form of cooperation, one that can serve as a functional building block for promoting trust in effective and reciprocal burden-sharing between the participating states, thus creating a stronger basis for further cooperation in the future. Although it does not present an easy case for cooperation, the Rohingya crisis does present the best opportunity for cooperation, particularly given its protracted nature:

One mechanism of regional cooperation might usefully focus on the plight of the long-term displaced. Its aim would be to resettle those who have been displaced for at least two years and who have no hope of escaping persecution and returning to their country safely. This mechanism could be piloted as part of existing resettlement programs in Australia, New Zealand and Japan, as a way of

⁵⁵Spokesman for Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Legal, Political and Security Affairs, Djoko Suyanto.

⁵⁶Kevin, 16.

⁵⁷Della-Giacoma, 9.

⁵⁸ Daniel Flitton, “Diplomat Rejects Abbott's Tow-Back Plan”, *The Sydney Morning Herald* (October 24 2012): <http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/diplomat-rejects-abbotts-towback-plan-20121023-283hp.html#ixzz2ADhYwtq7> (accessed 28/02/2015).

⁵⁹ Ibid.

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implementing the *Bangkok Principles* on burden-sharing.⁶⁰

Not for the first time, a refugee crisis involving Rohingya asylum seekers from Myanmar took place in early 2015, in which roughly 25, 000 Rohingya and Bangladeshi's attempted to seek refuge in Thailand.⁶¹ When Thailand began to push the refugees back to sea, they attempted to reach Malaysia and Indonesia instead, with many left stranded on boats.⁶² The reactions to these refugees provoked international outrage, including calls for ASEAN states to seek a cooperative solution to the crisis,⁶³ and calls for Australia to step up and play a role in the crisis.⁶⁴ It took some time for any form of cooperation to take place, with an initial meeting between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand inducing the agreement of Malaysia and Indonesia to stop turning boats away, and a Special Meeting on Irregular Migration in the Indian Ocean being held with the attendance of twenty governments and international agencies. This resulted in agreement on a number of

measures, although these were not comprehensive and certainly did not address the root causes of the refugee crisis, being "their stateless status and persecution within Myanmar".⁶⁵ It is therefore likely that such a crisis will happen again, and having the potential for more comprehensive and responsive regional cooperation on the issue would be highly valuable. Ideally, cooperation would go one step further and work on processing Rohingya refugees already outside Myanmar, for example those in Thai-Burmese border camps or Thai immigration detention centres.⁶⁶ As Slezak, Singer, and Ramadurai argue, "the international community must take concrete steps to share the responsibility of protecting the Rohingya".⁶⁷ Thailand would need to be involved in a regional cooperative effort, as it is most commonly the country of first asylum.⁶⁸ Indonesia and Malaysia, as the destination countries,⁶⁹ would also need to be involved. Australia and New Zealand, as the two developed states in the region with a refugee resettlement programme, are

⁶⁰Joyce Chia, and Justice Susan Kenny, "The Children of Mae La: Reflections on Regional Refugee Cooperation", *Melbourne Journal of International Law* 13, no. 2(2012): 858.

⁶¹Carlyle A. Thayer, "Southeast Asia's Regional Autonomy Under Stress", *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2016).

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴Kneebone, 166.

⁶⁵ Thayer, "Southeast Asia's Regional Autonomy Under Stress".

⁶⁶Amanda Crews Slezak, Thalia Roussos Singer, and Rupa Ramadurai, "Stateless and Fleeing Persecution: the Situation of the Rohingya in Thailand", *Children's Legal Rights Journal* 35, no. 1(2015): 46.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸Slezak 48.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

uniquely positioned to be leading forces in a regional effort to manage the current population of Rohingya in camps and detention centres outside Myanmar, and any future mass exoduses of Rohingya from Myanmar. As New Zealand has already indicated willingness to help Australia settle asylum seekers from its offshore detention policy,⁷⁰ it is likely they would be willing to partake in a regional cooperative arrangement to resettle Rohingya refugees. There is undeniably a need for regional cooperation on the Rohingya refugee issue, and Australia is well placed to be able to take a leadership role in conjunction with ASEAN. This would not only help in the management of a humanitarian crisis but also serve to build a foundation of trust which would promote further cooperation in the future and subsequently open up alternative policy options on asylum seeker issues for the Australian government.

Conclusions: Prospects for Australian-Led Regional Cooperation?

As discussed at the beginning of the paper, Australia must play a leadership role on this issue for there to be any kind of comprehensive, multilateral regional

cooperation on the issue of asylum seekers and refugees. Betts' three key points for promoting cooperation are all in play with Australia's interests extending beyond pure humanitarian concerns, a key individual in the form of upcoming Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, and there is potential to build trust in effective and reciprocal burden-sharing. Although it is apparent that the political will required to forge an alternative policy path on asylum seekers within the domestic political context will be difficult to find and even more difficult to follow through on, there is currently more promise and opportunity for such a change to take place than there has been since the issue once more began to dominate political debate. There are a number of different reasons for this. Firstly, both international and domestic critiques of the nature of human rights abuses involved in Australia's offshore detention programme have intensified. Although such critiques have been ongoing for some time now, it appears that they are having some degree of impact given Turnbull's decision to change the legislation regarding doctors and nurses speaking about the detention centres.⁷¹ Health professionals are now

⁷⁰Helen Davidson, "Turnbull Rejects New Zealand Offer to Take 150 Refugees From Detention", (29 April 2016):<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/apr/29/turnbull-rejects-new-zealand-offer-to-take-150-refugees-from-detention> (accessed 21 October 2016).

⁷¹Bianca Hall, "'A Huge Win for Doctors': Turnbull Government Backs Down on Gag Laws for Doctors on Nauru and Manus", *The Sydney Morning Herald* (October 20

exempt from ‘the definition of “immigration and border protection workers”’, which removes them from the provisions regarding secrecy in the Border Force Act and means they no longer face two years jail time for discussing any abuses or negligence taking place in offshore detention centres.⁷² Bianca Hall argues that this change is likely prompted by the fact that the government was due to submit its defence against the case presented by the Fitzroy Legal Centre and Doctors for Refugees regarding the secrecy provisions.⁷³ A negative finding from the High Court at this time would follow on from the highly publicised ABC Four Corners report on the issue, as well as the release of a major report on the treatment of detainees on Nauru by Amnesty International and the 2000 incident reports which were leaked in August.⁷⁴ Clearly, humanitarian critiques of the offshore detention policy are beginning to take their toll. Secondly, the future of using Manus Island for offshore detention is in doubt following a determination by the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea

in April that the Regional Processing Centre on Manus Island was unconstitutional and had to be closed down.⁷⁵ Although it was recently announced by Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister Rimbink Pato that only one of the two facilities on Manus Island is covered under the Supreme Court ruling, at the very least one facility is being closed down and the other one remains under fire from the Papua New Guinea Opposition.⁷⁶ These two changes taken together indicate that the policy of offshore detention in its current form is weakening, although the domestic political demand for deterrence-based policies remains strong. This means that if the situation regarding claims of human rights abuses and the feasibility of continuing use of Manus Island as an offshore detention location continue to deteriorate, the government will be keen to seek a change in policy which can still be marketed as being tough on borders. The only way to achieve such a policy would be through regional cooperation.

What, then, are the prospects for regional cooperation? As argued above, a

2016):<http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/a-huge-win-for-doctors-turnbull-government-backs-down-on-gag-laws-for-doctors-on-nauru-and-manus-20161019-gs6ecs.html>(accessed October 20 2016).

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Author not specified, “Manus Island: PNG Government Under Fire from Opposition, Greens, After Keeping Asylum Facility Open”, *ABC News*(5 October 2016):<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-10-05/png-manus-detention-opposition-legal-decision/7906036>(accessed 20 October 2016).

⁷⁶ Ibid.

strong relationship with Indonesia is vital for regional cooperation to take place on asylum seeker and refugee issues. Many of the methods through which a bilateral relationship can be improved include more long-term approaches. In the case of Australia and Indonesia, one of the key methods would be increased education on each other, particularly on the Australian side both with regards to Indonesia as a country and society, as well as Indonesian language learning. This would come under the category of people-to-people relations, which are slowly being improved through increasing cultural and study exchange, such as that facilitated by the reverse Colombo Plan. However, there are also short-term improvements that can be made. One of these involves leader-to-leader and government-to-government relations. Given the leadership change in Australia from the often contentious Tony Abbott to Malcolm Turnbull, there is certainly potential for improvement in this area. The contentiousness of Tony Abbott was not helped by the change in leadership in Indonesia in 2014 from the overtly internationalist Yudhoyono to the domestically-focused Joko Widodo. However, the recent announcement of President Widodo's planning to visit Australia in November following the positive start to their relationship during Turnbull's visit to Jakarta last year,

certainly indicates that there is considerable potential for the relationship between the two leaders to develop.⁷⁷ Jewel Topsfield argues that the announcement shows "a powerful indication of the warmth between the leaders of the two countries".⁷⁸ While Topsfield argues that last year's visit was seen as a turning point in the relationship,⁷⁹ Tim Lindsey goes on to claim that this year's visit will mark "a reset in the wake of Tony Abbott's departure from the prime ministership".⁸⁰ Any influence Antonio Guterres could exude from his international platform would be much more effective if it were able to build on a strong relationship between Turnbull and Widodo. The influence of Antonio Guterres, improved relations between Turnbull and Widodo, and the ongoing disintegration of Australia's offshore detention policy,

⁷⁷Jewel Topsfield, 'Indonesian President Joko Widodo to Visit Australia in November 2016', *The Sydney Morning Herald*(September 8 2016):<http://www.smh.com.au/world/indonesian-president-joko-widodo-to-visit-australia-in-november-2016-20160908-grc3po.html>(accessed 11 October 2016).

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰Tim Lindsey, quoted in Naomi Woodley, 'Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull's Visit Could 'Reset' Australia's Relationship with Indonesia', *ABC News* (3 November 2015):www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-03/turnbull-could-reset-australia-indonesia-relations-experts-say/6906922(accessed 20 October 2016).

provide the best opportunity for cooperation on asylum seekers that has been seen in recent years. If this could be channelled into cooperation on the resettlement of Rohingya asylum seekers, an issue which has every chance of escalating once more, then a building block for further cooperation could be established, paving the way to deeper, broader, and more sustained regional cooperation on asylum seeker and refugee issues.

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Sofia Trisni, Apriwan & Poppy Irawan | Strategi Indonesia dalam Merespon
Kebangkitan Tiongkok pada Masa Kepemimpinan Presiden SBY (Studi Kasus: Laut
Tiongkok Selatan)

**Strategi Indonesia dalam Merespon Kebangkitan Tiongkok pada Masa
Kepemimpinan Presiden SBY (Studi Kasus: Konflik Laut Tiongkok
Selatan)**

Apriwan * Poppy Irawan ** & Sofia Trisni ***
sofi_hi01@yahoo.com

Abstract

Dunia Internasional pada abad 21 ditandai dengan fenomena kebangkitan Tiongkok. Kebangkitan Tiongkok ini direspon secara beragam oleh negara-negara yang ada dunia. Tulisan ini mencoba untuk menjelaskan strategi yang digunakan oleh Indonesia dalam merespon kebangkitan Tiongkok pada era presiden SBY dengan menggunakan setting Konflik Laut Tiongkok Selatan sebagai arena yang mempertemukan Indonesia dengan Tiongkok dan negara-negara ASEAN lainnya. Tulisan ini menemukan bahwa strategi yang digunakan oleh Indonesia dalam merespon kebangkitan Tiongkok adalah strategi engagement melalui ASEAN dan hedging dengan memperbanyak opsi yang dimiliki oleh Indonesia.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, Engagement, Hedging, ASEAN

Pendahuluan

Kebangkitan Tiongkok telah menarik perhatian dunia internasional, beragam pandangan terhadap fenomena ini pun bermunculan; ada yang memandangnya sebagai sebuah kesempatan baik dan ada pula yang menganggapnya sebagai sebuah ancaman. Kesempatan baik berkaitan dengan keuntungan untuk ikut maju bersama perekonomian Tiongkok yang terus menanjak, sedangkan ancaman berkaitan dengan kekhawatiran akan bagaimana Tiongkok menggunakan kekuatannya. Kaum realis memandang kebangkitan Tiongkok sebagai sebuah ancaman terhadap supremasi Amerika.¹ John Mearsheimer, seorang *offensive realist* berpendapat bahwa Tiongkok akan mencoba untuk mendominasi dunia dan akan memastikan bahwa tidak ada satu negara pun yang bisa menyainginya.² Bukan hanya itu, skenario terburuk yaitu Tiongkok akan menguasai dunia dan memindahkan fokus kekuatan hegemoni dari Barat ke Timur, seperti yang diungkapkan oleh Martin Jacques:

Shanghai will replace New York and London as the world's centre of

¹D. Dou, "The Rise of China : Conflict or Harmony in East Asia?" in Er, Lam Peng (ed), *The rise of China and India : A new Asian Drama*, World Scientific Publishing Company, 2009, p.12

²J.J Mearsheimer, "China's unpeaceful Rise", *Current History* 105:690, 2006, p.1

financial power. Mandarin will replace English as the global language. People will celebrate the great discoverer He Zheng rather than Christopher Columbus...etc.³

Sedikitnya, pertumbuhan ekonomi Tiongkok yang sangat luar biasa pada tiga dekade terakhir semenjak tahun 1980 telah merubah arti pentingnya Tiongkok bagi negara lain, terutama di Asia. Bersama Jepang dan Korea Selatan, Tiongkok merupakan negara eksportir yang paling besar di Asia Timur, partner dagang terbesar ASEAN, negara importir terbesar ketiga bagi Indonesia.⁴Khusus bagi Indonesia, signifikansi hubungan dagang kedua negara terlihat dari meningkatnya angka perdagangan bilateral. Antara 2005-2007, angka perdagangan antara Indonesia dan Tiongkok meningkat sebanyak US\$5 triliun dari US\$ 12.5 triliun menjadi US\$18.2 triliun yang menempatkan Tiongkok sebagai patner perdagangan terbesar ketiga pada tahun 2006.⁵

Dengan meningkatnya arti penting Tiongkok dan seiring dengan

³P. J. Katzenstein, "China's rise : rupture, return, or recombination?" in P.J Katzenstein (ed), *Sinization and the Rise of China: Civilizational processes beyond East and West*, Routledge, 2012

⁴T. Shiraishi, "The rise of China and its implications for East Asia", in P.J Katzenstein (ed), *Sinization and the Rise of China: Civilizational processes beyond East and West*, Routledge, 2012

⁵I. Storey, *Southeast Asia and the Rise of China : the search for security*, Rourledge, 2011, p.205

berlangsungnya "power shift" di Asia⁶, sangat penting bagi Indonesia untuk tetap menjaga hubungan diplomatik yang baik dengan Tiongkok. Akan tetapi, peningkatan kapabilitas militer Tiongkok yang cepat dan kurangnya transparansi negara ini telah memicu kecemasan di Asia Timur, termasuk di Indonesia. Storey mencatat bahwa:

*In Asia, China's rising power and arms build-ups has stirred anxiety... It is important to bring into the open this underlying sense of discomfort, even insecurity, about the political and military ambitions of China.*⁷

Karena itulah, Indonesia harus dapat memilih strategi yang tepat untuk dapat menjaga hubungan baik dengan Tiongkok, mengingat hal ini tidak mudah untuk dilakukan. Sebagaimana yang diungkapkan oleh Ahli Kebijakan Luar Negeri Indonesia, Rizal Sukma, bahwa negara-negara di kawasan Asia Timur sedang dihadapkan dengan permasalahan yang rumit yang berkaitan dengan bagaimana cara merespon kebangkitan Tiongkok dengan baik.⁸ Sayangnya jika

kita menilik ke strategi yang digunakan oleh Indonesia, ketidakjelasan terlihat disini, sehingga menimbulkan perdebatan mengenai strategi yang paling tepat dalam merespon kebangkitan Tiongkok ini.

Perdebatan tersebut terlihat dari perbedaan pendapat yang dikemukakan oleh para ahli Hubungan Internasional, seperti Evan Laksmana yang berpendapat bahwa strategi Indonesia terhadap Tiongkok sangatlah ambivalen⁹, sementara kebanyakan ahli lain beranggapan bahwa Indonesia menggunakan strategi *hedging*. Syamsul Hadi, Akademisi dari Universitas Indonesia, berargumen bahwa Indonesiamengadopsi strategi *constructive engagement*.¹⁰ Argumen Rizal Sukma sedikit berbeda dalam hal ini. Sukma berargumen bahwa selain menerapkan strategi *hedging*, Indonesia juga menggunakan strategi *engagement* dengan menggunakan ASEAN.¹¹ Argumen Sukma ini menjadi menarik karena pada kenyataannya, Indonesia tidak dapat dilepaskan dari ASEAN, sehingga penulis tertarik untuk meneliti respon Indonesia

⁶Lihat misalnya Hugh White, "Power Shift: Rethinking Australia's Place in the Asian History" Australian Journal of International Affairs, 65:1, 81-93, 2011

⁷I. Storey, *Southeast Asia and the Rise of China*, p.44

⁸R. Sukma, "ASEAN and the Major Power in new emerging order" in J. Tsunekawa (ed), *Regional order in East Asia: ASEAN and Japan Perspectives*, NIDS Joint Research Series No.1, National Institute for Defence study, Tokyo 2007, p.84

⁹E.A. Laksmana, "Indonesia's dance with the titans", *Today online*, 27 March 2010, <http://www.toddayonline.com/print/weekendvoices>

¹⁰S. Hadi, *Menyikapi Kebangkitan China*, Kompas, 2 September 2008

¹¹R. Sukma, "Indonesia's response to the rise of China: Growing Comfort amid Uncertainties" in Jun Tsunekawa (eds) *The Rise of China: Responses from Southeast Asia and Japan*, Tokyo

terhadap kebangkitan China dengan melakukan testing terhadap argumen Sukma tersebut. Untuk menguji kedua argumen Sukma tersebut, penulis akan menggunakan studi kasus sengketa wilayah di Laut Tiongkok Selatan, yang merepresentasikan gambaran kompleks dari hubungan antara Indonesia, Tiongkok dan negara ASEAN lainnya. Untuk mencapai tujuan tersebut, tulisan ini akan dibagi menjadi beberapa bagian yaitu pendahuluan, penjelasan mengenai metode yang digunakan dalam meneliti, penjelasan mengenai *engagement* dan *hedging* serta pembahasan.

Metodologi

Tulisan ini menggunakan metode yang unik untuk menjawab pertanyaan penelitian, yaitu dengan cara menguji dua argumen Rizal Sukma mengenai strategi Indonesia dalam menghadapi kebangkitan Tiongkok. Dalam monografinya, Rizal Sukma berargumen bahwa: Reaksi Indonesia terhadap kebangkitan Tiongkok di luar bidang ekonomi dapat digolongkan menjadi dua: yang pertama, Indonesia mencoba meng-*engage* Tiongkok melalui ASEAN dan yang kedua, ketidakpastian akan lamanya atensi Tiongkok terhadap

Indonesia telah mendorong Indonesia untuk melakukan strategi *hedging*.¹²

Penulis menggunakan sengketa di Laut Tiongkok Selatan sebagai kawasan untuk meneliti interaksi antara Indonesia dan Tiongkok. Lebih spesifik, untuk meneliti apakah memang Indonesia mencoba untuk mengikat Tiongkok dengan menggunakan ASEAN, penulis akan meneliti interaksi antara Indonesia dan Tiongkok dalam usaha perumusan *Code of Conduct* di Laut Tiongkok Selatan. Selanjutnya, untuk membuktikan bahwa Indonesia memang menerapkan strategi *hedging*, penulis akan meneliti mengenai meningkatnya keasertifan Tiongkok dan kehadiran Amerika di kawasan. Melalui kedua fenomena tersebut, penulis akan mendapatkan jawaban apakah benar respon strategis Indonesia dalam menanggapi kebangkitan Tiongkok adalah memang dengan menggunakan strategi *engagement* dan *hedging*.

Tulisan ini akan menggunakan metode kualitatif yang akan berfokus pada riset pustaka. Riset ini akan meneliti jurnal-jurnal internasional yang terkait dengan konflik LTS, termasuk kejadian-kejadian aktual yang dimuat oleh harian

¹²R. Sukma, "Indonesia's response to the rise of China...."

berita terpercaya seperti CNN, BBC, New York Times dan Aljazeera untuk kemudian digunakan sebagai data yang dianalisis.

Selanjutnya, tulisan ini menggunakan 2 strategi dalam merespon kekuatan baru menurut ilmu hubungan internasional, yaitu strategi *engagement* dan *hedging*.

Strategi pertama yang digunakan dalam tulisan ini adalah strategi *engagement*. Strategi ini menurut Schweller, merupakan salah satu strategi yang digunakan dalam merespon kebangkitan sebuah kekuatan baru. Schweller mendefinisikan strategi ini sebagai :

Engagement refers to the use of non-coercive means to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising major power's behaviour. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order. The most common form of engagement is the policy of appeasement, which attempts to settle international quarrels "by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody and possible very dangerous".¹³

Dari pengertian di atas, dapat disimpulkan bahwa strategi *engagement* ini mengutamakan penyelesaian

permasalahan dengan jalan damai, yang dapat dilakukan melalui negoisasi ataupun kompromis. Tujuan utama strategi ini adalah untuk menghindarkan negara untuk menggunakan kekerasan dalam menyelesaikan masalah, seperti penggunaan senjata yang dapat menimbulkan kerugian, baik secara fisik ataupun mental. Jadi, negara dapat dikatakan menggunakan strategi ini, jika terlihat aksi-aksi untuk mengajak negara terlibat konflik untuk menyelesaikan konflik dengan cara damai. Cara damai ini bisa jadi melalui negoisasi dan kompromis yang keduanya dapat dilaksanakan melalui institusi internasional.

Strategi kedua yang akan digunakan dalam tulisan ini adalah strategi *hedging*. Goh, dalam *Policies Studies no 16* mendefinisikan *hedging* sebagai "as a set of strategies aimed at avoiding (or planning for contingencies in) a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality".¹⁴ Sementara Sukma mengartikan *hedging* sebagai "a strategy to prevent the worst (saiaku) while trying

¹³R.L. Schweller, "Managing the rise of great powers : history an theory" in A.I. Johnston an R.S. Ross (eds), *Engaging China*, Routledge, 1999, p.14,

¹⁴E. Goh, *Meeting the China Challenge : The US in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies*, East-West Centre, Washington ,2005, p.viii

to construct the best".¹⁵ Selain itu, Roy, seorang ahli Hubungan Internasional berargumen bahwa "*hedging implies a present condition of strategic uncertainty*".¹⁶ Dalam situasi yang penuh ketidakpastian, Ciorciari menambahkan bahwa negara-negara berkembang memilih untuk memiliki pilihan strategis yang terbuka (banyak pilihan).¹⁷ Lebih lanjut, Sukma menambahkan bahwa negara memutuskan untuk tidak menerapkan satu strategi saja di kawasan dimana terdapat kekuatan utama didalamnya.¹⁸ Sejalan dengan itu, Goh menyatakan bahwa negara-negara berkembang ini akan memilih untuk berada di posisi tengah, sehingga tidak harus mengambil resiko dalam berhadapan dengan kekuatan lainnya.¹⁹

Dari pengertian-pengertian diatas dapat disimpulkan bahwa *hedging* merupakan sebuah strategi yang diterapkan ketika negara belum berani untuk memilih strategi yang *straight forward* karena takut akan resiko yang akan didapatkan jika negara memilih untuk berpihak kepada salah satu pihak.

Pada akhirnya negara memilih untuk berada ditengah-tengah, sehingga tidak satu negarapun merasa terganggu dengan negara tersebut.

Pembahasan

Pada bagian ini, penulis akan mencoba untuk menganalisis respon strategis Indonesia terhadap kebangkitan Tiongkok. Bagian ini terdiri atas empat sub bagian yang diawali dengan penjelasan singkat mengenai hubungan antara Indonesia dan Tiongkok yang sedikit banyaknya mempengaruhi hubungan kedua negara. Selanjutnya penulis akan memaparkan penjelasan mengenai konflik di Laut Tiongkok Selatan sebagai kawasan di mana kepentingan Indonesia, Tiongkok dan ASEAN bertemu. Pada sub bagian ketiga, penulis akan meneliti proses pembuatan Code of Conduct (CoC) di Laut Tiongkok Selatan untuk mengetahui apakah benar Indonesia melakukan strategi *engagement* dengan menggunakan ASEAN, sedangkan pada sub bab keempat penulis akan melihat meningkatnya sifat asertif Tiongkok di LTS yang kemudian memancing kehadiran Amerika Serikat untuk mengetahui apakah Indonesia benar menerapkan strategi *hedging*.

¹⁵R.Sukma, "ASEAN and the Major Power in new emerging order", p.86

¹⁶Roy, p.306

¹⁷J. D.Ciorciari,, *The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers since1975*, Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C., 2010.p.135

¹⁸R.Sukma, "ASEAN and the Major Power in new emerging order", p.86

¹⁹E. Goh, *Meeting the China Challenge*, p.viii

Gejolak hubungan Indonesia dengan Tiongkok

Seperti yang telah dijelaskan sebelumnya, kebangkitan Tiongkok merupakan kepedulian yang besar bagi Indonesia. Sebagai sebuah negara yang secara geografi berlokasi relatif berdekatan dengan Tiongkok, Indonesia merasakan dampak positif dan juga negatif dari kebangkitan Tiongkok, yang membuat Indonesia harus menggunakan respon strategis secara berhati-hati. Sub bab ini akan menjelaskan secara singkat mengenai turun naiknya hubungan antara Indonesia dan Tiongkok, yang sedikit banyaknya merupakan akar dari respon Indonesia terhadap Tiongkok.

Karakteristik hubungan antara Indonesia dan Tiongkok dapat dikatakan naik turun. Indonesia menjalin hubungan diplomatik dengan Tiongkok untuk pertama kalinya pada tanggal 13 April 1950,²⁰ negara kedua di Asia Tenggara yang membuka hubungan diplomatik dengan Tiongkok setelah Vietnam. Hubungan kedua negara mencapai puncaknya pada tahun 1963—1965 ketika konflik antara Indonesia dan Malaysia

sedang memanas.²¹ Hubungan kedua negara kemudian memburuk pada tahun 1965 ketika pemberontakan PKI terjadi.²² PKI yang beraliran Komunis memiliki hubungan yang dekat dengan Tiongkok, dan disinyalir bahwa Tiongkok ikut terlibat dalam pemberontakan PKI.²³ Dibawah pimpinan Mayor Jenderal Suharto, PKI berhasil diberangus dan kemudian diikuti dengan pengumuman pembekuan hubungan diplomatik kedua negara pada tanggal 23 Oktober 1967 dan diikuti oleh Beijing lima hari kemudian.²⁴ Priode orde baru merupakan periode anti komunis dan penuh kecurigaan kepada Tiongkok.

Normalisasi hubungan dengan Tiongkok dimulai ketika Menteri Luar Negeri Tiongkok Wu Xueqian bertemu dengan Menteri Luar Negeri Indonesia Mochtar Kusumaatmadja dan Presiden Suharto pada Konferensi Asia Afrika di Bandung dan Jakarta pada tanggal 24-25

²⁰Embassy of PRC in Indonesia, "Sekilas Hubungan bilateral" (bilateral relations of China—Indonesia), <http://id.china-embassy.org/indo/zgyyn/sbgxgk/> view online 15 November 2013

²¹A. L. Smith, "From Latent Threat to Possible Partner : Indonesia's China Debate", *Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Study Special Assessment*, 2003, view online 16 April 2013
http://www.apcss.org/Publications/SAS/ChinaDebate/ChinaDebate_SmithIndo.pdf, p.2

²²Embassy of PRC in Indonesia

²³R.Sokolsky, A. Rabasa & C.R Neu, *ASEAN Perceptions of Rising China*, RAND, 2000, p.38

²⁴A. L. Smith, "From Latent Threat to Possible Partner, p.2

April 1985.²⁵ Pada pertemuan tersebut, Wu meyakinkan Indonesia bahwa PRC tidak memiliki hubungan dengan PKI selama 18 tahun belakangan, dan meyakinkan Indonesia bahwa Tiongkok tidak tertarik untuk mencampuri urusan domestik Indonesia.²⁶ Pertemuan tahun 1985 ini dapat dikatakan sebagai awal mula membaiknya hubungan diplomatik kedua negara. Pada tahun 1990, hubungan diplomatik antara kedua negara kembali dibuka.²⁷ Walaupun demikian, kecurigaan ABRI terhadap komunis belum dapat dikikis sepenuhnya.²⁸

Citra positif Tiongkok di mata Indonesia kemudian mulai naik pada saat krisis Asia terjadi pada tahun 1997-1998. Pada saat itu, Beijing menolak untuk men *devalue* mata uangnya dan memberikan asistensi yang cepat melalui IMF untuk membantu negara-negara Asia yang terkena konflik.²⁹ Bantuan ini sedikit banyaknya memperbaiki *image* Tiongkok

di mata Indonesia, bahwa Tiongkok sebagai sesama negara Asia bergerak dengan cepat untuk memastikan negara-negara yang terkena krisis tidak jatuh lebih dalam. Krisis ekonomi tahun 1997-1998 ini membawa kejatuhan bagi Suharto yang telah berkuasa selama 32 tahun. Suharto digantikan oleh B.J Habibie yang merupakan wakil presiden pada masa itu. Tidak banyak perubahan yang terjadi dalam hubungan Indonesia dan Tiongkok selama masa Presiden Habibie³⁰, kemungkinan karena keadaan domestik yang kacau pada saat itu, sehingga fokus Habibie lebih ke dalam negeri.

Hubungan Indonesia dan Tiongkok memasuki fase baru ketika Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid terpilih menjadi Presiden Indonesia pada tahun 1999. Presiden Wahid menjadikan Tiongkok sebagai negara tujuan pertama kunjungannya setelah dilantik pada bulan Oktober 1999.³¹ Presiden Wahid mengumumkan kebijakan “Look towards Asia” yang termasuk di dalamnya keinginan untuk berhubungan baik dengan Tiongkok.³² Rizal Sukma berargumen bahwa setidaknya ada tiga alasan

²⁵J.M van der Kroef, “Normalizing’ Relations with China : Indonesia’s Policies and Perceptions”, *Asian Survey*, Vol.26. No.8 (1986), pp.909-934 : 909

²⁶J.M van der Kroef, p.910

²⁷I.J Storey, “Indonesia’s China Policy in the New Order and Beyond : Problems and Prospect”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 22, No.1 (2000), pp.145-174 :148

²⁸I.J Storey, “Indonesia’s China Policy, p.148

²⁹G. Nabbs-Keller, “Growing Convergence, Greater Consequence : The Strategic Implications of Closer Indonesia-China Relations”, *Security Challenges*, Vol. 7 No.3, 2011, pp.23-41, p.27

³⁰G. Nabbs-Keller, p.27

³¹R. Sukma, “Indonesia-China Relations : the Politics of Re-engagement”, p.596

³²A.L. Smith, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid : Radical of Status Quo State?”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, V.22, No.3, December 2000, 498-525 : 512

pemerintahan Presiden Wahid dalam membangun hubungan yang kuat dengan Tiongkok ; pertama, perasaan kekecewaan terhadap dominasi Barat dalam sistem internasional, termasuk di dalamnya perasaan merasa dikhianati saat lepasnya Timor Timur dari Indonesia. Kedua, Presiden Wahid berharap penguatan hubungan dengan Tiongkok dapat meningkatkan kepercayaan etnis Tionghoa Indonesia kepada negara, sehingga dana besar yang di bawa keluar dari Indonesia pada saat kerusuhan Mei dapat dibawa pulang ke Indonesia kembali, yang akan dapat menstimulasi perekonomian Indonesia. Presiden Wahid berharap untuk mendapatkan dukungan Tiongkok di dunia internasional dalam hal pengelolaan konflik separatisme yang sedang dihadapi Indonesia di Aceh, Papua, Maluku dan daerah-daerah lainnya.³³ Terlihat di sini, bahwa berhubungan baik dengan Tiongkok dapat memberikan keuntungan yang besar kepada Indonesia, sehingga pemerintahan Wahid berusaha sedemikian rupa untuk dapat mendekatkan hubungan kedua negara.

Pemerintahan setelah Presiden Wahid, yaitu pemerintahan Presiden

Megawati dan Presiden SBY tidak jauh berbeda dengan pemerintahan sebelumnya. Kedua presiden, berusaha untuk terus menjalin hubungan baik dengan Tiongkok. Puncaknya terjadi pada tahun 2005 ketika Jakarta dan Beijing menandatangani Kemitraan Strategis.³⁴

Konflik Laut Tiongkok Selatan

LTS merupakan kawasan laut seluas 3.5 juta kilometer persegi, termasuk Teluk Thailand³⁵ yang terbentang dari pantai barat daratan Asia Tenggara, Kalimantan dan Kepulauan Filipina.³⁶ LTS menghubungkan Asia timur laut dan Pasifik bagian barat ke Samudera Hindia dan Timur Tengah³⁷, dimana jalur ini dilewati oleh sepertiga dari total kapal dunia.³⁸ Disamping posisinya yang strategis, kawasan laut ini juga menyimpan sumber daya alam yang

³⁴I.J Storey, "Indonesia's China Policy, p.148

³⁵G.Zhiguo, "South China Sea : Turning Suspicion into Mutual Understanding and Cooperation" in Saw Swee-Hock, Sheng Lijun & Chin Kin wah (eds), *ASEAN – China Relations Realities and Prospect*, ISEAS, Singapore 2005, p.330

³⁶M. Weasley. "What's at stake in the South China Sea", *Lowy Institute for International Policy*, 2012, <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/whats-stake-south-china> view 6 Sep 2012,p.1

³⁷A.S.P. Baviera.'The South China Sea Disputes after the 2002 Declaration : Beyond Confident Building' in Saw Swee-Hock, Sheng Lijun & Chin Kin wah (ed), *ASEAN –China Relations Realities and Prospect*, ISEAS, Singapore 2005, p. 344

³⁸M. Weasley. "What's at stake....p.1

³³R. Sukma , "Indonesia's response to the rise of China : Growing Comfort amid Uncertainties" in Jun Tsunekawa (eds) *The Rise of China : Responses from Southeast Asia and Japan*, Tokyo 2009, pp. 145-7

potensial di dalamnya, yaitu hidrokarbon dan sumber daya ikan yang sangat kaya.³⁹ Tidak heran, karena kekayaannya tersebut, LTS menjadi wilayah yang diklaim secara tumpang tindih oleh 6 negara yaitu: Tiongkok, Taiwan (bukan sebuah negara secara teknis), Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam dan Filipina.⁴⁰

Selain bagi Indonesia, klaim Tiongkok di LTS juga mengganggu Amerika Serikat. Amerika menginginkan LTS sebagai lautan internasional, yang memberikan kebebasan kepada setiap warga dunia untuk melewatinya, termasuk juga kebebasan dalam melaksanakan berbagai penelitian dan juga kebebasan untuk melakukan latihan perang. Jika wilayah ini diklaim oleh Tiongkok, Amerika merasa terganggu *freedom of navigation*-nya, sehingga penting sekali bagi Amerika untuk memastikan bahwa LTS tetap menjadi lautan internasional.

Di luar permasalahan tumpang tindihnya klaim terhadap kawasan laut tersebut, LTS memiliki kekhususan bagi Indonesia dan hirauan bagi Amerika. Klaim Tiongkok yang terkenal dengan “9 *dotted-lines*” telah mengganggu wilayah ZEE Indonesia di utara kepulauan Natuna

yang kaya akan Gas Alam.⁴¹ Menjaga stabilitas wilayah merupakan keinginan Indonesia, negara ini tidak menginginkan penjaran konflik yang dapat mengganggu keamanan Indonesia.⁴²

Apakah Indonesia menggunakan strategi *engagement* melalui ASEAN?

Untuk meneliti apakah benar Indonesia menggunakan framework ASEAN untuk mengikat Tiongkok, Tulisan ini meneliti usaha Indonesia dalam pembuatan CoC, khususnya setelah kegagalan Asean Ministerial Meeting (AMM) tahun 2012.

Indonesia sepakat dengan pandangan para pengamat politik⁴³ bahwa CoC adalah solusi terbaik untuk mengurangi tensi di LTS. Pada sebuah meeting dengan Hillary Clinton pada tanggal 4 September 2012, Menlu Natalegawa mengatakan bahwa “ketiadaan CoC, ketiadaan proses diplomasi, kita dapat meyakini bahwa akan insiden yang lebih banyak lagi akan

⁴¹S. Hongfang, “South China Sea Issue in China-ASEAN Relations : An Alternative Approach to Ease the Tension”, *International Journal of China Studies*, V.2, No.3, Dec 2011, pp. 585-600, p.588

⁴²President Yudhoyono as quoted by Antara, “Presiden soroti potensi konflik perbatasan sebagai tantangan” *President highlighted the potential of the border conflict as a challenge*, *SHNews*, 16 August 2012, view online <http://www.shnews.co/detile-6473-president-soroti-potensi-konflik-perbatasan-sebagai-tantangan.html> 22 October 2012

⁴³ Lihat misalnya Evan Laksmana, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, C.Tayer, etc

³⁹M. Weasley. “ What’s at stake...”,p.1

⁴⁰M. Weasley. “ What’s at stake...”,p.1

terjadi dan tensi akan terus meningkat di kawasan (Asia Tenggara) kita ini.⁴⁴ Karena itulah Indonesia sangat berkomitmen untuk memfasilitasi terciptanya CoC ini. Pada kesempatan lain, Presiden SBY menekankan pentingnya CoC pada sebuah forum pada tanggal 17 Juli 2012: “*a meaningful and practicable code of conduct in the South China Sea is central to improving confidence building, it will help enhance predictability and bolster stability in a region that desperately needs it*”.⁴⁵ Keinginan untuk menyelesaikan permasalahan dengan jalan damai, dengan tidak menggunakan kekerasan merupakan pemahaman dasar dari strategi *engagement*, sehingga dengan memfasilitasi terciptanya panduan untuk berperilaku di LTS, Indonesia dapat dipastikan tidak ingin terjadi penyelesaian konflik dengan kekerasan. Panduan pada CoC akan memandu setiap negara yang berkonflik untuk menyelesaikan permasalahan dengan damai. Pernyataan Menlu Natalegawa dan Presiden SBY ini sesuai dengan strategi *engagement*.

Indonesia terlibat secara aktif dalam menemukan solusi ketegangan di LTS dengan menggunakan ASEAN sebagai media. Keterlibatan aktif Indonesia ini tidaklah mencengangkan, yang setidaknya didasari oleh faktor internal dan faktor eksternal. Untuk faktor internal, tidak dapat dipungkiri bahwa ASEAN menempati posisi yang penting dalam kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia,⁴⁶ sehingga tidak mengherankan bahwa dalam setiap tindakan Indonesia akan selalu “melirik” ASEAN. Bukan itu saja, lokasi konflik berada dekat dengan kepulauan Indonesia. Bisa dipahami, jika konflik di antara negara-negara tersebut melebar, maka keamanan Indonesia pun akan ikut terganggu. Dalam pidatonya pada pembukaan *the Strategic Review Journal* di New York pada tanggal 26 September 2012, Presiden SBY menyatakan bahwa: “*Also of great concern to us are the overlapping territorial and sovereignty claims to all or parts of the South China Sea*”⁴⁷ Jika digabungkan, kedua alasan diatas saling

⁴⁴Natalegawa sebagaimana yang dikutip oleh S.Adam, “Indonesia key to Resolving tension in South China Sea”, *Epoch Times*, 7 September 2012

⁴⁵Presiden Yudhoyono sebagaimana yang dikutip oleh A. Manners, “China Strengthen ties with Indonesia, ASEAN as Obama stays grounded”, *Strategic Analysis*, 9 Oktober 2013

⁴⁶D.F. Anwar, “Posisi dan Peran Strategis Indonesia dalam konstalasi Politik Internasional”(Indonesia’s strategic position and role in the constellation of International Politic) , in S. Hartono; H. Djarab and L.Irahali (eds), *Semangat Kebangsaan dan Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia* (the Spirit of Nationality and Indonesia’s Foreign Policy), Angkasa Bandung, 2002, p.502

⁴⁷Presiden SBY, Keynote speech at the launching of the Strategic Review Journal”, New York 26 September 2012

berkaitan satu dan lainnya. Karena ASEAN merupakan pijakan bagi kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia, maka setiap permasalahan yang terjadi di kawasan ini yang menjadi kepedulian Indonesia akan selalu menggunakan ASEAN dalam penyelesaiannya.

Selain itu faktor eksternal dari ASEAN dan negara-negara anggota ASEAN lainnya. ASEAN berharap banyak bahwa Indonesia akan ikut turun tangan dalam penyelesaian konflik yang melibatkan negara-negara ASEAN. Keinginan ini dapat terlihat jelas dari pernyataan Sekretaris Jenderal ASEAN Le Luong Minh pada tahun 2013, “*We look forward to coordinating with the member states especially Indonesia*”.⁴⁸Pernyataan ini sedikit banyaknya memperlihatkan harapan besar dari ASEAN untuk menyelesaikan permasalahan yang melibatkan negara-negara ASEAN, sehingga mau tidak mau Indonesia pun terikat dengan ASEAN guna menyelesaikan permasalahan LTS.

Selain alasan di atas, persepsi yang diletakkan pada Indonesia sebagai natural Leader di kawasan ASEAN telah

mempengaruhi sikap Indonesia.⁴⁹ Ketika terjadi permasalahan di kawasan ini, maka Indonesia akan merasa terhimbau untuk ikut serta menyelesaikan permasalahan tersebut. Sebagai salah satu negara pendiri ASEAN, Indonesia dianggap memiliki pengaruh yang besar dalam menjaga keutuhan ASEAN. Sehingga siapapun, pemimpin ASEAN-nya, dia pasti akan berharap lebih kepada Indonesia, karena persepsi Indonesia sebagai *natural leader*-nya ASEAN ini.

Keinginan Indonesia untuk menggunakan ASEAN dalam meng-*engage* Tiongkok setidaknya terlihat dari usaha yang dilakukan Indonesia setelah gagalnya tercipta Joint Communique pada ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) tahun 2012 lalu. Indonesia meletakkan harapan yang tinggi pada forum ini, melalui forum ini Indonesia berharap terciptanya suara yang bulat di dalam tubuh ASEAN, sehingga *Draft of Conduct* di LTS dapat dihasilkan. Setelah kegagalan AMM, Presiden SBY segera mengirimkan surat kepada negara-negara anggota ASEAN, berharap dukungan

⁴⁸BBT Saragih, “ASEAN chief pushes RI to act on South China Sea dispute”, *The Jakarta Post*, 9 April 2013

⁴⁹S. Hadi, “Indonesia, ASEAN and the Rise of China : Indonesia in the midst of East Asia’s Dynamics in Post-Global Crisis World”, *International Journal of China Studies*, V.3, No.2, Agustus 2012, 151-166, p.155

mereka terhadap usaha Indonesia dalam melahirkan CoC di LTS.⁵⁰

Kepedulian Indonesia akan suara bulat di ASEAN tak pelak karena Indonesia ingin menggunakan ASEAN sebagai wadah untuk meng-engage Tiongkok. Jika ASEAN tidak bersatu, maka akan sulit sekali bagi Indonesia untuk dapat menggunakan ASEAN, seperti yang diungkapkan oleh D. Blumenthal, Direktur Asian Studies pada American Enterprise Institute, bahwa dengan tercerai berainya ASEAN, maka “*victory will be on the Chinese side*”.⁵¹ Pemahaman inilah yang kemudian membuat Indonesia berusaha sekuat tenaga untuk menjaga keutuhan suara dalam ASEAN, agar penggunaan ASEAN dalam menghadapi Tiongkok menjadi lebih mudah.

Keinginan untuk mengikat Tiongkok kepada ASEAN sepertinya terkait erat dengan persepsi Indonesia bahwa jika Tiongkok tidak dihadapi secara kolektif maka negara ASEAN yang kecil

dan lemah akan begitu mudahnya dikalahkan oleh Tiongkok.⁵² Indonesia merasa bahwa penyelesaian hubungan secara bilateral bukanlah jalan keluar yang baik untuk negara-negara ASEAN, Indonesia berharap dapat membawa Tiongkok pada satu meja dan mengikatnya dengan aturan yang ada di ASEAN, sehingga penyelesaian masalah ini dapat dilakukan dengan menggunakan ASEAN way. Sehingga, penyelesaian konflik ini tidak akan menggunakan strategi yang diinginkan Tiongkok, tetapi strategi yang diinginkan oleh ASEAN.⁵³

Apakah Indonesia menggunakan strategi *hedging* terhadap Tiongkok

Bagian ini akan meneliti hubungan antara Tiongkok, Indonesia dan Amerika di LTS. Melalui interaksi ketiga negara ini akan dilihat apakah Indonesia memang menggunakan strategi *hedging* terhadap Tiongkok.

Pada bagian tinjauan pustaka, penulis telah menjelaskan pengertian dari strategi *hedging*. Agar Indonesia dikatakan menerapkan strategi ini, maka haruslah terlihat bahwa Indonesia memiliki lebih dari satu strategi dalam menghadapi Tiongkok. Lebih lanjut, harus dapat terlihat bahwa Indonesia memilih berada di

⁵⁰L.C. Sebastian, “Indonesia regional diplomacy : Imperative to maintain ASEAN cohesion”, *RSIS Commentaries* No.132/2012, 23 July 2012

⁵¹D. Blumenthal as quoted by P.Barta, “Sea Dispute Upends Asian Summit”, *The Wall Street Journal*, 23 July 2012, view online <http://www.intellectualltakeout.org/library/articles-commentary-blog/sea-dispute-upends-asian-summit> 11 September 2012

⁵²J. Brown, p.12

⁵³J. Brown, p.12

tengah-tengah dan tidak memilih salah
satu dari Amerika ataupun Tiongkok.

Peningkatan Sikap Asertif Tiongkok di LTS

Walaupun Tiongkok mencoba
meyakinkan dunia bahwa kebangkitannya
adalah kebangkitan yang damai dan dapat
menghasilkan keuntungan bagi semua
pihak,⁵⁴ aksi-aksi asertif di LTS tetaplah
membuat semua negara yang terlibat
menjadi waspada. Pada tahun 2013,
Tiongkok memperlihatkan sikap yang
tegas, bahwa jika pihak lain yang
bersengketa tidak bersedia untuk
menyelesaikan permasalahan tersebut
dengan *win win basis*, maka Tiongkok
tidak akan segan-segan untuk
menggunakan "*tough tactics at both the
rhetorical and substantive levels*".⁵⁵

Tough tactics Tiongkok yang
diterapkan pada *substantive
levels* memperlihatkan manifestasinya
melalui kehadiran militernya di LTS
dengan tujuan untuk mempertegas
kedaulatannya di wilayah itu. Dari tahun
2010, Beijing telah memperbanyak dan
memperbaiki kualitas fasilitas militernya
di Pulau Paracels dan Spratly, termasuk

⁵⁴M.C.Ott, "Deep Danger : Competing claim in the
South China Sea", *China and East
Asia*, V.110, Issue 737, September 2011, 238

⁵⁵W. Lam, "Beijing's Aggressive New Foreign
Policy and implications for the South China
Sea", *China Brief*, Vo. XIII, Issue 13, June
12, 2013, p.12

landasan penerbangan dan
pertahanan. Lebih lanjut, negara ini
meningkatkan jumlah latihan militer,
patroli reguler dan mengumumkan
larangan untuk memancing di areal yang
dipersengketakan; yang meningkatkan
keyakinan dari negara-negara sekitar
bahwa Tiongkok meningkatkan sikap
asertifnya di sini.⁵⁶ Pada tahun 2010, PLA
mengadakan latihan militer yang
melibatkan lebih dari 100 kapal dan 1800
orang marinir.⁵⁷ Pada tanggal 7 Maret
2011, Menteri Luar Negeri Yang Jiechi
mengumumkan pelarangan eksplorasi
minyak di daerah yang diklaim Cina
sebagai teritorialnya.⁵⁸ Pada tahun 2012,
Cina mengumumkan bahwa mereka telah
mendirikan markas militer di Woody
Island, yang merupakan bagian dari grup
kepulauan Paracel, walaupun markas
militer tersebut masih dalam kapasitas
yang terbatas.⁵⁹

Bukan itu saja, Cina juga
menunjukkan perluasan kapasitas
militernya dengan menempatkan 3 divisi
pesawat tempur, dua divisi amfibi, dua

⁵⁶Swaine and Fravel, "China's assertive behaviour,
Part Two : The Maritime Periphery", *China
Leadership Monitor* No.35 2012, p.5

⁵⁷C. Ungerer, "Making mischief : the return of the
South China Sea dispute" *ASPI Special
Report*, Issue 36, December 2010, p.1

⁵⁸C.A Thayer, "China's new wave...p.3

⁵⁹I. Storey, "Slipping away? A south China Sea
Code of Conduct Eludes Diplomatic
efforts", *East and South China Seas Bulletin*
No.11, Center for a new American Security,
March 20, 2013, p.3

brigade laut dan tujuh grup operasi khusus yang kesemuanya dilengkapi dengan kemampuan untuk berperang.⁶⁰ Lebih lanjut, Cina juga memperkuat persenjataannya dengan 24 buah SU-30MK2 yang merupakan kapal pesiar yang dilengkapi dengan senjata perang.⁶¹ Dengan semua inovasi militer dan perkembangan sikap yang lebih tegas di LTS, tidak mengherankan jika dunia internasional beranggapan bahwa Cina memang sedang mengalami peningkatan sikap asertif yang kemudian perlu diwaspadai oleh negara sekitar.

Kepentingan Amerika Serikat di LTS

Konflik LTS telah mengundang AS untuk ikut terlibat, karena kepentingan yang dimiliki oleh negara tersebut di wilayah laut ini, selain keinginan untuk tetap mempertahankan kedudukannya di wilayah Pasifik. Rowan berargumen bahwa setidaknya ada dua kepentingan AS di LTS: Pertama, ancaman terhadap kebebasan navigasi dan kedua, AS tidak ingin Cina menguasai akses ke LTS.⁶² Pernyataan ini juga diperkuat dengan pernyataan dari United States Institute of

Peace pada tahun 1996 yang menjelaskan kepedulian panjang AS terhadap LTS :

*Safety of navigation and over flight and the freedom of sea lanes of communication are critical strategic interest of the United States, which uses the South China Sea as a transit point and operating area for the U.S navy and air force between military bases in Asia and the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf areas. Any military conflict in the South China Sea that threaten the strategic interest of the United states or the Security and economic interest of Japan might be seen as sufficiently destabilizing to invite U.S involvement to preserve navigational freedom in these critical sea lanes.*⁶³

AS menginginkan kawasan ini sebagai perairan internasional, sehingga menurut Hukum Internasional, latihan militer dan pengumpulan data inteligen diizinkan untuk dilakukan.⁶⁴

Kutipan diatas menjelaskan bahwa AS memiliki kepentingan di LTS yang berkaitan dengan kebebasan untuk berlayar dan terbang disekitaran wilayah LTS. Jelas kebebasan yang dimaksud menunjukkan keberatan AS atas klaim Cina terhadap LTS, yang lebih lanjut bermakna bahwa setiap penggunaan areal

⁶⁰I. Storey, Making mischief : the return of the South China Sea dispute”*ASPI Special Report*, Issue 36, December 2010,p.7

⁶¹I. Storey, Making mischief

⁶²J.P Rowan, “The U.S – Japan security alliance, ASEAN and the South China Sea Dispute”, *Asia Survey*, Vol.45, No.3, June 2005, pp.414-436,p.429

⁶³United States Institute of Peace, “The South China Sea Dispute : Prospect for Preventive Diplomacy”, *Special Report*, No.18, August 1996, p.4

⁶⁴M. Weasley, “What Stake in the South China Sea”, *Lowy Institute for International Policy*, 2012, <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/whats-stake-south-china> view 6 Sep 2012,p.5

laut ini akan membutuhkan izin dari Cina, artinya Cina berhak untuk mengizinkan atau tidak mengizinkan kapal/pesawat untuk melintasi kawasan ini. Hal inilah yang tidak diinginkan oleh AS.

Selain alasan diatas, kepentingan ekonomi AS juga mengalami ancaman dengan klaim yang dibuat Cina. AS ingin mengamankan perusahaannya yang memiliki proyek pengeboran minyak bumi di wilayah konflik, seperti yang diungkapkan oleh *Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs* yang bernama Scott Marciel yang mengungkapkan bahwa keberadaan Exxon mobil di LTS mengalami ancaman karena konflik ini.⁶⁵

Semua alasan di atas kemudian membingkai kepentingan AS di LTS, sehingga sikap asertif yang ditunjuk oleh Cina dapat diklasifikasikan sebagai gangguan bagi AS.

Indonesia diantara AS dan Cina

Telah dijelaskan diatas bahwa Indonesia berkomitmen penuh untuk ikut terlibat dalam penyelesaian konflik di LTS. Komitmen ini kemudian membuat Indonesia bertemu dengan dua negara besar, yaitu AS dan Cina, yang menghasilkan kesulitan bagi Indonesia

⁶⁵I. Storey, *Making mischief*, p.6

dalam menerapkan strategi yang tepat. Ketakutan Indonesia dalam memilih salah satu negara diungkapkan Iin Gindarsah yang merupakan peneliti isu-isu pertahanan dari CSIS, dalam artikelnya, Gindarsah mengungkapkan bahwa Indonesia harus bertindak sangat hati-hati sehingga tidak terlihat keinginan untuk pro AS ataupun pro Cina.⁶⁶

Pandangan yang sama juga ditunjukkan oleh Menteri Pertahanan Indonesia pada tahun 2004-2009, Juwono Sudarsono yang menyatakan bahwa :

*We want to maintain a strategic space from the rivalry between the United States and China.....We can navigate between that rivalry, from time to time giving out signals that both the United States and China are important to us, because if we align ourselves too closely, it would be detrimental to the core values of Indonesia's foreign policy.*⁶⁷

Sejalan dengan itu, Syamsul Hadi, akademisi dari Universitas Indonesia berpendapat bahwa Indonesia harus mampu menyeimbangkan kedua kekuatan,

⁶⁶D. Safitri, "Kartu Indonesia dalam konflik Laut China selatan", *BBC Indonesia*, 15 July 2013, view online http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2013/07/130614_indonesiadefencedynamic.shtml, 21 October 2013

⁶⁷J. Sudarsono as quoted by N. Onishi, "Obama and China play rival suitors to Indonesia", *The New York Times*, 9 November 2010 view online http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/world/asia/10indo.html?_r=0, accessed 26 November 2013

sehingga Indonesia bisa menjadi negara yang aman di tengah-tengah.⁶⁸ Lebih lanjut, Presiden SBY menekankan bahwa “*I will not adopt a theory where one power counterbalances another, but I perceive that there must be a dynamic equilibrium among all players*”.⁶⁹

Jika dilihat dari pernyataan-pernyataan tokoh sentral di Indonesia di atas, dapat disimpulkan bahwa mereka semua menyarankan dan menginginkan Indonesia untuk memilih berhubungan secara netral, tidak memilih salah satu kekuatan, tetapi berusaha untuk menjadi sebuah keseimbangan yang dinamis, yang lebih lanjut dapat diartikan sebagai keinginan untuk berdiri di tengah kedua negara.

Indonesia, sepertinya menggunakan kondisi kontes di LTS sebagai ajang aji mumpung. Keterlibatan Indonesia sebagai negara paling berpengaruh di ASEAN telah membuat AS dan Cina berusaha untuk memperebutkan “hati” Indonesia. Memperebutkan hati ini kemudian dilakukan dengan memberikan bantuan kepada Indonesia, dengan harapan

Indonesia akan melirik kepada negara tersebut. Bentuk nyata dari pernyataan di atas adalah penandatanganan *strategic partnership* antara Indonesia dan Cina pada tahun 2005⁷⁰ yang kemudian diikuti dengan perjanjian kerjasama Pertahanan tahun 2007 yang diperkuat dengan penguatan kerjasama berbasis teknologi.⁷¹ Kerjasama ini kemudian diwujudkan melalui latihan perang bilateral antara Indonesia dan Cina pada tahun 2011 dan 2012.⁷² Bentuk praktek aji mumpung lain yang dilakukan oleh Indonesia adalah dengan menerima tawaran Amerika untuk melakukan latihan militer yang diadakan di Malang Jawa Tengah dengan melibatkan beberapa negara peserta.⁷³

Tidak hanya itu, keberadaan AS – Indonesia – Cina di LTS juga memberikan keuntungan dalam hal bantuan ekonomi. Pada tahun 2012, Cina menawarkan untuk membangun sistem penjagaan di sepanjang pantai Indonesia dengan nilai bantuan sekitar \$158 juta untuk melengkapi sistem lama yang dibangun oleh AS yang bernilai \$57 juta.⁷⁴ Aksi ini kemudian ditindak lanjuti oleh AS dengan

⁶⁸S. Hadi, “Indonesia, ASEAN, and the Rise of China : Indonesia in the Midst of East Asia’s Dynamics in the Post-Global Crisis World”, *International Journal of China Studies Vol.3 No.2*, August 2012, pp.151-166 : 161

⁶⁹President Yudhoyono as quoted by A. Siahaan, “China, US step up rivalry

⁷⁰I. Lianti p.137

⁷¹E.A. Laksmana, “Variation on a theme pp30-31

⁷²The National Institute for Defense Studies, *East Asian Strategic Review 2013*

⁷³The National Institute for Defense Studies, *East Asian Strategic Review 2013*

⁷⁴R.A Supriyanto, “Indonesia’s South China Sea.....p.2

memenuhi keinginan Indonesia untuk membeli helikopter AH-64. Sepertinya, kebijakan yang diambil oleh Indonesia adalah kebijakan yang pragmatis, yang tidak memihak kepada satu pihak, tetapi mencoba mendekati kedua belah pihak.

Penjelasan di atas menghasilkan asumsi bahwa Indonesia tidak menerapkan sebuah strategi langsung sebagai respon terhadap kebangkitan Cina. Seperti kita ketahui, ada berbagai macam strategi dalam HI untuk kasus seperti ini. Strategi langsung adalah seperti *balancing* yang mencoba untuk menghimpun beberapa kekuatan sehingga mampu mengimbangi negara yang sedang bangkit ataupun strategi *bandwagoning* yang secara langsung tunduk kepada negara yang sedang bangkit. Di sini terlihat bahwa Indonesia tidak dapat dikatakan menerapkan satu strategi secara penuh, sehingga jika digabungkan, strategi yang dilakukan Indonesia adalah berhubungan baik dengan kedua negara, berusaha untuk tidak terlihat pro pada satu pihak dan di sisi lain, tetap mencari alternatif yang baik dalam berhubungan dengan kedua negara. Ditilik lebih lanjut, apa yang dilakukan oleh Indonesia memanglah strategi *hedging*, mengingat terpenuhinya unsur-unsur yang memperlihatkan kecenderungan kearah hal tersebut.

Kesimpulan

Tulisan ini telah menjabarkan mengenai kebangkitan Cina dan pentingnya bagi Indonesia untuk menerapkan strategi yang tepat dalam merespon fenomena tersebut. Tulisan ini menyimpulkan bahwa strategi Indonesia terhadap Cina adalah *engagement* melalui ASEAN dan *hedging*. *Engagement* melalui ASEAN terlihat dari usaha Indonesia untuk menyelesaikan permasalahan konflik dengan Cina dengan menggunakan bingkai ASEAN, Indonesia terlihat terus-menerus menginginkan penyelesaian masalah dengan membawa serta seluruh negara ASEAN, mengingat negara ASEAN yang kecil akan sangat mudah untuk dikalahkan oleh Cina jika penyelesaian konflik dilakukan secara bilateral. Untuk mendorong Cina setuju penyelesaian masalah dengan menggunakan ASEAN, Indonesia melakukan dua cara, yaitu diplomasi kepada ASEAN sehingga ASEAN menyelesaikan permasalahan ini secara kolektif dan dengan melakukan diplomasi langsung secara bilateral terhadap Cina, dengan harapan negara tersebut mau menyelesaikan permasalahan ini di forum ASEAN.

Sementara itu, *hedging* terlihat dari sikap Indonesia yang tidak

memperlihatkan pro kepada salah satu pihak dengan gamblang. Indonesia berusaha untuk tetap bekerjasama dengan kedua belah pihak, berusaha memanfaatkan kedua negara untuk kemajuannya. Strategi yang dipilih Indonesia bukanlah strategi langsung yang jelas, sehingga di sini aplikasi dari strategi *hedging* terlihat jelas.

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Rika Isnarti | A Comparison of Neorealism, Liberalism, and Constructivism
in Analysing Cyber War
**A Comparison of Neorealism, Liberalism, and Constructivism in Analysing
Cyber War**

Rika Isnarti*
rika_isnarti@fisip.unand.ac.id

Abstract

Cyberwar can be considered as one of phenomena in International Relations. However, recently, there are not many literature about International Relations theory talking about cyber war or cyberspace generally. The phenomena of cyberspace is matter to International Relations as it involved sovereignty, state interactions and other elements in International Relations theory. On the other hand, cyber space blurs many concept in International Relations such as sovereignty is borderless in the realms of cyber space. Therefore, this articles analyses three perspectives in International Relations in analyzing cyber war. It explains what cyber war in context of International Relations, how three theories in International Relations with their elements analyses actors and interaction in cyber space. Finally, it found that Neorealism is the most adequate theory among other two theories in analyzing cyber war.

Keywords: cyber war, neorealism, liberalism, constructivism

*Staf Pengajar Jurusan Ilmu Hubungan Internasional, Universitas Andalas

Introduction

This paper utilises three traditions in International Relations, neorealism, liberalism, and constructivism, in an analysis of cyberwar. The paper consists of three parts. The first part explains cyberwar; the second examines how neorealism, liberalism, and constructivism can be applied to an analysis of cyberwar; and the last part identifies which of these theories is most adequate to analyse cyberwar.

Cyberwar can be considered an International Relations problem. However, there appears to be little International Relations literature on the subject.¹⁵⁵ Though some literatures do discuss the technology and policy related to cyber security. Dunn Cavelty suggests that the phenomena in cyberspace are a matter for International Relations as they involve sovereignty, state actors, state relations and other elements.¹⁵⁶ Cyberspace blurs the concept of sovereignty as it is borderless. States can act in the cyber realm without territorial limitation. Actors in cyberspace are not only states but also private companies that build e-systems

which also suffer from cyberattack. There are also hackers, sometimes from the military and in other times from civilian, who conduct cyberattacks. In terms of state relations, the transnational, unidentifiable character of cyber space and conflict makes it hard to determine who is a friend and who is an enemy. Further, both strong and weak states can effectively conduct cyber-attacks.

Theories in International Relations could explain cyberwar differently. Although many theories in International Relations discuss war and national security, they analyse them differently. Neorealism is a state centric theory and security is the main concern. Thus, neorealism can explain much about state behaviour in the conduct of cyber war. Liberalism is a tradition which promotes cooperation in the international system, with other actors apart from the state seen as very important. So, perhaps Liberalism can better explain how to solve the problem of cyberwar.

Through cooperation amongst various state and non-state actors. Constructivism sees international phenomena such as states as socially constructed, not given. This theory can be used to explain why cyberwar occurs, its conduct, and the various processes and actors involved. Each of the three theories explains cyberwar from a different point of view, identifying and analyzing different

¹⁵⁵ Maximilian_Mayer, Mariana_Carpes, & Ruth_Knoblich. (2014). *the Global Politics of Science and Technology: An Introduction the Global Politics of Science and Technology - Vol. 1 Concepts from International Relations and Other Disciplines* (pp. 1-38): Springer. P. 4

¹⁵⁶ Cavelty, M. D. (2010). Cyberwar. In G. Kassimeris & J. Buckley (Eds.), *the Ashgate Research Companion to Modern Warfare* (pp. 123-144). Aldershot: Ashgate. p.127

structures, units, actors and processes. Therefore, it is important to first explain what cyberwar is.

What Is Cyberwar?

Cyberwar was first associated only with military action.¹⁵⁷ Cyber war complemented physical or kinetic war. To win a military conflict it is important to secure one's own military information but also to be able to attack an enemy's military information systems. However, due to the development of cyber space, cyber war is not only limited to physical military strategy.¹⁵⁸ It is used widely to attack enemy computer systems in order to destroy or disturb the systems of nation-state, particularly digital infrastructure such as transportation, telecommunication, gas pipeline controls, and nuclear power controls. Clarke and Nauke define Cyber war as "Actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption".¹⁵⁹

There are many different types of activity in cyberspace, such as cyber vandalism, cyber campaigns, and cybercrime. Not all actions can be categorized as cyberwar. Thus, an attack

on computer systems should only be called cyberwar if it is carried out with warlike intentions.¹⁶⁰ We need to note that cyberwar is related to kinetic war or physical conflict.¹⁶¹ Cyberwar will always be part of the larger kinetic war or conflict, whether to start kinetic war or conduct kinetic war.

There are four phenomena in cyber insecurity they are cybercrime refers to an action aiming to steal money from networks. Hactivism refers to an action to steal information for political purposes so they can spread to public, such as wikileaks, anonymous and so on. Cyber espionage is associated with an action to steal information particularly from company or from university regarding research and development and send the information to other companies so they can take advantages or get the information without having to pay much money to do research by their own and the last one is

¹⁶⁰ Caveltly, M. D. (2010). Cyberwar. p.14

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See further, Greathouse, C. B. (2013). Cyberwar and strategic thought: Do the Classic Theorists Still Matter? In J. F. Kremer & B. Müller (Eds.), *Cyberspace and International Relations: Theory, Prospects and Challenges* (pp. 21-40). Berlin: Springer. P. 23-26

¹⁶¹ Libicki, M. C. (2014). Why Cyber War Will Not and Should Not Have Its Grand Strategist. *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 8(1), 23-39. P.36

¹⁵⁷ Caveltly, M. D. (2013). Cyber security. In A. Collins (Ed.), *Contemporary Security Studies* (3 ed., pp. 361-378): OUP Oxford. P. 369

¹⁵⁸ Choucri, N. (2012). *Cyber politics in International Relations*. Massachusetts: MIT Press. P.3

¹⁵⁹ Clarke, R. A., & Knake, R. (2010). *Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It*. HarperCollins.p.6

cyber war. For example in 2008 when Russian's tanks entered Georgia, there was cyber-attack on Georgian networks. Its government website and banking system cannot be accessed as usual.¹⁶²

There are some characteristics of cyberwar that make it different from kinetic war. First cyber war is much cheaper than kinetic war.¹⁶³ To conduct a cyber-attack do not need specialist or sophisticated tools. Anyone who can connect to computers and networks can conduct cyberwar. A state involved in cyber war does not have to buy and rely upon sophisticated military tools such as tanks, missiles, canons, or modern fighters. The state only needs cyber warriors, computers, and networks. Therefore, a state with a weak economy can also become involved in cyber war. Consequently the identity of major cyber actors is unpredictable. Participation in cyber war does not depend on state economic power. Any state can become a cyber-power.

Second, cyberwar does not necessarily involve the loss of many human lives on the battlefield, or the

conquest of and territory.¹⁶⁴ The objective of cyber war is to cause disruption of state networks systems, particularly important digital infrastructures vital to human life. Third, in term of actors, cyberwar can be conducted not only by state military and security organisations, but also by civilians with cyber 'know how'.¹⁶⁵ Almost anybody can be a cyber-warrior or cyber invader. It is hard to make sure who the invaders are, whether military or civilian. A state that suffers from a cyberattack may not be certain of the identity of the attacker.

In addition, Barlow argues that the elusive nature of cyber war presents a number of new challenges regarding unidentifiable actions.¹⁶⁶ For example, in 2009, someone, probably under Chinese state instruction, hacked a US defence contractor's computer and stole the plans for the new U.S F-35 plane. However, Barlow argues that many cyber-attacks such as this may have unpredictable and mixed motives, including espionage, acts of war, or commercial piracy.¹⁶⁷ Many of the actors cannot be recognized. There was only an assumption that the hackers were

¹⁶² Nazario, J. (2009). Politically motivated of Denial of service attacks. In C. Czosseck & K. Geers (Eds.), *the Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on Cyber Warfare* (pp. 163-181). Virginia: Ios Press.p. 167

¹⁶³ Kassab, H. S. (2013). In Search of Cyber Stability: International Relations, Mutually Assured Destruction and the Age of Cyber Warfare. In J. F. Kremer & B. Müller (Eds.), *Cyberspace and International Relations: Theory, Prospects and Challenges* (pp. 59-76). Berlin: Springer. P. 69

¹⁶⁴ Rueter, N. C. (2011). *The Cybersecurity Dilemma*. (Master of Arts), Duke University, Durham. P. 37

¹⁶⁵ Choucri, N., & Goldsmith, D. (2012). Lost in cyberspace: Harnessing the Internet, international relations, and global security. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 68(2), 70-77. P.71

¹⁶⁶ Barlow, J. (2010). Cyber War and U.S. Policy: Part I, Neo-neorealism. *The journal of education, community and values*, 10(5), 1-11. P.3

¹⁶⁷ Barlow, J. (2010). Cyber War and U.S. Policy: Part I, Neo-neorealism. P.7

from China because the Internet Protocol address was traced to China.¹⁶⁸ However, the actor could be non-Chinese. Another example occurred on 4 July 2009, when U.S and South Korean government websites, the New York Exchange, the Pentagon, and the blue house (executive office and official residence of the President of the Republic of South Korea) were attacked by 'denial of service' attacks.¹⁶⁹ Some U.S cyber experts found that the IP address was from China, but they were not sure whether the state of China did the attacks.¹⁷⁰ However, they did find that a coded message was sent by a North Korean agent, which contained simple set of instructions to start attacking a list of U.S. and South Korean government and corporate websites.¹⁷¹ The U.S concluded that, North Korea sent their cyber warriors to China and conducted the cyber-attack, or that there was a possibility that North Korea cooperated with China to conduct the attack. This demonstrates the difficulties in identifying cyber attackers.

¹⁶⁸ Gorman, S., Cole, A., & Dreazen, Y. (2009, April 21, 2009). Computer Spies Breach Fighter-Jet Project. Retrieved 1 June 2015, 2015, from

<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124027491029837401>

¹⁶⁹ Weaver, M. (2009, 8 July 2009). Cyber attackers target South Korea and US. Retrieved 1 June 2015, 2015, from

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/08/south-korea-cyber-attack>

¹⁷⁰ CNN. (2009, 8 July 2009). U.S. government sites among those hit by cyberattack. Retrieved 1 June, 2015, from

<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/TECH/07/08/government.hacking/index.html?iref=24hours>

¹⁷¹ Clarke, R. A., & Knake, R. (2010). *Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It*: HarperCollins.p.18

Cyber war is a new type of war.

This phenomenon introduces new and different processes, actors and units, different to those associated with conventional kinetic war. Many International Relations theories talk much about war but not about cyber war. As this phenomenon is part of international relations it is important to look at how International Relations theories interpret and analyse cyber war.

Neorealism and Cyber Warfare

Neorealism is a theory in International Relations focusing on the structure of the international system and its growing interdependence. This tradition explains states behaviour in the international system including how states seek relative or absolute power.¹⁷² Further, neorealism is also a state centric paradigm. Neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz argue that the international system is in a state of anarchy.¹⁷³ There is no higher authority than states. Thus, there is no guarantee that a state will not attack another state. Fear and uncertainty drive states to maximize their military capability, economic capability, and other powers.¹⁷⁴ This theory is known as offensive

¹⁷² Jørgensen, K. E. (2010). *International Relations Theory: A New Introduction*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. P.85

¹⁷³ Jørgensen, K. E. (2010). *International Relations Theory: A New Introduction* .p.84

¹⁷⁴ Dunne, T., Kurki, M., & Smith, S. (2013). *International Relations Theories*. Oxford: OUP Oxford. P. 77-78

neorealism.¹⁷⁵ On the other hand, Walt and other defensive neorealists argue that if states gain too much power, the international system will punish them in term there would be another states try to be balance with them.

The defensive neorealist 'offence-defence balance' concept can be used to understand why cyberwar happens, and to explain state behaviour in response to cyberwar. Dunne explains the offence-defence balance as follows:

Offence defence balance indicates how easy or difficult it is to conquer territory or defeat a defender in battle. If the balance favours the defender, conquest is difficult and war is therefore unlikely. The reserve is the case if the balance favours the offence.¹⁷⁶

In addition, Jervis argues that technology is one of the major determinants in the offence-defence balance, and that less costly and more effective technology tends to cause insecurity, making wars more likely.²³ More precisely, cyberwar is more likely to happen if offensive gains are likely, given the defender's weak position in the offence-defence configuration. Therefore, as in physical war, cyber war is likely to

happen when attack is made easier by weak defences in cyber systems.

There are also several reasons why offensive action is more likely to happen in cyberwar. First, from the cost point of view, it is much cheaper to design cyber offensive weapons than create cyber defensive weapons. For example according to Singer and Friedman, the cost of cyber offense in the U.S military is three times less than the cost of cyber defence because offensive cyber capability directly translates to power, whereas defensive cyber capability can only be measured by more or less complex and fuzzy risk assessments.²⁴ To create cyber weapons, you only need software and capable cyber invaders. You do not need hardware because you can attack and destroy an enemy's hardware systems. However, to create cyber defence you need good firewalls, antivirus software, and complex software and hardware maintained by capable cyber warriors.

Second, Richard argues that cyber defence will fail in cyber warfare.²⁵ The problem is how to avoid attacks on all national networks. Perhaps a country's military can defend a state's computer systems. However, in cyber warfare the intruder does not only attack state digital infrastructure but also private. digital infrastructure such as banking systems. Further, much infrastructure today is

¹⁷⁵ Dunne, T., Kurki, M., & Smith, S. (2013). *International Relations Theories*. p. 77

¹⁷⁶ Dunne, T., Kurki, M., & Smith, S. (2013). *International Relations Theories*. Oxford: OUP Oxford.p.355

operated by private companies, including power grids and transportations. How are they going to build cyber defence as strong as the military cyber defence? Further, Richard also gives examples of some countries that can do cyber defence in simple ways.²⁶ First, Russia, where the state controls and operates the internet networks in the whole country, and second China, which does filter everything that enters its cyber space. However, other countries have weaker cyber defence capability.

Another offensive advantage in cyberwar is it is difficult for the victim to identify the attacker. Cyberattacks can be conducted anywhere, even from outside the country that sponsored it. In addition, as cyber war is designed to support physical conflict, a potential attacker is more likely to do attack as fewer lives would be lost.

However, there are some limitations of the neorealist 'offence-defence balance' concept when analysing cyberwar. First neorealism tends to focus on states or great powers as the primary players in the international system.²⁷ However, this makes it difficult to identify *who is* the great power in cyber space. Every state has their own cyber capability, including small states, weak economic states, and weak military power states. This does not mean they are weak power in cyber space. For

example North Korea has no cyber space but has cyber warriors and cyber capability.²⁸

Second, neorealism is used to analyse the structure of the international system: the distribution of power, and changing power configurations. However, as in the first point, it is difficult to predict such matters in cyber space and cyber warfare. In the physical world we can measure with some accuracy a state's power, but not so in cyber space. For example, the U.S is a great military and economic power but in cyber space the U.S is a country which tends to face frequent cyberattacks.²⁹ In kinetic war, it is easier to measure a state's capabilities, but in cyberwar it would be difficult. So, neorealism fails to adequately explain the configuration of power in the cyber international systems. It is hard to say whether some states are more or less powerful than others. How we can map the international cyber power? There are so many actors in cyber space, not just states.

Liberalism and Cyber Warfare

Liberalism is a theory that emphasizes there are various actors in the international system beyond the state. Liberalism is concerned about how to promote peace and stability amongst states and other actors through cooperation and consensus.³⁰ Like neorealism, this tradition views states as the major actors in the

international system, however, the role of other units, such as organizations, individuals, and social movement groups need to be recognised.

Liberalists view war as most likely to occur between militaristic and undemocratic governments pursuing their interests and extending their powers.³¹ Burchill argues that war is a way for the governments to increase their control over citizens, and raise taxes.³² On the other hand, democratic countries have little interest in conflict with each other. Rawls claims that liberal democracies are less likely to engage in war, unless they need to defend themselves, or do so to protect human rights or vulnerable liberal states.³³ For example, in 1998, the U.S joined a humanitarian intervention during the Kosovo war. At the time, the U.S and NATO used cyberattacks as one of their war strategies. U.S hackers hacked Serbian air defence systems, and spied on the email accounts of Serbian elites.³⁴

In term of ideology, cyberwar is like kinetic war. States may go to war because they have different ideologies. It is rare for democratic countries to attack each other in cyberspace. Most cyber-attacks by democratic states are against states with a different ideology, such as Syria, China, Russia, and Iraq, all cyberattacked by the U.S. as part of a kinetic war strategy. However, cybercrime, hactivism, and

cyber espionage is conducted between democratic countries. For example, in May 2015, an Australian hacked the U.S army and Microsoft stealing U.S army software for helicopter simulation, and intellectual property related to Microsoft's new Xbox.³⁵ Australia and the U.S are both liberal democracies, yet this 'cyber espionage' occurred.

In terms of actors, there are many powerful actors in cyber space. Ericksson and Guacomello state that;

Cyber-threats weaken the sovereignty and security of the state. Non-state actors are becoming even more numerous and powerful because of the information revolution.³⁶

Therefore, governments alone cannot secure cyber space. There are individuals, terrorist groups, and other activist groups that are all capable of cyberattack. Further, private sectors also own and operate networks. For example private companies own and operate internet service providers but do not have the same security capacity as states. Although states would have the technological capability, it would not be enough to protect all private companies from cyberattack. As a result, liberals believe government alone cannot secure cyberspace. There should be international

state-corporate cooperation to secure cyberspace.

In order to secure cyber space, there are many international agreements both bilateral and regional/multilateral designed to create cyber peace. For example in May 2015 Russia and China signed a cyber-security pact with both countries agreeing not to conduct cyberattacks against each other.³⁷ At the regional/multilateral level, there is the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime which aims to protect the signatories from cybercrime and computer fraud. However, to date there is no comprehensive multilateral global agreement regarding cyber security, cyberattack, or cyber war.³⁸ There is no global consensus or cooperation on the matter.

Like neorealists, liberals agree that the international system is characterised by anarchy.³⁹ Therefore, it can be difficult to achieve cooperation amongst state actors. Liberals, like neorealists, acknowledge that there are some significant barriers to international cooperation.⁴⁰ For example, there may be a lack of information about another state's capabilities and intentions, creating a fear that the other state will cheat, despite signing an international agreement. Therefore, despite liberal optimism about international cooperation, we cannot be certain about whether

international agreements and institutions can effectively deal with cyber security and war. Liberalism does not provide sufficient information or argument about how liberal norms and institutions will run effectively in this field.

Constructivism and Cyber Warfare

Constructivism is a theory that views the field of international relations as a social construct. While neorealism analyses what is, and liberalism prescribes what ought to be, constructivism analyses how things have been socially constructed, and how such constructs can in turn be changed. While neorealism and liberalism accept the notion of a state of anarchy, where peace and stability are secured through the balance of power or liberal institutionalism, constructivists, see anarchy as a social construct, not a given state.⁴¹

There are some key concepts from constructivism that can be used to analyse cyber war. Constructivists see the international system as a condition created by how states or actors see themselves and others, and this can shape their interactions. There is a correlation between identities, interests, and interactions between those different identities, particularly state elites.⁴² Identity is a core concept in constructivism. Identity relates to how people see themselves, and these identities shape their preferences and

interests. Identities cannot be presumed, or taken for granted. The formation of identities and interests is a social process, the product of people's interactions with society and other elites and peoples. Communication amongst elites is important in understanding and reshaping the identity and interests of others. Through communication, interaction and networking elites may learn about one another and come to see others as friends rather than enemies.⁴³ In order to interact effectively with each other in the international system there needs to be recognised norms or standards of behaviour. Norms are constructed by actors who have strong ideas about what is appropriate behaviour for states.⁴⁴ Therefore, there are guidelines in the international system for actors to follow. In addition, constructivism also emphasizes culture. Constructivists refer to culture as a set of practices that give some sort of meaning to shared experiences and actions.⁴⁵ Culture is important to construct the values and rules that inform identity. States previous experiences will shape their identity.

To understand cyberwar through the constructivist lens, unlike neorealists or liberals, we are not going to analyse what states or other actors may need to do to deal with cyberwar. We are going to analyse how cyberwar is socially constructed. The advances in technology

have led to the development of cyberspace, such that cyberspace can be used to threaten national and human security. Thus, cyber space and cyber war have widened the concept of security.

Previously, security in international relations was only identified with how to secure physical spaces, such as land, sea, air and space, for national security purposes. However, the focus of security has in part shifted to include cyber space as this area can also be used to harm the state. There has been a shift in the value of 'spaces'. Cyberspace facilitates cyberwar leading to fear of attack from enemies. Dunn Cavelti has argued that the problem in cyberwar is not the attack itself, but the fear of potential attack.⁴⁶ She argues there have been very few attacks that had the potential to rattle an entire nation, or cause a global shock.⁴⁷ For example, the loss of revenue, the loss of intellectual property rights and other proprietary data, the costs of maintenance and repair, and increased security costs, together have the potential to reduce public confidence in internet transactions and e-commerce. However, the fear of cyber war is because this attack is new and fear from the actor who conduct the war, which is enemy. Here, there is social construction of what fear is. Fear that the cyber system will not capable to support human's daily life.

Another thing to consider in this constructivist analysis is the construction of identity. Cyber attackers are often identified as enemies in cyberwar. However, when the attack is not from an enemy, but from someone with a similar identity, then it becomes cyber espionage. For example, if Syria cyber attacked the U.S it would count as cyberwar, but if an Australian teenager conducted attack to Microsoft Xbox, it count as espionage because Australia is a U.S ally. Nevertheless, cyberwar is largely driven by state (mis)perception of the interests and identities of other states. If states were to talk to one another, and come to share norms, or respect identity, then perhaps cyber war would be less likely to happen.

Conclusion, which theory is adequate in explaining cyberwar?

For purpose of this essay, I argue that neorealism as a good theory that helps us to understand cyberwar. Liberalism argues that there are many major actors in cyber war. Individuals and the private sector have to be considered as important actors in cyber war. To control behaviour in cyber space, liberals argue that cooperation through institutions is important. However, to date, there are no such strong institutions to control behaviour in cyber space, or to prevent cyber war. Thus, cyber war is still likely to happen. Further, liberals do not explain

how norms and institutions can effectively tackle cyber war. Although there are some international institutions, the primary actors are states, not other actors.

Constructivism offers an alternative analysis. National security used to be largely concerned with national sovereignty, but with the development of cyber space, the concept and field of security has been enlarged. In addition, international relations and national security involves perceptions about identities and interests. In order to secure cyber peace, elites need to interact with one another, come to understand different identities and interests, and in this way perhaps come to see the other as a (cyber) friend.

Nevertheless, neorealism is the most adequate theory for understanding cyber war. This theory explains why cyber war happens. Cyber war happens because states, in seeking national security, act 'offensively', in accordance with the 'offence-defence balance' concept. Neorealism provides a more realistic account of the units and processes involved. States are the major actors, and the state of anarchy shapes their behaviour in both the physical and cyber spaces.

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**Decentralization in Indonesia:
An Evaluation of the Implementation of Laws 22 and 25 of 1999**

Beche Bt Mamma*

bechemamma@yahoo.com

Abstract

Indonesia has been undergoing a reform process. It started with the process of rapid decentralization government began in 1999 from a strong centralized system. One of its process is the introduction of decentralization, a process of transfer power from the central government to provinces to sub-provinces. Decentralization became a worldwide phenomenon since over three decade. Countries around the world use decentralization principles with varying degree, mostly by transferring responsibilities of public service delivery to lower levels of government. The decentralization literature promotes the good governance aspects associated with decentralization including local citizen participation, democratic elections and financial and political equity. Decentralization in Indonesia is much more of an administrative decentralization rather than a fiscal decentralization. The central government continues to control a vast share of the revenues required for local governance under true decentralization.

Key words: Decentralization, Reform Process, Centralized System, Governance

*International Relation's Lecture at Bosowa University

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Indonesia has been undergoing a reform process. It started with the process of rapid decentralization government began in 1999 from a strong centralized system. One of its process is the introduction of decentralization, a process of transfer power from the central government to provinces to sub-provinces.¹This paper will assess the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia under new decentralization guidance in 2001 under law 22/1999 on regional government and law 25/1999 on fiscal balance between the central and regional government in 2004.²Therefore, the first part of this essay will explain the background of decentralization process in Indonesia which caused the two laws that mentioned above to be enacted. Then it will assess strengths and weaknesses of decentralization in Indonesia since the decentralization was introduced in 1999.

Decentralization in Indonesia

Decentralization became a worldwide phenomenon since over three decade. Countries around the world use

decentralization principles with varying degree, mostly by transferring responsibilities of public service delivery to lower levels of government.³Many countries around the world have embraced decentralization over the past ten years in regions as diverse as the newly independent states of Eastern Europe, Mozambique, Brazil, India, and Indonesia. The decentralization literature promotes the good governance aspects associated with decentralization including local citizen participation, democratic elections, and financial and political equity.⁴Decentralization in Indonesia is much more of an administrative decentralization rather than a fiscal decentralization. The central government continues to control a vast share of the revenues required for local governance under true decentralization. Local governments on average receive more than 80 percent of their revenues from the central government. This creates a disconnecting between revenues received at the local level and expenditure decisions

¹K. Green, Decentralization and Good Governance: the case of Indonesia, Munich Personal rePEc Archive, MPRA Paper no. 18097, 26 October 2009, p. 1.

²See R. E. D. Darmawan, The Practices of Decentralization in Indonesia and Its Implication on Local Competitiveness, Public Administration-Public Governance Study, School of Management and Government, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands, 2008, p. ii.

³R. R. Simatupang, Evaluation of Decentralization Outcomes in Indonesia: Analysis of Health and Education Sectors, A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies of Georgia State University, 2009, p. 1.

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that are made locally. Local governments are responsible for paying salaries that were previously paid for by the central government and paying for basic required services such as health and education. Consequently, local governments have increased spending responsibility without the additional locally controlled revenue base necessary to support extra spending. Decentralization is a national development policy that can yield national development outcomes.⁵As Simandjuntak suggests 'through decentralization various national problems will be solved at the regional level by using local means to cope with local challenges'.⁶It is important to know that the decentralization process in Indonesia according to the World Bank has started off much better than expected. As a result, Indonesia becomes center of attention from international scholars as they often mentioned about Indonesia's decentralization as an example in their works.⁷

Indonesia is a unitary state. So that provincial and local governments are the creation of the central government. In the colonial period, government administrative was highly centralized, although municipalities were more autonomous than at present.⁸In addition, local infrastructure services in Indonesia are developed and operated in a multitier and complex system of regional administration. So that, central government ministries and their regional offices are expected to work cooperatively with agencies of provincial and local governments in planning and implementing development projects and providing services.⁹Indonesia today is comprised of 30 autonomous provinces that contain districts and municipalities. Districts, located in rural areas, and municipalities, outside of rural areas, are the same level of government. The provinces have a governor who serves as the central government's representative and a representative parliament. The provinces and local governments are sub-national governments.¹⁰According to Green, regional autonomy legislation was drafted in 1999 (Law 22 and Law 25) and

⁵ K. Green, p. 4.

⁶T. B. Pepinsky and M.M. Wihardja, Decentralization and Economic Performance in Indonesia, 10 December 2010, http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228427343_Decentralization_and_economic_performance_in_Indonesia/links/004635242ae33e3ca4000000, consulted on 12 November 2014.

⁷ R. R. Simatupang, Evaluation of Decentralization Outcomes in Indonesia: Analysis of Health and Education Sectors, A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of

Philosophy in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies of Georgia State University, 2009, p. 1.

⁸P. Smoke and B. D. Lewis, Fiscal Decentralization in Indonesia: A New Approach to an Old Idea, *World Development*, vol. 24, no. 8, p. 1282.

⁹ P. Smoke and B. D. Lewis, p. 1282.

¹⁰ K. Green, p. 3.

implemented in 2001, the decentralization law focused on empowering sub-provincial governments and were crafted without a well-developed transition or implementation plan.¹¹

Decentralization practice in Indonesia based on Law 22 and Law 25

Similarly, according to Darmawan, along with the reform that took place in 1998, the new decentralization were prepared under the escalating pressures of the disintegration and demands for more democratic government from the civil societies and international donors at that time. Thus, law no. 22/1999 on regional government and law no. 25 on fiscal balance between central and regional government were enacted on May 1999 and it was effective in January 2001.¹² To complete the process of preparation period, it took two years for all levels of governments to fully implement the laws.¹³ These laws emphasize on how decentralization should be carried out. These laws are designed to involve more powers to the district governments. In addition, as an emerging democracy country, this change is also accentuated by the Western international donor that tends to promote decentralization as a means of

devolution of powers to improve democratization in Indonesia.¹⁴ Further, Darmawan argues that ‘the newest decentralization laws have different emphasize on how decentralization should be carried out. These laws are designed to devolve more powers to the district governments. Besides, as an emerging democracy country which has been engaging in a reform, this change is also accentuated by the western international donors’ involvement that tends to promote decentralization as a means of devolution of powers to improve democratization’.

According to Akhmad Bayhaqi the Law No 22/1999 and 25/1999 in Indonesia, divide decentralization into two categories, Law 22 concerns administrative decentralization, while Law 25 concerns financial administration.¹⁵ As of January 2001, based on Law No 22/1999 and Law No 25/1999, the Indonesia’s government must have already implemented the new policy of regional

¹⁴ R. E. D. Darmawan, p. 24.

¹⁵ A. Bayhaqi, Decentralization in Indonesia: the Possible Impact on Education (Schooling) and Human Resource Development for Local Regions, Southeast Asian Studies Programme National University of Singapore, 2004, p. 3. Paper presented at The 2nd International Conference on Indonesia: Decentralization and Structural Reformation, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Diponegoro University, Semarang, July 7-8th, 2004. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/external/labor/FLS/IFLS/papers/2004_bayhaqi.pdf, consulted on 12 November 2014.

¹¹ K. Green, p. 3.

¹² R. E. D. Darmawan, p. 23.

¹³ R. E. D. Darmawan, p. 24.

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autonomy, the Laws provided the framework for decentralizing authorities once held by central government and gave local government's new responsibilities to manage their own regions.¹⁶This decentralization and special autonomy laws derives from Central government to the local governments in term of the authority and corresponding responsibility for the delivery of most basic services.¹⁷ However, as Bert Hofman and Kai Kaiser argue Law 22 of 1999 gives broad autonomy to the regions in all but a few tasks that are explicitly assigned to the center, including defense, justice, and police and planning. With the authority come the resources. In the first year, the regional share in government spending jumped from 17 percent to 30 percent. Over time, with the current assignments of functions, this share is likely to rise to over 40 percent, a sharp contrast with the average 15 percent of spending in the 1990s. This share is also much larger than can be expected on the basis of Indonesia's size—whether measures in population or geographical size. In addition to spending, much of the apparatus of government was put under the control of the regions. Over 2 million civil servants, or almost 2/3 of the central government workforce, was transferred to the regions. Now, out of a

civil service of 3.9 million, some 2.8 million are classified as regional. And 239 provincial-level offices of the central government, 3933 local-level offices, more than 16,0000 service facilities—schools, hospitals, health centers-- were transferred rock stock and barrel to the regional governments throughout Indonesia.¹⁸

Flaws in Implementation

In line with Hofman and Kaiser's argument in regards with the task divisions, Darmawan argues that due to the too short and hurried preparation, the implementation of this laws caused potential flaws and have inevitably started to produce adverse effects.¹⁹For example, during their short implementation period, several problems are identified, such as unclear division of authorities among the tiers of government causing a struggle for authorities among them, inefficient resource allocation caused by the low capacity and demoralization of civil servants within the regional governments, widening disparity among regions, and

¹⁶ A. Bayhaqi, p. 11.

¹⁷ A. Bayhaqi, p. 11.

¹⁸ B. Hofman and K. Kaiser, *The Making of the Big Bang and Its Aftermath: A Political Economy Perspective*, Paper presented in the Conference : Can Decentralization Help Rebuild Indonesia?, A Conference Sponsored by the International Study Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, May 1-3, 2002, p. 2,

<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/LearningProgram/Decentralization/Hofman2.pdf>, consulted on 13 November 2014.

¹⁹R. E. D. Darmawan, p. 24.

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stronger primordial ties based on ethnic and religion.²⁰ Moreover, the confusion started when the provinces are also mentioned as one of autonomous regions, while at the same time they retain into hierarchical relationship with the central government. Consequently, it leads to a de facto deconcentration practice. It would be clearer if it is stated that the provincial regions are excluded from being called as autonomous regions, since the true devolution only occurs at the regency and municipality level as they are detached from the higher level of government.²¹ In addition to that, the laws also declare that for the reason of economic and governance efficiency, one or more regions can be merged if they cannot perform the regional autonomy appropriately, or conversely, a new region can emerge once it has complied with the requirements. However, an amalgamation of some regions into one region or a split into new regions, could be not right in the political sense, because it can raise potential threats of conflict of interest among the communities to get the power over the new formed regions.²² Under the previous law, this

stipulation has prompted a rapid formation of new regions within a short time. Thus, the new law brings tighter requirements for new region formations.²³ Similarly, Bert Hofman and Kai Kaiser concerns with the short period of decentralization process to be implemented, where public services and national cohesion would be beneficial of this process.²⁴

According to Gabe Ferrasi, more than one year into decentralization, much unclarity remains on what exactly has been decentralized. Law 22 does not define local government functions directly, but only by specifying what the center (Art.7) and the province (Art 9) do. Article 11 specifies local government obligatory functions, but not to a level of operational detail. PP25/2000 is not much help here, as it focuses on the remaining functions of central and regional governments. This

Dampakekonomidanpolitik UU No. 22 dan 25 tahun 1999 tentang otonomidaerah. (The political and economy impacts of Law No. 22 and 25 /1999 concerning regional autonomy). CSIS working paper 054, June 2000. Also see Suwondo, Kutut. (2002). Decentralization in Indonesia. INFID background paper on decentralization. Downloaded from: www.infid.com Quoted in R. E. D. Darmawan, p. 25.

²⁰R. E. D. Darmawan, p. 24.

²¹ R. E. D. Darmawan, p. 25.

²² See Amri, PuspaDelima. (2000).

Dampakekonomidanpolitik UU No. 22 dan 25 tahun 1999 tentang otonomidaerah. (The political and economy impacts of Law No. 22 and 25 /1999 concerning regional autonomy). CSIS working paper 054, June 2000. See Amri, PuspaDelima. (2000).

²³R. E. D. Darmawan, p. 26.

²⁴ B. Hofman and K. Kaiser, Decentralization, Democratic Transition, and Local Governance in Indonesia, p. 82 in P. Bardhan and D. Mookherjee (edn), Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective, The MIT Press, Cambridge, London, 2006.

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legal framework of “general competency” rather than ultra vires definition of function as embedded in Law 5/1974 is unusual for local governments. It is also more radical than the subsidiarity principle—which was apparently the inspiration of the drafting team.⁹ Subsidiarity as a principle would not call for a limited list of central functions in the law, but for a process by which decentralization or centralization is determined, while specifying the principles that guide the process.²⁵ Furthermore, much of the detail on government functions is contained in such ministerial decrees. Moreover, even though regional regulations (PERDAs) are placed below central government legal instruments such as government regulations and Presidential Decrees, arguably organic regional regulations (i.e. based directly on a law that delegates regulatory responsibility to the regions) should take precedent over central regulations and decrees without a

direct basis in the law.²⁶ Worse, some central agencies, notably those for Land management and for Investment Approval have managed to get a Presidential Decree issued which exempts their authorities from decentralization as Law 22/99 calls for. And the adjustment of sectorial laws to align them with regional autonomy, as is called for in Law 22/99 Art. 133. Finally, the revised Art.18 of the constitution now calls for central functions to be regulated by Law, and the question is whether that law is Law 22/99, or whether a separate law is called for to specify these functions.²⁷ The bottom line of all this is that the distribution of functions, let alone the expected performance in exercising the functions, is still far from clear. Beyond causing utter confusion in the regions, this

²⁵ Gabe Ferazzi, (2002): Obligatory Functions and Minimum Standards: A Preliminary Review of the Indonesian approach GTZ SfDM, Report No/2002-2, March. Quoted in B. Hofman and K. Kaiser, The Making of the Big Bang and Its Aftermath: A Political Economy Perspective, Paper presented in the Conference : Can Decentralization Help Rebuild Indonesia?, A Conference Sponsored by the International Study Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, May 1-3, 2002, p. 2,
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²⁶ B. Hofman and K. Kaiser, The Making of the Big Bang and Its Aftermath: A Political Economy Perspective, Paper presented in the Conference : Can Decentralization Help Rebuild Indonesia?, A Conference Sponsored by the International Study Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, May 1-3, 2002, p. 2,

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²⁷ B. Hofman and K. Kaiser, The Making of the Big Bang and Its Aftermath: A Political Economy Perspective, Paper presented in the Conference : Can Decentralization Help Rebuild Indonesia?, A Conference Sponsored by the International Study Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, May 1-3, 2002, p. 2,

<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/LearningProgram/Decentralization/Hofman2.pdf>, consulted on 13 November 2014.

state of play not only undermines accountability of the regional government, but also hampers judgment on the vertical distribution of fiscal resources. The confusion has not stopped central government to embark on an effort to have the regions “recognize” their functions in a positive list that is to be cleared by Presidential. Without deeper understanding and agreement on the functions themselves, and the minimum standards for these functions, recognition of these functions seems distracting at best.²⁸

The strengths of decentralization

Despite the several flaws in the implementation, the laws 22 and 25 of 1999 has provided major changes in the decentralization implementation in Indonesia. Firstly, the hierarchical relationship between the province and the districts has been abolished. The kabupaten and kota formerly as kotamadya no longer report to the province. They are autonomous regions which have

become the focus of sub national governance in Indonesia.²⁹ They are responsible for a widerange of functions, they can communicate directly with central government, and they are incharge of administering the sub-districts (kecamatan). The second major change is the greatly expanded role of the local elected assemblies, the DPRD. They now have significant legislative powers; they appoint the heads of regions who are then responsible to the DPRD; and they are entrusted with the task of ‘implementing democracy.’ This points to a third change—a greater concern with democratic accountability.³⁰ This is indicated in provisions for public disclosure and transparency in government, and in the encouragement of partnership with civil society. Not only is there a concern for more accountability but also for accountability to local citizens rather than to Jakarta.

The fourth major change is the transfer of responsibility for a long list of functions to the kabupaten and kota. These include public works, health, education and culture, agriculture, communication,

²⁸ B. Hofman and K. Kaiser, *The Making of the Big Bang and Its Aftermath: A Political Economy Perspective*, Paper presented in the Conference : Can Decentralization Help Rebuild Indonesia?, A Conference Sponsored by the International Study Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, May 1-3, 2002, p. 2,
<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/LearningProgram/Decentralization/Hofman2.pdf>, consulted on 13 November 2014.

²⁹ M. Turner, *Implementing Laws 22 and 25: the Challenge of Decentralization in Indonesia*, *Asian Review of Public Administration*, vol. XIII, no. 1, 2001, pp. 72-73.

³⁰ M. Turner, *Implementing Laws 22 and 25: the Challenge of Decentralization in Indonesia*, *Asian Review of Public Administration*, vol. XIII, no. 1, 2001, pp. 72-73.

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industry and trade, capital investment, environment, land, cooperatives and 'manpower' affairs.³¹ This means that the parallel organizations of dinas and kandop will be amalgamated under the control of the autonomous regions while some former provincial functions will also be absorbed by the kabupaten and kota. Related to this is the final change introduced under Law 22—the creation of regional civil services. Large number of former central government employees will be transferred to autonomous regional government control. The kabupaten and kota have been awarded 'the authority to conduct appointment, transfer, dismissal, stipulation of pension, salary, allowance and employee welfare as well as education and training' (Law 22, Article 76). The autonomous regions can structure their organizations according to their own preferences.³² The profound changes introduced in Law 22 naturally have strong implications for financial arrangements. These have been addressed in Law 25 of 1999 on the Financial Balance between Central and Regional Government. Two leading transfers from central to sub

national levels have been abolished: the subsidi daerah Otonomi (SDO) for paying local public servants and routine expenditures and the block Inpres grants intended to fund development projects. These are replaced by a General Allocation Fund which is to be at least 25 percent of domestic revenue. Ninety percent of this fund goes to kabupaten and kota and ten percent to provinces distributed to individual sub national territories according to a special formula.³³

The most significant and contentious fiscal change is the introduction of revenue sharing between central and regional governments involving land and building tax, land acquisition, forestry, fisheries, mining, and oil and gas. For example, the central government will take 85 percent of oil revenues after tax while the region from which the oil was extracted will receive the remaining 15 percent.³⁴ Other initiatives include a Special Allocation Fund which may be used to finance special initiatives in the regions, and granting regions greater possibilities for securing loans but simultaneously increasing

³¹ M. Turner, *Implementing Laws 22 and 25: the Challenge of Decentralization in Indonesia*, *Asian Review of Public Administration*, vol. XIII, no. 1, 2001, pp. 72-73.

³² M. Turner, *Implementing Laws 22 and 25: the Challenge of Decentralization in Indonesia*, *Asian Review of Public Administration*, vol. XIII, no. 1, 2001, pp. 72-73.

³³ M. Turner, *Implementing Laws 22 and 25: the Challenge of Decentralization in Indonesia*, *Asian Review of Public Administration*, vol. XIII, no. 1, 2001, pp. 72-73.

³⁴ M. Turner, *Implementing Laws 22 and 25: the Challenge of Decentralization in Indonesia*, *Asian Review of Public Administration*, vol. XIII, no. 1, 2001, pp. 72-73.

regional accountability for them. There is in general an increased concern with financial accountability not only upwards to central government but also to the DPRD's which have been awarded the authority to reject the regional head's annual accountability report.³⁵

Conclusion

The implementation of decentralization in Indonesia has brought a fresh air in the government administration system in regards to the transfer power and authority from the central government to the provinces and sub-provinces. Despite it is as a popular policy, the poor implementation of this decentralization, particularly law 22 and 25 of 1999 that has been discussed in this essay, has influenced the performance and output of the policy. Thus, Indonesia government should do accurate assessment to ensure the implementation of this policy will encourage the public services, the transfer power and the fiscal benefits in Indonesia.

³⁵M. Turner, Implementing Laws 22 and 25: the Challenge of Decentralization in Indonesia, *Asian Review of Public Administration*, vol. XIII, no. 1, 2001, pp. 72-73.

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Kerjasama Korea Selatan –Indonesia dalam Manajemen Bencana Alam (Rekontruksi Aceh Pasca Tsunami Samudera Hindia)

Ady Muzwardi*
ady.muz16@gmail.com

Abstract

Natural Disasters is a part of media diplomacy and cooperation between nations, strengthening disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels. In coping with disasters, national resources could be overwhelmed, especially in the event of large-scale disasters. In this respect, bilateral and regional cooperation is of particular importance, and this is part of the Korean Indonesian relations. The political dialogue also intends to foster closer cooperation on humanitarian and activities between the Indonesia and Korean.

The tsunami in Aceh serves as an example of media diplomacy between the two nations as part of global cooperation. The development of political, social and culture cooperation through reconstruction efforts, programs and projects in Aceh has become a strength in the diplomatic relations between South Korea and Indonesia. This research aims to share knowledge and exchange best practices and to be able to work together in the event of major disasters.

Keywords: Natural Disasters, diplomacy, reconstruction.

*FISIP, Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji

A. Latar Belakang

Secara Sejak tahun 1600 sampai dengan tahun 2007, Indonesia telah mengalami 184 tsunami besar. Apabila kita melihat sumber penyebab terjadinya tsunami tersebut, hampir 90% kejadiannya disebabkan oleh gempa bumi di laut, 9% diakibatkan oleh letusan gunung api dan 1% karena tanah longsor bawah laut.¹

Tsunami terbesar di Indonesia terjadi pada 26 Desember 2004 dan menjadi salah satu tsunami terbesar di muka bumi. Tsunami tersebut menghantam pantai barat Sumatra dan menyebabkan korban jiwa lebih dari 227,000 serta menghancurkan berbagai fasilitas dan tempat tinggal. Lebih dari 14 negara di sepanjang Samudera Hindia terkena dampak tsunami tersebut. Secara cepat, setelah terjadi tsunami, operasi bantuan yang tidak terduga dimulai. Bantuan tersebut mengalir melalui ratusan negara dan lembaga bantuan internasional dari 130 negara yang berkontribusi terhadap program bantuan darurat yang massive.² Secara cepat operasi bantuan tersebut berjalan untuk pembangunan kembali infrastruktur di Aceh. Di bulan April 2005 pemerintah Indonesia

mengeluarkan sebuah *'Master Plan'* untuk mengarahkan rehabilitasi dan rekonstruksi kembali Aceh dan disaat bersamaan Presiden Indonesia membentuk Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR), yang bertugas untuk mengkoordinasikan rehabilitasi dan rekonstruksi kembali Aceh.

B. Permasalahan

Berdasarkan latar belakang masalah diatas, maka yang menjadi permasalahan dalam penelitian ini yaitu bagaimana Kerjasama Korea Selatan-Indonesia Dalam Manajemen Bencana Alam dalam Rekonstruksi Aceh Pasca Tsunami Samudera Hindia.

C. Tujuan

Adapun tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui bagaimana Kerjasama Korea Selatan-Indonesia Dalam Manajemen Bencana Alam dalam Rekonstruksi Aceh Pasca Tsunami Samudera Hindia.

D. Metode Penelitian.

1. Jenis penelitian

Penelitian ini menggunakan jenis penelitian kualitatif yaitu menganalisa permasalahan dari sudut pandang atau bahan pustaka. Desain penelitian ini lebih menitikberatkan pada data

¹ Latief, Hamzah, DKK.2000. *Tsunami Catalog and Zones in Indonesia*. Vol 22. Tohoku University

² UNEP.2007 *'Environment and Reconstruction in Aceh: Two years after the tsunami'*. United Nations Environment Programme publication

sekunder. Jenis data yang digunakan dalam penelitian yaitu sekunder. Data sekunder adalah data yang diperoleh dari bahan kepustakaan guna mendapatkan landasan teoritis.

E. Kerangka Teori

1. Diplomasi Bencana

Diplomasi Bencana menggabungkan dua kata kunci. Berdasarkan kamus Oxford, definisi bencana adalah “suatu kejadian kecelakaan atau penderitaan yang disebabkan oleh perubahan alam yang berdampak kerusakan besar atau berdampak pada hilangnya nyawa manusia” (oxforddictionaries.com). Kata kedua adalah “diplomasi”, kata diplomasi memiliki definisi yang berlawanan dengan perang, diplomasi bagian dari negosiasi dengan sisi politik yang kuat. Saat kedua kata tersebut digabung menjadi jawaban dari pertanyaan terkait keterlibatan atau kehadiran dari aktor internasional dalam konflik/bencana.³

Semua Diplomasi Bencana membuktikan sejauh ini hubungan

aktivitas dalam bencana yang dapat menjadi katalis dari diplomasi. Hubungan yang terjadi antar aktor dalam keadaan bencana dapat menciptakan diplomasi. Dalam jangka pendek (1 minggu atau 1 bulan) dampak diplomasi yang terkait aktivitas penanggulangan bencana dapat berakibat terciptanya hubungan positif. Diplomasi, pembentukan lembaga rekonsiliasi merupakan bagian dari diplomasi baik negosiasi formal.⁴

Menurut Louise K. Comfort, isu bencana sekarang ini menjadi isu yang sangat krusial bagi peningkatan kualitas kesejahteraan manusia. Bencana harus didefinisikan secara lebih luas, tidak hanya sebatas isu bencana alam semata, namun juga bencana penyakit ataupun isu pemanasan global. Pendefinisian bencana sebagai isu global diharapkan akan meningkatkan empati dari masyarakat dunia untuk terlibat bersama menyelesaikan problem bencana.

Disaster Diplomacy examines the role of disaster-related

³ Jonsson, C. and Aggestam, K. 2009. “*Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution*.” The SAGE *Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, eds. Bercovitch, J., Kartman, W. I., and Kremenjuk, V. Hal. 33-51

⁴ Kelman, I. 2007. “Disaster diplomacy: Can tragedy help build bridges among countries?” UCAR Quarterly, Fall 2007, p. 6.

*activities not just in international affairs and international relations, but also in political conflict not involving more than independent state. Disaster Diplomacy also embraces a wide definition of "disaster", not just rapid-onset events such as earthquakes and industrial explosions, but also events which are more diffuse in space and time such as droughts, epidemics, and global changes. These latter events have been termed "chronic disaster", "creeping changes", and "disaster conditions" amongst other terms"*⁵

Studi kontemporer yang dilakukan oleh I. Kelman menunjukkan bahwa bencana tidak selalu menjadi faktor yang buruk bagi masyarakat, namun dalam batas tertentu dapat dikelola untuk menyelesaikan persoalan-persoalan politik dan konflik yang selama ini tak terpecahkan, baik dalam konteks persoalan dalam level nasional

maupun antara Negara. Argumen besar dari Kelman adalah bencana justru memberikan ruang yang besar bagi pihak-pihak yang memiliki potensi sebagai daerah yang rawan bencana untuk mencari ruang yang bisa dikerjakan untuk mengurangi resiko yang ditimbulkan dari bencana alam itu sendiri.

Studi Kelman tentang semakin menunjukkan fungsionalitas diplomasi bencana alam. Dalam studinya juga menunjukkan bahwa bencana alam juga dapat dikelola untuk menjadi ruang bagi peningkatan kerjasama politik, ekonomi, sosial budaya yang lebih luas. Negara-negara yang tergolong sebagai daerah yang rawan bencana atau potensial mengalami bencana alam, yang sebelumnya tidak melakukan kerjasama yang intensif, bahkan cenderung bermusuhan secara politik, kemudian memilih melakukan kerjasama untuk mengurangi resiko dan dampak bencana.⁶

2. Rekonstruksi

⁵Ilan Kelman.2002."Disaster Diplomacy How Disasters Affect Peace and Conflict".Routledge.2011. p.15

⁶ Surwandono, Herningtyas.2013. "Peningkatan Kapasitas Birokrasi Pemerintah Daerah Propinsi DIY dalam Melakukan Diplomasi Bencana Alam".FISIPOL UMY. Hal 8

Rekonstruksi menurut Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia (KBBI) adalah pengembalian seperti semula. Secara khusus arti rekonstruksi dalam Penanggulangan bencana dan mitigasi Menurut KBBI ekonstruksi (reconstruction): Adalah program jangka menengah dan yang jangka panjang meliputi perbaikan fisik, sosial dan ekonomi untuk mengembalikan kehidupan masyarakat pada kondisi yang sama atau lebih baik dari sebelumnya. || rekonstruksi : Pembangunan kembali semua prasarana dan sarana, kelembagaan pada wilayah pascabencana, baik pada tingkat pemerintahan maupun masyarakat dengan sasaran utama tumbuh dan berkembangnya kegiatan perekonomian, sosial dan budaya, tegaknya hukum dan ketertiban, dan bangkitnya peran serta masyarakat dalam segala aspek kehidupan bermasyarakat pada wilayah pascabencana. || rekonstruksi : Rekonstruksi adalah tahap pembangunan kembali semua sarana dan prasarana agar kembali berkembangnya kegiatan perekonomian, sosial budaya, dan bangkitnya peran masyarakat dalam semua aspek kehidupan. B.N Marbun Rekonstruksi adalah

pengembalian sesuatu ketempatnya yang semula; Penyusunan atau penggambaran kembali dari bahan-bahan yang ada dan disusun kembali sebagaimana adanya atau kejadian semula. Kebutuhan rehabilitasi dan rekonstruksi diperkirakan berdasarkan penilaian kerusakan dan kerugian yang dilengkapi dengan penilaian kebutuhan pemulihan kemanusiaan masyarakat korban bencana untuk memperoleh perkiraan kebutuhan pemulihan pasca bencana. Keterkaitan antara penilaian kerusakan dan kerugian dengan penilaian kebutuhan pemulihan kemanusiaan memberikan umpan balik bagi kebutuhan pemulihan dengan menempatkan masyarakat korban bencana dan lingkungannya sebagai sasaran pemulihan pasca bencana.

Tabel 1. Rekonstruksi Pasca Bencana

<i>Disaster assessment</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rapid assessment • Preliminary damage assessment • Site assessment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Victims' needs assessments • "Lessons learned"
<i>Short-term recovery</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Impact area security • Temporary shelter/housing • Infrastructure restoration • Debris management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emergency demolition • Repair permitting • Donations management • Disaster assistance
<i>Long-term reconstruction</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hazard source control and area protection • Land-use practices • Building construction practices • Public health/mental health recovery 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic development • Infrastructure resilience • Historic preservation • Environmental recovery • Disaster memorialization
<i>Recovery management</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agency notification and mobilization • Mobilization of recovery facilities and equipment • Internal direction and control • External coordination • Public information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recovery legal authority and financing • Administrative and logistical support • Documentation


(Sumber : Lindell. 2013. *Recovery And Reconstruction After Disaster*.Springer. Texas. Hal 815)

Rekonstruksi pasca bencana memerlukan dana yang besar sehingga negara-negara yang mengalami bencana alam yang besar memerlukan kerjasama dengan negara-negara donor. Fase rekonstruksi pasca bencana dimulai dari proses penilai kebutuhan dilapangan (*assessment*) fungsi *assessment* sangat penting dalam rekonstruksi pasca bencana, melalui *assessment* dampak darurat pasca bencana dapat diidentifikasi terutama untuk membangun kembali rumah korban dan fasilitas umum lainnya.

Pembangunan kembali memerlukan pembuatan program yang dirancang dari kerjasama negara donor dengan negara yang mengalami bencana. Konsep rekonstruksi pada umumnya dimulai dari perencanaan sektor yang memiliki kebutuhan paling mendasar sehingga pembuatan program rekonstruksi dibantu dengan kemudahan dari regulasi yang ada dan pelaporan keuangan yang transparan dan memiliki akuntabilitas. Untuk tenaga ahli

dalam rekonstruksi banyak mengambil dari negara donor sebagai bagian dari kerjasama yang bukan hanya memberikan bantuan dana tetapi juga tenaga ahli.

Gambar1. Proses Penilaian Kebutuhan Pasca bencana dan Penyusunan Rencana Aksi



Sumber: BNPB.2014.Rencana aksi rehabilitasi dan rekonstruksi wilayah pasca bencana gempa bumi kabupaten aceh tengah dan bener meriah tahun 2013 – 2014. Hal 62

F. HASIL DAN PEMBAHASAN

1. Hubungan Diplomatik Korea Selatan dan Indonesia

Indonesia dan Korea Selatan telah menunjukkan hubungan yang erat sejak pembentukan hubungan diplomatik pada tahun 1973. Hubungan baik yang terjalin, salah satunya dibuktikan pada tahun 2012, sekitar 300.000 warga negara Korea

Selatan mengunjungi Indonesia dan 149.000 warga negara Indonesia mengunjungi Korea Selatan.⁷

Hubungan kenegaraan antara Indonesia dan Korsel telah berjalan sejak keduanegara tersebut menandatangani persetujuan pembukaan hubungan diplomatik kenegaraan tingkat konsuler pada 1966. Sebagai langkah pertama dimulainya hubungan kenegaraan resmi antara Indonesia-Korea Selatan tingkat konsuler tersebut, adalah dengan dibukanya banyak kesempatan bagi kedua negara untuk bekerja sama di berbagai bidang demi tercapainya kepentingan kedua negara.

Total perdagangan Indonesia dengan Korea Selatan pada periode Januari-Februari 2013 sebesar US\$4.415,38 juta, turun 16,64% dibanding periode Januari-Februari 2012, yang tercatat US\$5.296,89 juta. Total perdagangan periode Januari-Februari 2012 tersebut, terdiri dari ekspor Indonesia ke Korea Selatan sebesar US\$2.188,82 juta yang turun 25,21% dibanding periode yang sama tahun 2012 yang mencapai US\$2.926,45 juta, dan

impor Indonesia dari Korea Selatan sebesar US\$2.226,56 juta juga turun 6,07% dibanding periode yang sama tahun 2012, yang tercatat sebesar US\$2.370,44 juta. Neraca perdagangan Indonesia dengan Korea Selatan defisit bagi Indonesia sebesar US\$37,73 juta. Sementara itu, pada periode yang sama tahun 2012, Indonesia berhasil mencatatkan surplus sebesar US\$556,01 juta.

Pada periode Januari - Februari 2013 produk ekspor non-migas utama Indonesia ke Korea Selatan adalah barang-barang tambang (batubara, nikel, tembaga, dll), karet alam, bahan kimia, produk kayu, benang, dan peralatan listrik rumah tangga. Penurunan permintaan beberapa barang tambang Indonesia dari Korea Selatan disebabkan pengalihan impornya ke negara-negara lainnya seperti Australia, Jepang, dan Amerika Serikat.

Hubungan bilateral Indonesia-Korea Selatan terus mengalami perkembangan dan peningkatan yang cukup signifikan di berbagai bidang dari tahun ke tahun. Hubungan yang erat ini terlihat dengan adanya peningkatan kerjasama yang pesat yang tercermin dari semakin bertambahnya ikatan kerjasama

⁷<http://ipk.lipi.go.id/berita/208-indonesia-korea-selatan-semakin-mantapkan-hubungan-diplomatik>. diakses 16 Oktober 2016

antara kedua negara di berbagai bidang yang mencakup politik, pertahanan dan keamanan, ekonomi, perdagangan dan sosial budaya.

Indonesia dan Republik Korea mendirikan hubungan diplomatik pada tanggal 17 September 1973. Kemitraan strategis kedua negara mulai dijalin sejak 4 Desember 2006. Kerjasama kedua negara mengalami kemajuan yang signifikan dalam beberapa tahun terakhir sebagai hasil dari *summit diplomacy*, konsultasi, dan komunikasi pada tataran *working level* serta pertukaran antar-masyarakat yang intensif.

Republik Korea saat ini tercatat sebagai mitra dagang terbesar keempat dan investor asing terbesar ketiga Indonesia. Pada tahun 2012, volume perdagangan kedua negara adalah sebesar US\$27,02 milyar. Sementara investasi Republik Korea di Indonesia mencapai USD1,94 milyar, atau naik lebih dari 55% dari tahun sebelumnya.

Bentuk diplomasi Korea Selatan melalui diplomasi publik, yang bertujuan untuk menjadi negara yang paling dicintai di dunia. Upaya diplomasi Korea Selatan, dipelopori dengan cara mempromosikan TV drama Korea dan music K-pop

global, namun negara ini juga meluncurkan berbagai macam proyek-proyek publik diplomasi atas dasar pendanaan pemerintah termasuk proyek penanganan bencana alam, dimana untuk tahun fiskal 2014 di bawah pemerintahan Geun-hye nilainya sekitar 50% lebih tinggi dari tahun sebelumnya, pada 9 miliar won (sekitar ¥870.000.000).⁸

Dengan ekonomi yang terus berkembang dalam beberapa dekade terakhir, Korea Selatan menjadi salah satu "Macan Asia" dengan menjadi pemain terkemuka di kawasan Asia. Dengan hubungan bisnis dan perdagangan di seluruh dunia, Korea Selatan berjuang untuk menjadi salah satu pusat ekonomi Asia yang lebih terpadu bekerjasama dengan Indonesia. Fokus kerjasama Korea Selatan lebih menekankan pada strategi promosi yang bersifat diplomatik dengan fokus yang lebih global. Korea Selatan memiliki lima tujuan menuju diplomasi global yang berorientasi masa depan yaitu:

⁸Kwong Yongseok 2014 annual report - Korea Foundation

1. Konsolidasi hubungan diplomatik Korea dengan negara-negara tetangganya.
2. Memperluas upaya diplomatik Korea di wilayah lain.
3. Konsolidasi upaya diplomatik multilateral Korea.
4. Dukungan untuk pengembangan masyarakat Korea di luar negeri.
5. Mengejar aktif diplomasi budaya.

Fokus-fokus kerjasama Korea Selatan menjadi peluang kerjasama diantara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan terutama sebagai bentuk konsolidasi hubungan Korea Selatan dan Indonesia.

Tabel 1 Bantuan Korea (ODA) ke Indonesia: 2006-2010

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Tot al
Loans	53.0	-	58.9	58.0	140.0	309.9
Grants	24.0	24.1	21.2	16.6	18.4	104.3
Total	77.0	24.1	80.1	74.6	158.4	414.2

Sumber: <https://data.oecd.org/korea.htm>. diakses 16 Oktober 2016

Indonesia-Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IK-CEPA) yang telah memasuki negosiasi putaran ketiga diharapkan dapat mendorong pencapaian target perdagangan bilateral sebesar USD50 milyar pada tahun 2015 dan USD100 milyar tahun 2020. Dalam kaitan ini, IK-CEPA merupakan kerangka dan modalitas kerja sama saling menguntungkan di bidang ekonomi secara komprehensif dan tidak hanya di sektor perdagangan.

Selain isu bilateral, kedua Menteri Luar Negeri juga bertukar pandang mengenai situasi strategis di kawasan, khususnya terkait Semenanjung Korea. Kedua Menlu juga sepakat untuk mempererat kerja sama di forum regional dan internasional, antara lain dalam kerangka ASEAN-ROK, ASEAN Plus Three, ARF, EAS, FEALAC, dan APEC.⁹

2. Strategi Partnership Korea-Indonesia dalam Rekonstruksi Aceh

⁹Tempo.com. 2013. "Indonesia-Korea Selatan Tingkatkan Hubungan". Diakses dari <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2013/06/13/118488162/Indonesia-Korea-Selatan-Tingkatkan-Hubungan> diakses pada tanggal 14 Oktober 2016

Strategi *partnership* bertujuan untuk mendukung pengurangan kemiskinan dan pembangunan berkelanjutan di Indonesia yang sesuai dengan Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang dan Menengah Nasional 2005-2005 (RPJMN) dan *Master Plan* untuk Akselerasi dan Ekspansi Pembangunan Ekonomi Indonesia (MP3EI). *Master Plan* tersebut menjadi tampilan dari kerangka kerja dalam penguatan hubungan bilateral Korea dan Indonesia melalui Deklarasi Kerjasama dalam strategi *Partnership* sebagai media untuk mempromosikan persahabatan dan kerjasama di abad yang ditandatangani tanggal 4 Desember 2006 oleh kedua pimpinan negara. Implementasi dari deklarasi tersebut melalui pembentukan komite bersama dalam kerjasama ekonomi dan pembentukan *Working Level Task Force*.¹⁰

Kerjasama pembangunan Korea untuk Indonesia (2006-2010) secara total diperkirakan US\$414.2 juta (US\$309.9 juta dalam bentuk dana

konsesi dan US\$104.3 juta dalam bentuk komitmen anggaran) yang telah dialokasikan untuk Indonesia dalam periode 2006 sampai 2010 (rata-rata dengan dana rutin US\$83 juta). total bantuan dana Korea (ODA) untuk Indonesia dalam 2006 (US\$77.0 juta), dan sebagian besar dana untuk rekonstruksi Aceh, hal ini sebagai cemin kerjasama pembangunan kedua negara.

Kerjasama pemerintah Indonesia dengan pemerintah Korea Selatan dalam bidang disaster management lebih menekankan pada pencegahan dan penanggulangan bencana. Salah satunya kerjasamanya adalah pembangunan *Tsunami Response* di wilayah-wilayah rawan bencana tsunami.

Untuk mengatur kerjasama dalam *tsunami response*, Pemerintah Korea Selatan membentuk satuan gugus tugas yang memiliki respon yang cepat untuk mengatur kegiatan bantuan secara sistematis dengan bekerja sama dengan sektor swasta seperti ketika terjadinya bencana Tsunami Samudera Hindia.

Pemerintah Korea Selatan telah merespon secara cepat ketika Tsunami Samudera Hindia terjadi

¹⁰Republic of Korea.2012.*Country Partnership Strategy for the Republic of Indonesia 2012-2015*.

dengan memberikan bantuan sebesar \$50 juta, bantuan tersebut merupakan bantuan terbesar Korea Selatan terhadap bencana di luar Korea Selatan. Dari total jumlah tersebut, USD5 juta dialokasikan untuk bantuan darurat, dan \$45 juta untuk rekonstruksi. Indonesia menerima bagian terbesar (\$17.200.000) dari bantuan Korea Selatan karena menjadi negara yang paling parah terkena dampak bencana tsunami. Pemerintah Korea Selatan telah melaksanakan delapan proyek manajemen bencana alam di Indonesia termasuk melakukan rekonstruksi pembangunan sekolah dan rumah sakit. *The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)* berperan aktif dalam pengiriman kelompok relawan, dengan mengirim 73 relawan dalam tiga tahap. Para relawan yang terlibat berbagai kegiatan pemulihan bencana, bantuan tenaga kesehatan dan perawatan medis dan *field staff assistance*.

Tabel 1. *KOICA's Response to the Indonesian Tsunami 2004*

<i>Phase</i>	<i>Volum e</i>	<i>Activities</i>
<i>Emer</i>	<i>\$1.3m</i>	<i>- \$0.6M in financial</i>

<i>gency Relief</i>	<i>illion</i>	<i>aid</i> - \$0.7M in supplies including medicine, tents, blanket and water tanks - Emergency relief volunteers to primary school shelters in Banda Aceh
<i>Recovery and Reconstruction</i>	<i>\$15.9 million</i>	1. <i>Project Aid (construction, tech assistance, training)</i> - <i>KOICA model schools in Aceh Barat Daya/Nagan Raya (2006-2007, \$5.4M)</i> - <i>Korea-Indonesia Friendship Hospital in Aceh Barat Daya (2006-2007, \$3.7M)</i> - <i>Rehabilitation of Mangrove Forest & Coastal Area (2006-2008, \$1.8M)</i> 2. <i>Training of BRR/Aceh Government Officers on SME Development (\$0.1M)</i> 3. <i>Provision of</i>


		<p><i>Reconstruction Equipments/Supplies</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Tents, Blankets, financial aid for Recovery of Nias Island (\$0.2M)</i> - <i>Relief supplies for refugees and provision of reconstruction equipment in Banda Aceh (\$2 M)</i> - <i>Repairing of Fishing boats (\$0.8 M)</i> - <i>Provision of mobile cranes to rehabilitate harbors in Aceh</i> <p>4. <i>The Project for Establishment of the Disaster Information Dissemination System in Indonesia</i></p>
NGO funding	\$0.7 million	

Sumber: KOICA. 2009. "Evaluation of KOICA's Tsunami Response in Indonesia". Hal.17

Kerjasama Indonesia dengan Korea Selatan melalui kerjasama kementerian luar negeri Indonesia

dengan *Humanitarian Aid Division* melalui *Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade* (MOFAT) Korea Selatan, melalui KOICA. Sistem kerjasama yang dilakukan Korea Selatan dan Indonesia melalui MOFAT lebih khusus kepada lintas departemen yang dilibatkan dalam proses rekonstruksi. *Humanitarian Aid Division* memiliki kerjasama langsung dengan Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (BAPPENAS) melalui koordinasi kementerian luar negeri.

Gambar 2. Kerjasama Indonesia-Korea Selatan dalam kerjasama Disaster Management



Sumber: Diolah dari Berbagai Sumber

2. Proyek Rekonstruksi Aceh Pasca Tsunami

Proyek rekonstruksi membutuhkan koordinasi yang kuat

antar lembaga dari kedua belah negara yaitu Indonesia dan Korea Selatan, karena proyek rekonstruksi adalah proyek yang berkelanjutan. Pemerintah Korea Selatan melalui KOICA melakukan koordinasi dengan pemerintah pusat sampai dengan pemerintahan tingkat lokal di Indonesia. Proyek rekonstruksi Aceh melalui konsultasi antara KOICA dengan BAPPENAS dan BKRA. Beberapa proyek kerjasama Korea Selatan dan Indonesia setelah Tsunami meliputi proyek *The Korea-Indonesia Friendship Hospital*, dimana proyek tersebut bertujuan untuk (1.) meningkatkan bidang kesehatan di Aceh, (2.) meningkatkan kualitas pelayanan kesehatan di Aceh dengan mentransfer teknik pelayanan medis yang canggih dan (3.) meningkatkan kondisi kesehatan secara keseluruhan di wilayah yang terkena dampak tsunami.

Tabel 2. *Timeline for Korea-Indonesia Friendship Hospital*

Jan. 2005	<i>Korean Government committed to pledge total \$50 million of assistance for 2 yrs. ('05-'07) at</i>
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	<i>ASEAN Summit</i>
Jul. 12th, 2005	<i>Reached tentative mutual agreement on the direction of reconstruction project with BRR & Aceh Government personnel</i>
Sept. 7th, 2005	<i>MOU contract notice and request for dispatch of project-related personnel to Banda Aceh</i>
Oct. 10th, 2005	<i>Proposal for project area</i>
Nov. 20th-27th, 2005	<i>Dispatch of KOICA assessment team to Aceh Province</i>
Dec. 13th, 2005	<i>Established project basic framework</i>
Jan. 11th, 2006	<i>Creation of project implementation plan</i>
Apr. 17th, 2006	<i>Exchange of agreement from both governments</i>
Apr. 30th, 2008	<i>Installation of medical equipments</i>
May. 22nd,	<i>Held ceremony for building completion</i>

2008	
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Sumber: Koica, 2009, 33

Selain pembangunan *The Korea-Indonesia Friendship Hospital*, Indonesia dan Korea Selatan juga melakukan kerjasama pembangunan Aceh Model School di wilaya Naga Raya (1 TK, 1 SD, 1 SMP, 1 SMA), tiga sekolah di Aceh Barat Daya (1 SD, 1 SMP, SMA).

2006	
Apr. 17th, 2006	<i>Agreements exchanged between the two governments</i>
Apr. 30th, 2008	<i>School supplies installed</i>
May. 22nd, 2008	<i>Building completion ceremony held</i>

Sumber: Koica 2009, 42

Tabel 3. *Timeline for Aceh Model School Project*

Jan. 2005	<i>Korean government makes commitment for total assistance of \$50 million for two years (2005-2007) to disaster-stricken countries at ASEAN summit</i>
Jul. 12th, 2005	<i>Initial agreement on the reconstruction project selection and direction with BRR and Aceh Government officials</i>
Sept. 7th, 2005	<i>MOU signed and project correspondence from headquarter requested.</i>
Oct. 10th, 2005	<i>Nominates project areas</i>
Jan. 11th,	<i>Establishment of project implementation plan</i>

Kesimpulan

Keseluruhan paparan di atas memberikan gambaran bagaimana kerjasama Indonesia dengan Korea Selatan dalam penanganan bencana alam. Bencana alam dapat menjadi media kerjasama yang kuat bagi kedua negara sebagai bentuk hubungan transnasional. Pembangunan rumah sakit & sekolah di Aceh menjadi media diplomasi Korea Selatan untuk menguatkan hubungan kerjasamanya dengan Indonesia. Koordinasi dalam rekonstruksi di Aceh menjadi harmonisasi hubungan diplomatik kedua negara.

Kerjasama yang erat semakin memperkuat persaudaraan kedua negara, melalui proyek rekonstruksi kerjasama Korea Selatan-Indonesia di Aceh menjadi bentuk konsolidasi hubungan diplomatik Korea Selatan dengan negara-negara mitranya.

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Ekspor Revolusi Islam dan Identitas Republik Islam Iran

Naldo Helmys*
naldo.helmys@gmail.com

Abstract

Having been considered as rational actor acting based on national interests, sovereign states is also understood have their own identities. Moreover, state identities have pivotal role on determining state behavior in international social structure. Stand on that assumption, this paper will describe the four state identities of Islamic Republic of Iran that assist to find an answer for interesting question: why did Iran export their Islamic Revolution throughout Middle East during Ayatollah Khomeini's era (1979-1989)? During export of revolution, Iran was in war with Iraq and ideologically conflicted with Saudi while its fundamental ideology was spread across by propagating via international radio network and supporting oppressed nations in some countries. This historical phenomenon will be explained by Constructivism in International Relations, especially based on Alexander Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics. It can be seen that there are four identities of Iran: as an Islamic Iran nation, velayat-e faqih-based Islamic Republic, core of Islamic world, and part of Pan-Islam.

Keyword: Export of Revolution, State Identity, Islamic Republic of Iran

*Lulusan Program Sarjana Ilmu Hubungan Internasional, Universitas Andalas tahun 2015.

A. Pendahuluan

Di panggung perpolitikan Timur Tengah, kehadiran Republik Islam Iran sejak tahun 1979 secara signifikan berkontribusi dalam penentuan konfigurasi keamanan di kawasan tersebut, yang juga menjadi pokok perhatian masyarakat internasional. Terakhir kali, pemutusan hubungan diplomatik Iran oleh Arab Saudi pada 3 Januari 2016 telah menimbulkan kekhawatiran berbagai pihak, termasuk Pemerintah Indonesia.¹ Namun, hal itu bukan kali pertama hubungan Iran dengan negara di sekitarnya memicu ketidakstabilan kawasan.

Pada sepuluh tahun pertamanya berdiri (1979-1989) di bawah kepemimpinan Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran telah memicu perang dengan Irak, ketegangan dengan Arab Saudi, dan pemberontakan di berbagai negara. Adapun istilah yang diberikan untuk model politik luar negeri Iran saat itu adalah “ekspor revolusi” yang sederhananya dipahami sebagai propaganda koersif dan persuasif untuk menyebarkan ideologi Revolusi Islam ke seluruh dunia Islam. Menurut Katzman,

ideologi ini masih mempengaruhi politik luar negeri Iran.²

Dilatarbelakangi oleh fenomena di atas, tulisan ini mencoba untuk melihat dua hal. Pertama, apa sebetulnya dan bagaimana ekspor revolusi tersebut berlangsung. Hal ini akan dijelaskan dengan mengacu kepada penjelasan Fred Halliday. Kedua, seperti apa identitas Republik Islam Iran yang menentukan arah kepentingan nasional dan politik luar negeri negara tersebut.

Persoalan yang kedua ini dibedah dengan empat konsep identitas negara esensial: identitas korporat, identitas tipe, identitas peran, dan identitas kolektif yang dirumuskan oleh Alexander Wendt. Identitas ini terbentuk ketika Iran melihat dirinya sendiri dalam hubungannya dengan pihak lain.

B. Ekspor Revolusi Iran 1979-1989

Ekspor revolusi bukanlah sesuatu yang asing di dalam kajian Hubungan Internasional, khususnya ketika mengamati perilaku negara yang lahir dari sebuah revolusi. Menurut Halliday, ekspor revolusi adalah tindakan-tindakan atau aksi-aksi yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah suatu negara yang telah berhasil meraih kemenangan untuk mempromosikan

¹Simela Victor Muhammad, “Krisis Hubungan Arab Saudi-Iran,” *Info Singkat Hubungan Internasional* VIII, no. 01 (Januari 2016):5-7.

²Kenneth Katzman, “Iran’s Foreign Policy,” *Congressional Research Service* (Januari 2016), 2.

revolusi yang sama ke negara lain.³ Semua negara revolusioner, nyaris tanpa terkecuali, akan mempromosikan revolusi mereka ke negara lain dengan tujuan mengubah hubungan sosial dan politik di negara-negara tersebut.⁴

Iran sebagai negara yang lahir dari Revolusi Islam 1979 merupakan model yang sesuai untuk menggambarkan bagaimana negara revolusioner mengeksport revolusi mereka. Khomeini pada tanggal 21 Maret 1980 menggaris bawahi bahwa ekspor revolusi harus dilakukan karena dua alasan. Pertama, pada prinsipnya Islam adalah agama yang anti penindasan. Apabila perlawanan terhadap penindasan berhasil dilaksanakan di Iran lewat Revolusi Islam 1979, maka hal tersebut sudah sepatutnya dilakukan di wilayah Islam lainnya. Kedua, adanya kekhawatiran bahwa negara adidaya akan bertindak membasmi Iran apabila negara tersebut tetap mengurung dirinya.⁵

Berdasarkan metodenya, ekspor revolusi Iran dilakukan lewat dua cara: persuasif dan koersif. Cara pertama merujuk kepada propaganda yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah Iran sendiri maupun oleh para fanatis yang percaya dengan ide-ide revolusi. Sedangkan upaya kedua dilakukan dengan perang terbuka, membentuk kelompok jihad di negara lain, dan mendukung beberapa kudeta.

Propaganda dalam bahasa Persia adalah *tablighat*, yang sepadan dengan kata ‘dakwah’ dalam bahasa Indonesia. Kata ini biasanya digunakan untuk penyebaran pesan-pesan agama. Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa tindakan politis Iran dalam mengeksport revolusi memiliki akar kultural keislaman yang kuat. Said Hajjarian mengakui bahwa sudah menjadi hal yang lumrah apabila Iran melakukan propaganda karena setiap negara melakukannya. Namun, menurutnya, pola propaganda Iran dilakukan dengan mengajarkan Quran.⁶

Dalam wujud konkritnya, propaganda Iran dilakukan dengan memanfaatkan *Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting* (IRIB), jaringan radio milik pemerintah yang melakukan penyebaran berita secara global. Pada masa awal

³Fred Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 94-32.

⁴Fred Halliday, “The Sixth Great Power: on the Study of Revolution and International Relations.” *Review of International Studies*, 16/3 (1990), 214.

⁵Ayatollah Khomeini, *Sahifeh-ye Imam: An Anthology of Imam Khomeini's Speeches, Messages, Interviews, Decrees, Religious Permissions, and Letters* vol. 12, (Tehran: The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Work, 2008), 176.

⁶Christin Marschall, *Iran's Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami* (London: Routledge, 2003), 28.

revolusi, Khomeini memberi kepercayaan kepada Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, salah seorang ajudannya selama masa pembuangan di Paris, untuk mengepalai IRIB. Menurut Pierre Pahlavi, IRIB memiliki 45 cabang di seluruh dunia, termasuk di Jerman, Brazil, Malaysia, dan Amerika Serikat. IRIB menyebarkan informasi melalui gelombang pendek dan satelit seperti Telstar 5, Telstar 12, dan Arabsat 2D dalam 27 bahasa di dunia, termasuk bahasa Albania, Jerman, Inggris, Arab, Azeri, Bosnia, Balukh, Kurdi, Spanyol, Prancis, Ibrani, Italia, dan Rusia. Konten radio diatur oleh pemerintah agar pesan-pesan revolusi tersampaikan. Misalnya, konten bersifat kultural diawasi langsung oleh Kementerian Kebudayaan dan Bimbingan Islam. Di samping itu, badan lain yang mengawasi konten IRIB adalah Organisasi Kebudayaan dan Hubungan Islam (ICRO) yang dikatakan secara *de facto* sebagai organisasi diplomasi kultural Iran. Tujuan ICRO adalah untuk mempromosikan hubungan kultural antar bangsa-bangsa dan komunitas-komunitas internal Iran; mengonsolidasikan hubungan kultural Iran dengan bangsa-bangsa lain; mempresentasikan kebudayaan dan peradaban Iran; menyiapkan basis persatuan di antara Muslim di seluruh dunia; membangkitkan dan mempromosikan kultur dan ajaran Islam ke seluruh dunia; dan menyebarkan

informasi mengenai prinsip-prinsip dan realitas-realitas dari Revolusi Islam.⁷

Di samping menggunakan IRIB, ekspor revolusi yang persuasif juga dilakukan oleh Iran dengan menggelar pertemuan agama berkelas internasional. Pertemuan ini terselenggara pada Maret 1982 atas prakarsa Asosiasi Ulama Militan dan Korps Garda Revolusioner Iran (IRGC) di Tehran. Pertemuan tersebut berhasil menjaring ulama-ulama dari Iran, Kuwait, Saudi, Bahrain, dan Lebanon. Kemudian pada Januari 1983, Iran menyelenggarakan Kongres Imam Jumat dan Pemimpin Shalat. Pertemuan ini mencapai resolusi final pada Kongres Imam Jumat se-Dunia di Tehran pada Mei 1984 dengan penegasan terhadap persatuan gerakan-gerakan di dalam Dunia Islam dan dukungan penuh terhadap gerakan-gerakan pembebasan dan kemerdekaan.⁸ Iran juga pernah menggelar Internasional Islam Revolusioner pada Februari 1984 sebagai tandingan atas pertemuan Organisasi Konferensi Islam di Kasablanka, Maroko.⁹

Di samping melakukan propaganda, Iran juga melakukan ekspor revolusi

⁷Pierre Pahlavi, "Understanding Iran's Media Diplomacy," *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs*, vol. 6, no. 2 (2012). 22-23.

⁸Maryam Panah, *The Islamic Republic and the World: Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution* (London: Pluto Press, 2007) 70.

⁹Christin Marschall., 28.

dengan penggunaan cara-cara kekerasan. Adapun instansi yang menonjol dalam melakukan peranan ini adalah IRGC, kesatuan bersenjata khusus yang terpisah dari angkatan bersenjata konvensional yang bertujuan untuk mempertahankan revolusi. Menurut Hinnebusch, IRGC, beserta Kementerian Dalam Negeri dan Kementerian Intelijen Iran adalah pihak yang mendanai Front Islam Pembebasan Bahrain (IFLB), sebuah kelompok militan Syiah yang bermaksud menggulingkan pemerintahan di Bahrain pada Desember 1981.¹⁰ Di Kuwait, Iran menjalin hubungan dengan kelompok oposisi Brigade Revolusioner Arab yang dipimpin oleh Abbas al-Muhri, ipar Khomeini.¹¹

Hubungan Iran dengan Irak yang berujung pada perang sewindu juga dianggap bagian dari ekspor revolusi. Kelompok oposisi Syiah yang menentang rezim Saddam Hussein membentuk organisasi Dewan Agung Revolusi Islam di Irak (SCIRI) pada September 1981. Kelompok ini didirikan oleh Baqir al-Hakim yang memiliki akses langsung dengan Khomeini. Peran IRGC dalam mendukung SCIRI adalah dengan memberikan bantuan finansial dan

pelatihan militer.¹² SCIRI adalah satu dari beberapa kelompok oposisi di Timur Tengah yang mendapatkan pelatihan di Taleghani Centre, Tehran. Dari tempat itu mereka dikirimkan ke kamp pelatihan paramiliter yang tersebar di Tehran, Ahvaz, Isfahan, Qom, Shiraz, Mashad, dan Bushehr, dan dilatih oleh IRGC.¹³ Terakhir, IRGC berhasil menginfiltrasi kelompok militan Syiah di Lebanon pada 1980. Dua tahun kemudian kelompok tersebut bertransformasi menjadi Hizbullah.¹⁴

C. Empat Identitas Republik Islam Iran

Fenomena ekspor revolusi yang dilakukan Iran tidak dapat dilepaskan dari kepentingan nasional negara tersebut. Namun, kepentingan itu juga dibentuk terlebih dahulu oleh identitas nasional Iran sebagai sebuah negara. Oleh karena itu, mengetahui identitas Iran adalah kunci untuk memahami politik luar negeri Iran di Timur Tengah.

Dalam pengertian yang sangat luas, identitas merupakan apapun yang membuat segala sesuatu menjadi sesuatu. Namun, pemahaman seperti ini sebatas menempatkan identitas sebagai pengertian akan 'Diri' (*Self*). Dalam Konstruktivisme

¹⁰Raymond Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 194.

¹¹Christin Marschall., 33.

¹²Soren Schmidt, "The Role of Religion in Politics: The Case of Shia-Islamism in Iraq" *Nordic Journal of Religion and Society*, vol.22, no.2 (2009), 128-129.

¹³Christin Marschall., 31-32.

¹⁴Maryam Panah., 73-74.

Wendt, agar identitas itu bekerja, diperlukan juga ‘Pihak Lain’ (*Other*) sehingga identitas dipahami sebagai sesuatu yang intersubjektif. Sebagai perumpamaan, seorang budak mendapatkan identitasnya sebagai budak karena adanya hubungan dengan pihak lain, yaitu tuannya. Dari pengertian itu, terdapat empat bentuk identitas yang bisa disematkan kepada negara menurut Wendt, yaitu: 1) personal atau korporat, 2) jenis, 3) peran, dan 4) kolektif.¹⁵

Identitas personal atau korporat (*personal or corporate identity*) dibentuk oleh pengaturan diri, struktur-struktur *homeostatic* (keseimbangan internal) yang membuat aktor membedakan entitas-entitas lainnya. Dalam konteks manusia, identitas personal ini sama pentingnya dengan tubuh itu sendiri. Namun, yang paling pokok adalah adanya kesadaran dan ingatan akan ‘Diri’. Tanpa adanya kesadaran dan ingatan akan ‘ke-aku-an’ maka seseorang tidak bisa dikatakan memainkan peran sebagai agensi. Dalam konteks negara, identitas korporat—disebut korporat karena negara adalah sesuatu yang terorganisir—menjadi penting karena meskipun negara tidak memiliki ‘tubuh’, identitas korporatnya terlihat ketika anggota-anggota negara memiliki

narasi bersama yang menjadikan mereka sebagai sebuah aktor korporat. Identitas korporat kemudian menjadi peron untuk memahami identitas lainnya.¹⁶

Wendt mendefinisikan ‘identitas tipe’ (*type identity*) sebagai kategori sosial atau label yang disematkan kepada orang-orang yang berbagi beberapa ciri, seperti dalam bentuk, kebiasaan, perilaku, nilai, kecakapan, pengetahuan, opini, pengalaman, kebersamaan historis, dan sebagainya. Identitas jenis bersifat intrinsik pada aktor terlepas pihak lain mengakuinya atau tidak. Dalam konteks negara, identitas jenis mewujudkan dalam bentuk ‘tipe rezim’ atau ‘bentuk negara’ seperti negara kapitalis, negara fasis, negara monarki, dan sebagainya.¹⁷

Berbeda dengan identitas jenis yang bersifat intrinsik, identitas peran (*role identity*) disandarkan kepada hubungan dengan ‘Pihak Lain’. Identitas ini hanya muncul ketika agen mengambil posisi di dalam struktur sosial. Dalam politik internasional, Wendt memosisikan negara berdaulat sebagai bentuk dari adanya identitas peran dikarenakan kedaulatan itu sendiri membutuhkan pengakuan oleh negara lain. Identitas peran juga dapat berbentuk ‘teman’ atau ‘musuh’ sehingga

¹⁵Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 224.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 224-225.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 226.

negaratetap dikatakan memilikinya meskipun sedang berperang. Wendt sampai pada kesimpulan bahwa peran definisikan tidak bergantung kepada proses institusionalisasi melainkan pada derajat ketergantungan atau keintiman antara 'Diri' dengan 'Pihak Lain'.¹⁸

Identitas kolektif (*collective identity*) menjadi bentuk terakhir yang dibicarakan Wendt. Identitas kolektif bergantung kepada hubungan antara 'Diri' dengan 'Pihak Lain' yang mewujudkan dalam bentuk 'identifikasi'. Identifikasi merupakan proses kognitif dimana perbedaan antara Diri-Pihak Lain menjadi buram, bahkan sama sekali menjadi transenden. Biasanya, identifikasi hanya ada pada isu-isu tertentu dan jarang sekali bersifat menyeluruh. Dalam konteks negara, identitas kolektif tampak ketika beberapa aktor negara menuju kepada upaya penyamaan diri.¹⁹

Mengacu kepada konsep identitas negara yang dirumuskan Wendt, tulisan ini mencoba memaparkan hasil temuan dari penelitian sederhana mengenai identitas Republik Islam Iran. Hasil temuan dapat dirangkum yaitu bahwa Iran memiliki: 1) identitas korporat: Iran Islam; 2) identitas tipe: Republik Islam berdasarkan *velayat-e*

faqih; 3) identitas peran: *Umm al-Qura*' (pusat dunia Islam); yang pada akhirnya bermaksud untuk mencapai 4) identitas kolektif: Pan-Islam atau kesatuan *Ummah Islam*.

Identitas Korporat

Pada Republik Islam Iran identitas korporatnya adalah dirinya sendiri yaitu 'Iran Islam'. Hal ini terlihat abstrak, tapi bisa dikonkritkan dengan mencari tahu bagaimana Iran melihat imaji dirinya sendiri (*self-image*) sebagai kesatuan 'Iran dan Islam'. Imaji diri sendiri sebuah bangsa biasanya akan diterjemahkan melalui simbol-simbol nasional yang menjadi atribut tak terpisahkan untuk memahami identitas korporat negara.

Simbol-simbol nasional Iran yang merepresentasikan 'Iran Islam' tertuang dalam beberapa pasal di dalam Konstitusi seperti: bahasa dan aksara resmi nasional adalah Persia (pasal 15); bahasa Arab wajib dipelajari karena ia adalah bahasa Quran (pasal 16); penanggalan Islam (lunar) digunakan untuk urusan agama dan penanggalan masehi (solar) untuk urusan pemerintahan (pasal 17); dan bendera tiga warna yang disematkan lambang khusus Republik Islam adalah bendera resmi Iran (pasal 18). Bendera tiga warna Iran terdiri dari warna hijau yang melambangkan Islam, putih perlambang

¹⁸Ibid., 228.

¹⁹Ibid., 229.

perdamaian, dan merah yang bermakna keberanian. Pada bagian tengah terdapat lambang khusus Republik Islam yaitu enkripsi Allah dalam Bahasa Arab yang ditulis dengan warna merah. Terdapat pula enkripsi *Allah Akbar* dalam Bahasa Arab bergaya kaligrafi kufi yang muncul dua puluh dua kali di bagian atas dan bawah.²⁰

Menurut Wendt, 'ke-aku-an' negara ini ada di dalam kesadaran dan terlihat ketika orang-orang di negara tersebut memiliki narasi yang sama. Sehingga di balik simbol-simbol nasional terdapat pula narasi yang disepakati mereka yang menggunakan simbol tersebut yang mana di dalamnya terdapat makna. Narasi ini turut menegaskan identitas korporat RII sebagai Iran Islam. Abrahamian melihat bahwa Iran tidak bisa melepaskan identitas Islam Syi'ah dan identitas kesejarahan Iran pra-Islam yang besar di masa lampau melalui imperium seperti Achaemenes, Parthia, dan Sassan. Di sinilah letak narasi bersama tersebut bahwa dari dulu yang relatif tidak berubah adalah ide mengenai *Iran Zamen* (Tanah Iran) dan *Iran Shahr* (Negeri Iran). Orang Iran mengenal dengan baik dua narasi. Pertama adalah *Shāhnameh* (Kitab Raja-Raja) karya Ferdowsi (940-1020), epos agung Bangsa

Iran yang bercerita mulai dari Kaiumers, manusia pertama dalam mitologi Iran, hingga kematian Rostam, pahlawan dalam epos tersebut.²¹ Kedua adalah narasi Islam historis yang mengambil Nabi Muhammad dan Ahlul Bait sebagai sentralnya termasuk bagaimana gugurnya Imam Hussein di Karbala yang dikenang oleh Muslim Syi'ah manapun. Menurut Abrahamian, dua tradisi ini mempengaruhi orang-orang Iran hingga sekarang.²²

Identitas Tipe

Berbentuk 'Republik Islam' dengan rezim yang berkuasa berupa pemerintahan para yuris Islam (dikenal dengan istilah *velayat-e faqih*) menunjukkan identitas tipe yang dimiliki oleh Iran. Menurut Wendt, identitas tipe dibangun oleh prinsip-prinsip internal legitimasi politis yang mengatur hubungan negara dan masyarakat. Demikian pula halnya dalam konteks Iran, bahwa identitas tipe sebagai 'Republik Islam' berakar dari prinsip-prinsip internal.

Sebagaimana dicantumkan dalam pasal 1 Konstitusi Iran, bentuk pemerintahan 'Republik Islam' ini disokong oleh rakyat. Republik Islam ini sebagaimana dijelaskan dalam pasal 2

²⁰A. Shapur Shahbazi, "Flags," dalam *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, ed. Ehsan Yarshater, vol. X, Fasc. 1 (California: Mazda Publisher, 2001), 12-27.

²¹Ervand Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 2.

²²*Ibid.*, 2.

dibangun di atas keyakinan terhadap: 1) Keesaan Tuhan, kedaulatan eksklusif dan hak Tuhan untuk membuat hukum, dan keharusan untuk berserah diri terhadap perintah-perintah Tuhan; 2) wahyu ilahiah dan peran fundamentalnya dalam menyusun hukum-hukum selanjutnya; 3) berpulang kepada Tuhan pada Hari Akhir, dan peran konstruktif keyakinan ini pada jalan kembalinya manusia kepada Tuhan; 4) keadilan Tuhan dalam penciptaan dan pembuatan hukum-hukum; 5) kepemimpinan(imamah) yang berkelanjutan dan panduan abadi, dan peran fundamentalnya dalam menjamin proses revolusi Islam; 6) kemuliaan harkat dan martabat manusia, dan kebebasan manusia bergandengan dengan pertanggungjawaban di hadapan Tuhan; yang mana dalam kesetaraan, keadilan, kebebasan politik, ekonomi, sosial, dan kultural, dan solidaritas nasional terjamin oleh jalan lain untuk: a) ijtihad berkelanjutan dari fuqaha yang memenuhi kualifikasi, terlatih dalam Quran dan Sunnah; b) ilmu pengetahuan dan seni dan pencapaian-pencapaian besar manusia, bersama dengan usaha untuk memantaskan kehidupan umat manusia selanjutnya; dan c) peniadaan segala bentuk penindasan, baik berbentuk hukum dan kepatuhan terhadapnya, ataupun berbentuk dominasi.

Sebagai ‘Republik Islam’, bentuk negara yang diambil oleh Iran memiliki elemen-elemen yang membuat ia menjadi ‘Islam’ sekaligus ‘republikan’. Namun, Republik Islam Iran dibangun di atas prinsip suatu teori politik Islam yang kental dengan tradisi Islam Syi’ah, dikenal dengan *velayat-e faqih*, sehingga penting untuk melihat tentang apa sebetulnya teori tersebut dan bagaimana aktualisasinya di ranah praksis karena prinsip ini tidak diadopsi oleh seluruh ‘Republik Islam’ atau ‘Negara Islam’ di dalam Dunia Islam.

Velayat-e faqih yang dirumuskan oleh Khomeini terbatas pada persoalan mengapa suatu pemerintahan Islam dibutuhkan dan mengapa fuqaha mewarisi kewalian para Imam²³ untuk menjalankan pemerintahan Islam tersebut. Tulisan Khomeini tentang pemerintahan Islam hanya sampai pada bagaimana cara menggulingkan pemerintahan lama agar pemerintahan Islam tersebut terlaksana, yang oleh Khomeini dirumuskan dengan cara: 1) memutuskan semua hubungan dengan institusi pemerintah; 2) menolak bekerjasama dengan pemerintah; 3) menahan diri dari tindakan yang mungkin dapat menolong pemerintah; dan 4)

²³Imam adalah sebutan 12 pemimpin Islam setelah kematian Nabi Muhammad di dalam keyakinan Syiah.

membentuk institusi yudisial, finansial, ekonomi, kultural, dan politik yang baru.²⁴

Agar terlihat konkrit menyatu dengan Republik Islam, prinsip *velayat-e faqih* perlu diterjemahkan, diaktualisasikan, dan diinstitusionalisasikan ke dalam bentuk Konstitusi sehingga dimensi praksisnya terlihat. Dalam hal ini, jasa Mehdi Bazargan, salah seorang nasionalis revolusioner, tidak bisa dilupakan. Bazargan menggabungkan prinsip abstrak *velayat-e faqih* Khomeini dengan Konstitusi Republik Kelima Prancis yang republikan menjadi Konstitusi Republik Islam Iran. Inilah yang membuat identitas tipe Iran menjadi jelas sebagai negara berbentuk ‘Republik Islam’ yang bersandar kepada prinsip *velayat-e faqih* yang membuat Iran berbeda dengan negara-negara Islam lainnya.

Ketika Konstitusi selesai disusun dan disahkan, konsekuensi-konsekuensi politis pun muncul dan menunjukkan sifat republikan Iran. *Pertama*, adanya pemilihan umum yang diikuti oleh warga negara dewasa—termasuk perempuan—untuk memilih presiden, parlemen, dewan

di tingkat provinsi dan lokal, dan anggota Majelis Ahli. *Kedua*, adanya otoritas yang dimiliki oleh Parlemen seperti yang umumnya ada pada negara republik. *Ketiga*, Konstitusi pada akhirnya tidak bisa mengabaikan janji-janji populis seperti: uang pensiun, pemberian uang terhadap pengangguran, bayaran untuk kaum berkebutuhan khusus, perumahan yang layak, fasilitas kesehatan, dan pendidikan gratis untuk tingkat sekunder dan primer.²⁵

Identitas Peran

Dalam pandangan Konstruktivisme, terdapat identitas yang ditentukan oleh diri sendiri (*self*) semata dan ada identitas yang didapatkan melalui hubungan antara diri sendiri (*self*) dengan pihak lain (*others*). Dua identitas yang telah dibahas—korporat dan tipe—ditentukan oleh diri sendiri. Namun, dua identitas selanjutnya—peran dan kolektif—ditentukan oleh hubungan dengan pihak lain. Sebutan lain untuk identitas peran ini adalah ‘identitas sosial’ (*social identity*) yang oleh Wendt didefinisikan sebagai ‘seperangkat makna yang diatribusikan oleh aktor terhadap dirinya sendiri saat mengambil perspektif pihak lain.’²⁶ Dengan begitu, makna

²⁴ Ayatollah Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution: Writing and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (Hokumat-i Islam: Velayat-e Faqih)*, terj. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), 146.

²⁵ Ervand Abrahamian., 166-167.

²⁶ Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State” *The American Political Science Review*, vol.88, no.2 (June, 1994), 385.

identitas peran Iran hanya dapat dipahami dengan menghadirkan pihak lain.

Iran mendefinisikan dirinya sendiri sebagai sebuah ‘Republik Islam’ yang dibangun di atas prinsip *velayat-e faqih*. Bagi Khomeini, pemandu jalannya ideologi republik tersebut, hal yang utama adalah menyatukan ‘Dunia Islam’ menjadi satu kesatuan *ummah*. Keberhasilan revolusi di Iran, bagaimanapun dalam pandangan Khomeini, harus disebarluaskan ke seluruh dunia. Dari sinilah lahir istilah ‘ekspor revolusi’ (*sudur-e enqelab*) yang merupakan konsekuensi logis dalam rangka menguatkan identitas-identitas Iran. Dengan menelisik pandangan diri sendiri (*self*) sebagai Republik Islam yang berhasil berdiri dari sebuah Revolusi Islam dan menerjemahkan kondisi sosialnya sebagai sesuatu yang rusak dan harus diperbaiki dengan mengekspor revolusi, Iran telah mengambil tempat di dalam struktur sosialnya sehingga dapat ditarik suatu identitas peran atau sosial yaitu sebagai “pusat dunia Islam” (*umm al-qura*), negara revolusioner yang bermaksud mengubah struktur sosial sistem internasional.

Menurut Mohammad Javad Larijani, sebagaimana dikutip oleh Said Amir Arjomand, keberhasilan Revolusi Islam di Iran telah membuat Iran menjadi *Umm*

al-Qura’ atau ‘Ibu Kota’ bagi Kediaman Islam.²⁷

Identitas sebagai pusat dunia Islam merupakan sesuatu yang besar dan butuh penguatan yang lebih gigih, mengingat disintegrasi dalam komunitas Muslim. Di sini Iran melihat perannya sangat besar sebagaimana ditegaskan di dalam Pembukaan Konstitusi 1979:

“Konstitusi memberikan landasan untuk menjamin keberlanjutan Revolusi di rumah sendiri dan luar negeri. Khususnya, dalam perkembangan hubungan internasional, Konstitusi akan berusaha dengan gerakan Islam dan popular untuk menyiapkan jalan bagi pembentukan komunitas dunia yang tunggal (yang sejalan dengan perintah *al-Qur‘ān*: “Sesungguhnya inilah komunitas kamu semua; komunitas yang satu; dan Aku adalah Tuhan kamu, maka sembahlah Aku” (Q.S. 21:92), dan untuk menjamin keberlanjutan perjuangan pembebasan semua

²⁷ Said Amir Arjomand, *After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 134.

masyarakat tertindas di dunia.”

Untuk lebih lanjut memahami *umm al-qura'*, mesti berangkat dari bagaimana Iran melihat posisinya pada pihak di luar dirinya. Dalam hal ini pandangan-pandangan Khomeini tentang tatanan atau sistem internasional tidak bisa diabaikan karena peran signifikannya sebagai *vali-e faqih*. Pada bagian ini penulis berhutang kepada ulasan komprehensif Muhammad Rida Dehshiri tentang sistem internasional menurut Khomeini dan tentang apa yang bisa dilakukan *umm al-qura'* pada sistem tersebut.

Dimulai dari karakteristik struktural sistem internasional dalam pandangan Khomeini, Dehshiri menjelaskan bahwa ada dua aspek untuk melihat struktur sistem internasional: jumlah dan tipe aktor-aktor. Dari segi jumlah pemain utama dalam sistem internasional, Khomeini menolak sistem bipolar yang membagi dunia berdasarkan dua negara adidaya sekaligus menolak dua ideologi dominan: komunisme dan kapitalisme. Khomeini juga skeptis terhadap dependensi struktural negara-negara satelit dengan negara-negara utama yang kuat. Bagi Khomeini, dunia yang seperti ini tidak menghasilkan apa-apa kecuali penjarahan kekayaan bangsa-bangsa yang tertekan oleh negara-negara

adidaya yang disebut oleh Khomeini sebagai 'arogan'. Dalam hal ini Khomeini berkeinginan akan adanya kesetaraan legal bangsa-bangsa dan ketiadaan supremasi suatu kelompok atas kelompok lain. Di dalam sistem internasional ini, Khomeini lebih banyak merujuk kepada pentingnya aktor bangsa ketimbang negara atau dengan kata lain aktor non-pemerintah dianggap memiliki peran lebih signifikan daripada aktor pemerintah. Khomeini beralasan negara-negara yang lemah memiliki ketergantungan kepada negara kuat karena secara psikologis, sifat alamiah manusia adalah memiliki hasrat yang tidak terbatas. Ketika negara lemah memiliki hasrat tak terbatas untuk mengejar kekayaan dan posisi, maka ia membutuhkan sandaran. Siapapun yang menginginkan posisi dan kepemimpinan membutuhkan sandaran yang dapat berupa Tuhan, rakyat, atau pihak asing. Namun, pemerintahan yang lemah, pada umumnya, menjadikan pihak asing sebagai sandaran sehingga ia tidak akan memihak kepada rakyat.²⁸

Dari segi fungsinya, Khomeini melihat sistem internasional sebagai sistem konfliktual yang menolak sistem

²⁸ Muhammad Rida Dehshiri, "Ways of Attaining the Ideal International Order from Imam Khomeini's Viewpoint," in *Imam Khomeini and the International System*, trans. Mansoor Limba (Teheran: The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works, 2005), 52-53.

konservatif dan sistem kompetitif. Sistem konservatif yang menjaga status quo ditolak karena memberikan hak veto terhadap negara adidaya semata. Sistem kompetitif yang ditunjukkan dengan adanya kompetisi antara negara adidaya ditolak karena hanya mengeruk sumber daya alam dan kekayaan negara-negara lain. Dehshiri berkesimpulan bahwa Khomeini melihat sistem internasional sebagai sistem konfliktual karena negara adidaya tidak ubahnya seperti serigala yang saling menakuti satu sama lain dan siap melahap kekuatan-kekuatan yang lemah. Sehingga bangsa-bangsa tertindas dihimbau oleh Khomeini untuk bangkit dan melakukan revolusi mengubah sistem tersebut.²⁹ Menurut Dehshiri pula, Khomeini melihat fungsi sistem internasional sebagai sistem revolusioner yang menekankan pada perubahan menyolok tatanan internasional yang ada. Sudut pandang revolusioner Khomeini didasarkan pada adanya perjuangan permanen kebaikan melawan kejahatan, perang antara masyarakat miskin dan kaya, dan antara bangsa-bangsa tertindas dan negara-negara arogan.³⁰ Dengan kondisi yang seperti inilah, Khomeini memosisikan peran Iran sebagai pembela bangsa-bangsa tertindas, yang kebetulan pada konteks zaman itu umat Muslim

ditafsirkan berada pada posisi sebagai bangsa-bangsa tertindas, sehingga peran sebagai *umm al-qura* menjadi hidup.

Identitas Kolektif

Identitas kolektif menurut Wendt adalah identitas yang menghasilkan 'identifikasi' diri sendiri (*self*) dengan pihak luar (*other*) melalui pengaburan perbedaan di antara keduanya. Pembentukan identitas kolektif ini menggunakan identitas-identitas peran dan tipe, dan pada tingkat yang lebih tinggi dapat membuat *self* dan *other* pada akhirnya memiliki identitas tunggal dimana aktor-aktor kemudian mendefinisikan 'keselamatan *other* sebagai bagian dari keselamatan *self*' sehingga terkesan altruistik.³¹

Bagian ini hanya akan mengidentifikasi apa yang menjadi identitas kolektif yang *diharapkan* oleh Iran. Disebut 'diharapkan' karena identitas kolektif yang diharapkan belum tentu akan diterima oleh aktor-aktor lain. Identitas kolektif yang baru akan dikatakan terbentuk ketika batas antara *self* dan *other* menjadi kabur. Artinya, identitas kolektif tidak hanya menjadi milik *self*, tetapi juga milik *other*.

Identitas kolektif yang diharapkan terwujud oleh Iran adalah Pan-Islam, suatu

²⁹ Ibid., 53-59.

³⁰ Ibid., 60.

³¹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory*, 229.

kesatuan yang holistik dalam dunia Islam. Hal ini telah tampak pada ulasan-ulasan sebelumnya. Pada identitas korporat, Iran berupa 'Iran Islam' disimpulkan bahwa di atas nasionalisme Iran, dorongan untuk mengupayakan persatuan Islam lebih kuat. Pada identitas tipe Iran sebagai "Republik Islam", republik tersebut didirikan di atas prinsip *velayat-e faqih*, sementara alasan dibentuknya pemerintahan di atas prinsip tersebut ditujukan untuk membebaskan Muslim tertindas dari dominasi kolonialisme dan imperialisme dan dari pemerintahan sekuler yang tidak menjalankan hukum-hukum Islam. Sehingga, dari kedua identitas tersebut kemudian muncul identitas peran *umm al-qura*' yang memiliki peranan sebagai pusat dari dunia Islam, model pemerintahan Islam yang dapat dicontoh, dan penyokong setiap aksi-aksi revolusioner di negeri-negeri Muslim agar terwujud kesatuan *ummah*. Tentu saja, revolusi ini akan dianggap sukses pada level yang lebih luas ketika terbentuk kesatuan Islam seperti yang diinginkan oleh Khomeini dan Iran, berupa Pan-Islam.

Kesimpulan

Tulisan ini telah mendiskusikan perilaku Republik Islam Iran di kawasan Timur Tengah yang ditelusur secara historis pada sepuluh tahun pertama negara

tersebut terbentuk. Lahir dari Revolusi Islam 1979 yang menjatuhkan rezim sekuler dan pro-asing, Iran bermaksud memicu revolusi yang sama di negara-negara Timur Tengah lainnya. Agenda ini dikenal dengan istilah 'ekspor revolusi'. Dipahami pula, bahwa perilaku politis ini tidak lepas dari identitas Iran sebagai sebuah negara yang sedari semula berbasis Islam, dan memandang dirinya sebagai pusat dari dunia Islam, sehingga merasa perlu membangun suatu identitas kolektif Pan-Islam di kawasan Timur Tengah.

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N 21. *Ibid.*, 145.

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