Asymmetric and Hybrid Warfare in Postmodern Times: Lesson from Hezbollah-Israeli War 2006

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ABSTRACT

This paper discussed asymmetric warfare between Hezbollah as a non-state actor against Israel in the Second Hezbollah-Israeli War in 2006. This paper focused on Hezbollah's strategy as the weaker side to fight against Israel as the state with the strongest military forces in the Middle East. The battle between Hezbollah and Israel can be categorized as post-modern warfare because it has hybrid and irregular elements of warfare. That is, the war mixes the use of conventional and non-conventional methods of warfare. This paper uses the concept of hybrid warfare and Taylor's strategy theory to explain the Hezbollah strategy against Israel. The main objective of this paper is to analyze and explain the strategies employed by Hezbollah, a non-state actor, in the Second Hezbollah-Israeli War in 2006, utilizing the concepts of asymmetric and hybrid warfare. The paper focuses on Hezbollah's use of post-modern strategies, such as guerrilla tactics, unconventional warfare methods, information warfare, and psychological tactics, to counter the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and achieve its goals in the asymmetric conflict. This paper finds that Hezbollah uses elements of post-modern strategy by conducting guerrilla and hide-and-seek tactics, mixing the use of conventional and modern warfare equipment, the use information and media, engaging in acts of terror, and applying psychological warfare to achieve the ultimate goal the main objective) in the fight against Israel Defense Force (IDF).

INTRODUCTION

Steven Metz asserts that the term "postmodern war" will be used to describe war and armed conflict in the twenty-first century (Metz, 2004). The nature of strategy on the battlefield itself is modified in post-modern warfare, in addition to the technical components. Post-modern warfare has several traits that are more asymmetrical, irregular, and inclined to be hybrid (Metz, 2004). Irony and post-modern warfare are inextricably linked, according to Cooker. How, for instance, in the three most significant prior Arab-Israeli conflicts, Israel lost more people fighting Hezbollah, a non-state force, than fighting the Arab world (Coker, 1998). This is intriguing given that Hezbollah is not regarded as a state like other regular country-on-country battles. As seen by the history of the Arab-Israeli war since 1947, Israel also possesses considerable power in terms of resources and military capability. At this point, it becomes worthwhile to investigate in further detail how strategy is used in post-modern warfare. In the post-modern period of strategy, how can an asymmetric war between parties with less resources and power resources prevail against parties with more power and resources.

The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006 serves as a prime example of how asymmetric and hybrid warfare strategies have changed in the post-modern period of conflict. After that, this essay will concentrate on post-modern war methods that are demonstrated by asymmetric

and hybrid warfare that took place between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006. What role do post-modern strategy studies play in asymmetric and hybrid conflicts? is the question this research seeks to answer. Given that Israel has significantly more advanced weaponry and technology than Hezbollah, what was the next step in Hezbollah's 34-day assault against Israel in 2006? The consequences of this approach for Hezbollah's defensive plan are discussed last.

This essay makes the case that hybrid warfare, which is a subset of post-modern warfare, has an impact on the advancement of strategic studies as well, in part because it is more difficult and dissimilar from earlier conventional and modern warfare. In the case of Hezbollah, the group uses elements of a post-modern strategy by using guerrilla and hide-and-seek tactics, combining the use of conventional and modern weapons, utilizing information and media, committing acts of terror, and engaging in psychological warfare in order to achieve its main goals, which include defeating the Israel Defense Forces. Hezbollah was not considered to have won that war, particularly in terms of the military. But Hezbollah was successful in putting an asymmetrical war plan into effect, which damaged Israel's reputation in the eyes of the world community and psychologically crippled the IDF, causing Israel to withdraw its soldiers from South Lebanon.

The main objective of this paper is to analyze and dissect the post-modern war strategies employed in the asymmetric and hybrid conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in the 2006 war. The focus is on understanding the intricacies of post-modern warfare, characterized by asymmetry, irregularity, and hybrid tactics, and how these strategies were effectively utilized by Hezbollah, a non-state actor, against Israel, a technologically superior state. The paper aims to explore the specific tactics employed by Hezbollah, such as guerrilla warfare, the use of media and information, psychological operations, and acts of terror, to achieve its goals despite the vast power disparity. Furthermore, the paper delves into the implications of these strategies, not only in terms of military outcomes but also in shaping international perceptions and influencing the decisions of the Israel Defense Force (IDF). Ultimately, the paper seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of how post-modern warfare strategies can be applied in asymmetric conflicts and how they impact the defense strategies of non-state actors like Hezbollah.

RESEARCH METHOD

This paper implements a qualitative approach method to address the main problem of this studies. In order to explain the case study, this research strategically uses the Hoffman's hybrid warfare framework and integrates General Taylor's strategy theory. The emergence of hybrid warfare does not imply an end to conventional warfare. However, hybrid warfare describes a different war strategy that generally emerges in the 21st century. Warfare in the post-modern era is synonymous with 'hybrid war' which is defined as warfare that includes a variety of different modes of warfare, by mixing conventional and modern methods, irregular tactics and formations, acts of terror and insurrection, non-state actors against the state, use of media and information, and the ambiguity between war and peace (Hoffman, 2007).

Hoffman defines hybrid warfare as follows "Hybrid wars incorporates a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics, and formations, terrorism acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder". In hybrid warfare, the actors who play become more varied. This means that war can be carried out both between two countries, between countries and non-state actors, or between non-state actors. These non-state actors can organizationally have a structured political hierarchy, coupled with decentralized cells

and tactical unit networks, examples of non-state actors, in this case, are Hamas, Hezbollah, and ISIS (Hoffman, 2007).

According to (Lele, 2014), conflicts over resources, ethnicity, and religion, as well as transnational crimes connected to terrorism and rebellion, illegal immigration, border disputes, and their connections to failed states, are the main causes of war in today's globe (Lele, 2014, p. 100). Table 1 below illustrates how traditional and postmodern war plans differ from one another. According to Tienhoven hybrid warfare is the simultaneous use of several forms of conflict, either combining elements from different current models or two other models altogether. The capacity of non-state actors to analyze the flaws in the military paradigm often used by western nations is further facilitated by this hybrid war (Tienhoven, 2016).

In discussing post-modern strategy, there is no definite definition in describing what post-modern strategy is. However, the post-modern strategy includes criteria and types of war strategy that are different from conventional strategies in general. Discussing the strategy, there is no single definition because there are many debates regarding the concept. However, Yarger's approach was outlined in this paper and it said that strategy is an attempt to close the gap between the present reality and a desired future state (Yarger, 2008). Consequently, computations incorporating goals, ideas, and resources are integral to strategy. According to Maxwell D. Taylor, a military strategy cannot be separated from a formulation that encompasses means, ways, and aims. ends referred to as a military goal (Taylor, 1974). Military strategic ideas are referred to as ways, and military assets are considered means to an end. This formulation leads to the conclusion that aims always provide a response to the question of "what," or what goals are to be realized. Concepts and methods always provide the "how," while means and resources describe how and what will be employed to carry out the concepts and ways.

The strategy employed in post-modern periods, which departs from the strategic notion, is primarily focused on the design of an uncommon conflict (irregular warfare). This type of irregular warfare also refers, according to Earhart (Earhart, 2017, p. 263), to the transition from conventional warfare tactics to post-modern warfare techniques. According to Arquilla (2016), irregular warfare is challenging to define and is comparable to conventional fighting. According to Arquilla, irregular warfare is defined by three factors: the deployment of tiny armed troops; the prevalence of guerrilla tactics; and the turn to terrorism. When one side or opponent is weaker than another with more strength, disorganized warfare circumstances might result, suggesting that the weaker side lacks the resources to directly confront the stronger opponent.

Table 1.
Differences in Characteristics of Conventional and Irregular Warfare (Source: Tienhoven, 2016)

Characteristics	Conventional Warfare	Irregular Warfare
Unit	Large (Division, Fleets, Wings)	Small (Cellular, Lights, Fast)
Supported	Well resourced	Comparatively under resourced
Doctrine	Joint combined arms maneuver warfare	Guerrilla tactics, insurgency, terrorism, special operation,
Effect	Quick and decisive	Protracted and slow burning

Objective	Annihilation	Attrition
Technology	New weapons developments	Leverage what is available

Asymmetric warfare, according to Quinn, is characterized by conflicts pitting weaker groups against more powerful adversaries. In other words, there is an imbalance in the way that power is distributed among the war's participants. The availability of resources, including member individuals, military and war equipment, manufacturing capacity, and logistical supplies like food, oil, and other necessities, is the primary distinction between these great and minor powers (Quinn, 2001, p. 10).

Quinn asserts that even a party with inferior military might be able to achieve a 'deadlock' with a powerful foe by becoming more tactically and strategically adept, locating and exploiting the foe's vulnerabilities, and dodging the foe's strikes. According to Arreguin parties with smaller troops often employ a guerilla war strategy as a direct defense tactic. In contrast to a direct attack, a direct defense focuses more on the use of military force against the strategic region, the local populace, and the opponent's resources (Arregun-Toft, 2001).

Asymmetry is also defined by (Sudhir, 2008) as an action taken against a military power with the intention of weakening the conventional military might they now possess. In this sense, the asymmetrical strategy employs strategies quite different from conventional strategies in general in an effort to avoid or reduce military force while exploiting its weaknesses. Still, according to Sudhir (2008), this strategy typically focuses on the psychological effects on the adversary, such as shock and surprise, which have an impact on the adversary's initiative, actions, and will. In the whole range of military operations, this strategy frequently employs tactics, weapons, and cutting-edge technology that may be used in all forms of strategic, operational, and tactical combat.

Asymmetrical warfare's primary strategic objective, according to Long, is to target the opponent's mentality rather than undermine their military might (E. Long, 2008). The weak party will use direct or indirect psychological intimidation to terrorize and terrify opponents in order to advance its political goal. The weak side will employ unusual guerilla terrorist tactics in an effort to avoid going up against the considerably superior military forces of the opponent. Gaining public support is also a key strategic objective of asymmetric warfare in order to secure safe havens, assistance financially and logistically, and the capacity to find new fighters. Organizational organizations cannot resist state actors for a very long period without achieving political aims with the help of outside allies.

They conduct operations and favor open fields as their battleground, in contrast to soldiers engaged in conventional combat who often strive to exclude people from the operations. As opposed to this, with the traditional guerrilla approach, the guerrillas use more people as cover and a base of operations for their attacks, making it more difficult for the adversary to locate them (Biddle & Friedman, 2008). This is consistent with (Mulhern, 2012) explanation of the fundamental element of irregular warfare, which is gaining the public's support by persuading them that one's own side is superior. He also emphasized how state and non-state actors may utilize DIME (Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economy) as a tool of power to sway public opinion and, in turn, affect the result of irregular warfare.

The weaker party in an asymmetrical conflict typically knows that they cannot match the power of the stronger side if they only depend on their own resources. They must thus develop methods and tactics if they are to defeat this formidable foe. Here is where guerrilla tactics and strategy are frequently used. The goal of the guerilla tactic being used in this instance is not to win the war on one's own, but rather to defend against and launch attacks that can paralyze the adversary's mindset, preventing the enemy or the opposing party from acting and launching more assaults. In asymmetrical conflict, smaller groups often employ guerrilla tactics against larger opponents. Asymmetric warfare, in which one party has a lesser force than the other, as demonstrated by Vietnam's use of guerilla tactics against US soldiers.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Hezbollah-Israel War of 2006

According to Cooper, there are several ironic aspects to that post-modern conflict. This may be demonstrated by examining the use of hybrid strategy by Hezbollah against Israeli forces during the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, which is an example of how hybrid warfare is portrayed in post-modern war strategy. As a country that is recorded as having the best-armed forces in the world, Israel has the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in carrying out resistance in the Middle East region. Ironically, though, the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict saw Hezbollah fighters compel IDF troops to flee. Israel has previously made few concessions in the Arab-Israeli War or prior Middle East wars. Additionally, Israel is outfitted with American military hardware whose quality has been established, including weapons technology. The IDF also employs American military techniques and concepts (Breen & Geltzer, 2011). But in 2006, Israel was defeated for the first time by an opponent whose status was not even considered that of a state. The IDF does not believe that Hezbollah would employ different assault techniques or plans in this instance from what has been done in the past.

Additionally, the two parties differ significantly when looking at resources. Because of this, the 2006 conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is sometimes referred to as an asymmetric war. In comparison to the IDF, Hezbollah is a significantly smaller army. Despite the fact that Israel attacked Lebanon directly. Hezbollah has lost its ability to launch a counter-military strike under these circumstances because it lacks the necessary arsenal. Because the approach utilized by Hezbollah to combat Israel is unquestionably distinct from traditional war techniques, here is where the organization's strategy and tactics for doing so become crucial.

Referring to the objective, resources, and concept strategy formulation above, the main goal of Hezbollah in fighting Israel is to liberate South Lebanon from Israeli occupation. Hezbollah itself is a professional militant organization as well as a political party that emerged in 1982 as a response to the marginalization of Shiites in Lebanon, the 1979 Iranian revolution, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Since 1982, Israel has had many confrontations with the Lebanese military and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) which is in the southern region of Lebanon, and this then also threatens the security of the local Lebanese population. Since then, Hezbollah has launched many attacks on Israel, which Israel has responded to through counter-terrorism efforts. Hezbollah's actions then led the United States and Israel to categorize Hezbollah as a terrorist group network (Brennen, 2009).

The IDF finds it more challenging to fight the Hezbollah organization than other terrorist groups in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank because it is a network of organized militant groups.

This is due to Hezbollah's superior training, discipline, and technological capabilities over other organizations. Hezbollah's tactical integration and use of modern technology is significant for hybrid warfare. Hezbollah deployed anti-tank missiles specifically against IDF personnel's defensive positions, which along with decentralized tactics caught the IDF off guard. In the battle of Wadi Salouki, Hezbollah ambushed IDF soldiers with anti-tank missiles, including the Russian-made RPG-29, AT-13 Metis, and AT-14 Kornet, which had a range of up to three kilometers. The AT-13 and AT-14 successfully engaged the Merkava Mark IV tanks for the first time. A total of 18 Merkava vehicles were damaged, and according to Hoffman (2009), anti-tank rockets are thought to be responsible for around 40% of IDF fatalities.

Hezbollah's Defense Strategy

Israel resumed attacking Hezbollah in 2006 after leaving Lebanon; this military campaign, which lasted 34 days, became known as the Hezbollah-Israeli conflict. Hezbollah's ultimate goals included a variety of objectives. They sought to repel the Israeli invasion of Lebanon militarily, cause severe damage, and provide a deterrent against further Israeli assault. They emphasized Israel's inability to decisively defeat a non-state actor in an effort to undermine Israel's political standing on the world arena. In addition, they hoped that by resisting Israeli soldiers, they would acquire legitimacy and support from the Lebanese people as well as the larger Arab world.

While for the ways, Hezbollah employed numerous strategies to attain their goals. First, armed guerrillas utilizing their familiarity with the local topography, Hezbollah soldiers used hit-and-run strategies, launching fast retreats after hitting Israeli military positions to avoid direct confrontations. Second, Hezbollah merged conventional and unconventional military tactics, obfuscating the distinction between asymmetrical tactics and conventional combat. The Israeli military was ready for a more traditional fight, so this hybrid strategy perplexed and tested it. Lastly, in order to lower Israeli military and civilian morale, Hezbollah employed psychological strategies. The Israeli military and society felt frustrated and uneasy as a result of their capacity to conduct sustained strikes and cause casualties over an extended period of time.

Even though Hezbollah's resources were somewhat limited in comparison to the Israeli military, they nonetheless made the most of what they had. Hezbollah members had extensive local knowledge and gained backing from the Lebanese community, which gave them access to information, housing, and supplies. Hezbollah got political, financial, and military backing from Iran and Syria, which also gave them access to cutting-edge equipment, tactical instruction, and strategic guidance. Hezbollah showed versatility by changing their tactics and strategies in response to the changing ground conditions, making it difficult for the Israeli forces to foresee their future movements.

Hezbollah's offensive plan against Israel in this conflict demonstrates aspects of a hybrid war by employing erratic techniques and tactics in a post-modern war strategy. This unconventional method is comparable to combining guerilla warfare with traditional warfare. Combining this combat strategy demonstrates the mixed nature of Hezbollah's conflict with Israel. In addition, the foreign backing provided to Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel might be considered as one of the hybrid components that contribute to abstractness. Through the Iran Revolutionary Guard, a majority-Shiite nation, Iran provides this overseas assistance. Hezbollah's sustainability in terms of financial backing, training, equipment, weapons, and other resources is significantly influenced by this close collaboration between Hezbollah and Iran. Each year, Iran gives Hezbollah between $50 and $100 million (Jacobs & Lasconjarias, 2015).

For instance, Hezbollah employs guerilla tactics by requiring its members to serve in both civilian and military capacities. In other words, these Hezbollah militants blend in with society as if there were no conflict, but in reality, this is part of their plan for avoiding enemy detection. Hezbollah's defensive approach makes it simpler for them to harm the Israeli army's mental and psychological health because by blending in with the local people, it is challenging for the IDF to pinpoint the locations of their strikes. Hezbollah, for instance, hides fighters and their gear in mosques or daycare centers. Furthermore, they use homes and schools as launch sites for their rockets, making it difficult for Israeli aircraft to hit these targets without suffering considerable collateral damage (Brennen, 2009, p. 64).

Hezbollah uses this defensive tactic as one of its key lines of defense against IDF assaults. Hezbollah asserts that its defense tactic of carrying out operational maneuvers among the populace is a viable defensive strategy to endure the destruction. According to Hassan Nasrallah, the head of Hezbollah, "[The organization's operatives] dwell in their homes, schools, mosques, churches, fields, farms, and workplaces. They cannot be eliminated the same way an army can, according to Erlich (2006). Additionally, in regards to Hezbollah's tactic of playing a civilian role, it entails the employment of civilian cars, vehicles used for humanitarian relief, and vehicles used for rescue as a plan for operational, administrative, and logistical objectives to conceal the actions they are carrying out. To reduce the chance of being struck by an IDF strike, Hezbollah, for instance, utilizes ambulances, ICRC trucks, and vehicles from other humanitarian convoys (Erlich, 2006). This is so that both parties cannot target humanitarian convoys, medical workers, or personnel since they are protected under international humanitarian law. Hezbollah can be liberated from the IDF's aim by employing the image of humanitarian relief.

This therefore becomes another facet of hybrid warfare, particularly when the terms of war and peace are ambiguous. Contrary to traditional combat, the terms of war and peace are extremely obvious. Additionally, as considered from the perspective of opposing players, the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel contains many characteristics of a hybrid conflict. In this instance, Israel is acting as a state and not in opposition to another state as it has done with Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Hezbollah itself is regarded as a non-state actor, and neither the Lebanese military nor the government took part in the organization of Hezbollah as a terrorist force against Israel in 2006. A state within a state has been created by Hezbollah. In addition to evolving into a regular Islamic terrorist organization, Hezbollah in Lebanon has grown in political and social influence, giving it legitimacy to enhance and widen its organizational network. Hezbollah is an illustration of a hybrid terrorist group, according to Azani, that has grown deeply ingrained in Lebanese political and administrative system (Azani, 2013). The involvement of state actors, especially Iran and Syria, in backing Hezbollah against Israel highlights the complexity of this hybrid conflict (Irani, 2007).

Hezbollah also makes use of traditional military hardware when engaging in guerilla warfare. The goal of this strike was not to engage in a military conflict with the IDF, but to undermine the enemy's mentality by identifying its vulnerabilities. Hezbollah, for instance, was particularly proficient at coordinating soldiers in nearby villages to fire anti-tank guided missiles (AT-5, AT-13, and AT-14) and small anti-tank rockets (RPG-7 and RPG-29). 50 Merkava tanks were among the IDF's weaponry that was severely damaged (together with TOW and TOW). Hezbollah launched 3,790 artillery rockets in 2006, as opposed to the infrequent rocket assaults it had made in previous years. Because a large number of the rocket assaults were also imprecise, Hezbollah's aggressive assault proved militarily unsuccessful. The attack, which crippled Israel's

economy and required the evacuation of more than a million inhabitants, was actually designed to intimidate the northern region of the country (Piotrowski, 2015).

Hezbollah's psychological operations (PSYOPs), also known as psychological assaults (PA), are part of its ongoing military operations and have become a crucial component of its asymmetric warfare strategy. This psychological assault was carried out through inciting public hostility toward the IDF among Israelis. Hezbollah, for instance, breached the security perimeter at the Israeli border, where a lot of Israeli media outlets monitor the local security situation. The event was then caused by an attack by Hezbollah, which was documented by Israeli media, which broadcast it live. In this instance, Hezbollah is convinced that it has joined the security network of the IDF. Because it was seen as a failure to combat non-state actors, this instantly diminished the IDF's legitimacy in the eyes of Israeli public (Gabrielsen, 2013).

Using media and information is one of several characteristics of hybrid warfare. Hezbollah takes advantage of Israel's restrictions on media reporting to spread informational propaganda and exert control over the information exchanged between the two. One instance is when Hezbollah raised the issue of Lebanese civilians who died as a result of Israeli assaults, which had an effect on the lack of support for Israel on the part of the world community (Gabrielsen, 2013, p. 439). Another illustration is the American media's refusal to use a graphic image of rescue personnel cradling the body of a little kid who was missing from the waist down when it was published by the news website Newsweek. However, Hezbollah disseminated the image through their media and said it was a victim of Israeli assault on Lebanon. Such propaganda might diminish Israel's credibility in the eyes of the world community as a "cruel" aggressor state, even though the victims in the picture may not necessarily be from Hezbollah (Kalb and Saivetz, 2007).

The leader of Hezbollah Hasan Nasrallah is portrayed in the media as someone who speaks out against Israel in the Arab world and Islamic society at large. This is only one example of Hezbollah propaganda that is carried out via the use of television and radio stations. As a result, Hezbollah, which operates as a non-state terrorist group, was able to convince the Arab world and the international community that it had conquered Israel, the Arab country with the strongest military might (Jacobs & Lasconjarias, 2015).

The Asymmetric Feature of the War

Guerrilla tactics and the use of a hybrid war paradigm are used in asymmetric warfare as a "weapon" by the weaker side to protect itself against attacks by the stronger side. The 'weapon' Hezbollah possesses to fight against Israeli strikes in the Hezbollah-Israel situation is its approach in the previously outlined asymmetric battle. As a result, Hezbollah's strategy against Israel has an impact on how it will defend itself from Israeli strikes for the next 34 days. According to Kissinger, in asymmetric warfare, guerilla tactics indicate success when the weaker side escapes defeat. In other words, they have the ability to ward off attacks from strong groups. The guerrillas must also initiate strikes that can break the opponent's focus in order to survive this. Much like how Hezbollah used psychological tricks to undermine the IDF's attitude while harassing Israeli soldiers.

Furthermore, it cannot be argued that the IDF has already fallen to Hezbollah in this hybrid conflict between that organization and Israel, or that Hezbollah has entirely defeated the IDF. Since the commencement of the war, there has been ambiguity over the precise starting and finish dates of the conflict due to the hybrid nature of battle. Comparable to conventional conflicts where the winning and losing sides, as well as the start and conclusion of the war, are visible, assessing who is

the winning party and who is the losing party differs. It may be claimed that in the Hezbollah-Israel asymmetric war, Hezbollah, as the side with the lesser power, was successful in applying an asymmetric war strategy and resisted Israeli strikes with more force, until ultimately the IDF was able to totally withdraw from Southern Lebanon.

It cannot be argued, however, that Hezbollah entirely won the battle, particularly from a military standpoint, as Hoffman noted after the end of the Hezbollah-Israel conflict. Hezbollah's tactic, in his opinion, was able to weaken the IDF's legitimacy, which in turn expanded and deepened Hezbollah's ideological impact (Hoffman, 2007). This is further supported by the fact that Hezbollah's power is derived not just from its military might but also from a variety of political, social, diplomatic, and informational elements, all of which constitute the backbone of the organization's potent military force.

The IDF was 'overwhelmed' in dealing with Hezbollah thanks to Hezbollah's policy of surprising IDF forces using guerilla tactics, psychological warfare, and using the role of civilians and the media. Hezbollah, for instance, was able to inflict more casualties and damage on Israel's adversary during the 34 days of ground attacks it launched by combining conventional and unconventional war strategies, as compared to the Arab-Israeli wars that took place in 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982 (Breen & Geltzer, 2011). A total of 4,000 rockets fired by Hezbollah throughout the 34-day conflict may have reached as many as two million Israelis, or up to a third of the country's population. The number of Israeli citizens who fled their houses and became internal refugees has been estimated to be between 350,000 and 500,000, with an additional 1 million people living in bomb-proof shelters (Erlich, 2006). As for the total number of casualties, the Israeli Foreign Minister stated that 162 Israelis, including 43 civilians and 119 military personnel, were confirmed dead throughout the 34-day conflict. Including 743 civilians, 34 troops, and 68 Hezbollah combatants, 845 Lebanese were reported dead on the Lebanese side alone.

If the number of wounded and dead is how Israel and Hezbollah are judged to have won, then Hezbollah is unquestionably the side with the highest number. However, as was previously stressed, Hezbollah's lesser force approach in the asymmetrical battle between them and Israel is considered to have been successful in undermining Israel's legitimacy, harming the IDF's psychologically, and persuading the general people to view Israel in a "negative" light. The same is true of Hezbollah's use of propaganda to portray Israel as the victor in the conflict. As a result, Hezbollah's tactics have a significant impact on its ability to carry out counterattacks that have the potential to seriously undermine Israel's position as the Arab world's most powerful military power, in addition to helping it survive Israeli strikes.

CONCLUSION

This essay comes to the conclusion that postmodern military strategy is more asymmetrical, irregular, and hybrid. This situation ultimately led to a conflict known as a hybrid war. This was demonstrated in the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel dispute. In the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel conflict, Hezbollah was successful in achieving its political objective of defeating Israel and expelling the IDF from Lebanon. a was due to the fact that Hezbollah utilized key aspects of hybrid warfare in an asymmetrical conflict, including the employment of conventional weaponry, information, and media, undermining the opponent's mentality, and guerilla acting techniques. Hybrid warfare in post-modern warfare is becoming more difficult since the state is no longer competing against other states, but rather against troublesome non-state entities.

The problematic complexity of conflict makes the deployment of strategies and tactics to further the political goals of the parties engaged more and more necessary. As a side with lesser forces than Israel, Hezbollah is affected by the asymmetrical conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. Although it is impossible to say that Hezbollah won the war militarily, Hezbollah did gain clear advantages because of the strategy it employed to undermine the IDF's credibility in the eyes of the Israeli public and the international community and psychologically paralyze the IDF so that Israel withdrew its troops from South Lebanon.

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