Confrontation Analysis as an Alternative Model in International Relations: From Chinese Civil War to Korean War

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A B S T R A C T

In analyzing confrontation, academic studies in the field of International Relation are highly associated with conventional narrative approaches. Unfortunately, exclusive and excessive use of an approach in the field may hinder the academic development in the field. Earlier studies show that cross-fertilization internal and external approaches can promote scientific progress in the field. This study aims to promote the use of confrontation analysis, an analysis tool that is considered as external to the field of international relations. There are some studies in the field of international relations that utilize confrontation analysis in conflict modelling. Nonetheless, these studies are limited only to the cases of western hemisphere. This study focuses on the implementation of confrontation analysis in the conflict in East Asia region, i.e. Chinese civil war and Korean war. These cases are selected due to the abundant available information on these conflicts and the knowledge on these conflicts has matured. This study shows that confrontation analysis is able to explain the increase of escalation and its downturn during the conflict.

A B S T R A K

Dalam menganalisis konfrontasi, kajian akademis di bidang Hubungan Internasional sangat terkait dengan pendekatan naratif konvensional. Sayangnya, penggunaan pendekatan yang ekslusif dan berlebihan di lapangan dapat menghambat perkembangan akademik di lapangan. Studi sebelumnya menunjukkan bahwa pendekatan cross-fertilization internal dan eksternal dapat mendorong kemajuan ilmiah di lapangan. Studi ini bertujuan untuk mempromosikan penggunaan analisis konfrontasi, sebuah alat analisis yang dianggap sebagai eksternal dalam bidang Hubungan Internasional. Ada beberapa penelitian di bidang Hubungan Internasional yang memanfaatkan analisis konfrontasi dalam pemodelan konfliknya. Meskipun demikian, penelitian ini terbatas hanya pada kasus di dunia Barat. Penelitian ini berfokus pada implementasi analisis konfrontasi dalam konflik di kawasan Asia Timur, yaitu perang saudara Tiongkok dan perang Korea. Kasus-kasus ini dipilih karena banyaknya informasi yang tersedia tentang konflik-konflik ini dan pengetahuan tentang konflik-konflik ini telah matang. Studi ini menunjukkan bahwa analisis konfrontasi mampu menjelaskan peningkatan eskalasi dan penurunannya selama konflik.

Introduction

The investigation in the field of international relations particularly in Asia Pacific studies is heavily dominated by narrative approach. Buzan (2002) discusses the significance of security dilemma in Asia Pacific region as a result of the lack of regional authority in a form of international organization in the region.[1] Yahuda (2004) investigates the political, economic and security interplay in Asia Pacific region both in Pre and Post-Cold War era and how maintaining stability in this region significantly matters for the US national interest.[2] Maswood (2002) studies the economic challenges and new nuclear Balance of Power in the region that Asia Pacific states had to face after the absence of Soviet Union in 1991.[3] McGrew (2002) researches US intervention in Asia Pacific countries, both politically and militarily, to contain communism influence in the region during the Cold War Era and its effects on the political changes in the region.[4] Nye (1995) examines the influence of China's rising power as newly economic and military strength after the collapse of Soviet Union towards security interdependence between the extra regional countries (i.e. the UK, the US and Russia) and the Asia Pacific

countries.[5]

The domination of a particular method in a field has been addressed by Klotz and Prakash (2008). They argue that strict division of paradigms reduces the appreciation of the scholars working in alternative approaches. This leads researchers to utilize methods which are only commonly used within a paradigm. On the other hand, the use of methods which are considered as "external" is hindered. Such exclusivity may block potential progress in developing knowledge. Accordingly, they suggest researchers to complement "internal" tools with "external" tools. Such a combination is expected to generate a kind of cross-fertilization by extracting the benefit of both "external" and "internal" knowledge.[6]

To understand the dynamic of confrontation in the Asia Pacific from different point of view, this paper focus on the case of Chinese Civil War that subsequently, triggered the Korean War for comparison during the Cold War era. As argued by Yahuda (2004), the Chinese Civil War that occurred from 1927 to 1949, followed by the Korean War that occurred in 1950 to 1953 illustrates similar and ongoing pattern at that time: the domino effect of intra-state confrontation between the nationalist against the communist in the region and both cases also involved external actor in supporting one of the parties. Although historically the outcome of both cases may be different, both represents the confrontation between opposed political ideology that was commonly occurred during the Cold War.

Confrontation analysis is one of external models that can be used to represent conflict phenomena. Earlier studies have

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[1] Barry Buzan, "The Asia Pacific: What Sort of Region in What Sort of World?," in *Asia-Pacific in the New World Order*, ed. Anthony McGrew and Christopher Brook (Abingdon: Routledge, 1998), 68–87.

[2] Michael Yahuda, *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

[3] Javed Maswood, "The Rise of the Asia-Pacific," in *Asia-Pacific in the New World Order*, ed. Anthony McGrew and Christopher Brook (Abingdon: Routledge, 1998), 57–66.

[4] Anthony McGrew, "Restructuring Foreign and Defence Policy: The USA," in *Asia-Pacific in the New World Order*, ed. Anthony McGrew and Christopher Brook (Abingdon: Routledge, 1998), 158–88.

[5] Joseph S. Nye, "The Case for Deep Engagement," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 4 (1995): 90–102, https://doi.org/10.2307/20047210.

[6] Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, *Qualitative Methods in International Relations*, ed. Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008), https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230584129.

implemented this tool in various conflict cases. [7] Most of these studies use confrontation analysis to investigate conflict in international relations cases. [8] Unfortunately, these studies are limited only to the cases in western hemisphere region. Inspired by the success in modeling international conflict, this study models the dynamic confrontation in Chinese civil war and Korean war using confrontation analysis. This paper is aimed to show the usefulness of confrontation analysis for analyzing the conflict in the field of international relations in the East Asia region.

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[7] Charles M. Benjamin, "Confrontation Analyses of United States-Soviet Grain Negotiations," *Group Decision and Negotiation* 3, no. 4 (December 1994): 393–411, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01414413; Peter Bennett, "Confrontation Analysis as a Diagnostic Tool," *European Journal of Operational Research* 109, no. 2 (September 1998): 465–82, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0377-2217(98)00071-X; Nigel Howard, *Confrontation Analysis: How to Win Operations Other Than War (Ccrp Publication Series)* (Washington, D.C: Command and Control Research Program, 1999); Peter Murray-Jones and Nigel Howard, "Confrontation Analysis: A Command and Control System for Conflicts Other Than War," in *Proceeding of 1999 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium* (Washington, D.C: Command and Control Research Program, 1999), 1–34; Nigel Howard, "How to Win Peace Operations: Theory Vs Practice," *CCRTS Symposium*, 2000; Peter Bennett, "Confrontation Analysis: Prediction, Interpretation or Diagnosis?," in *Proceedings of Analysing Conflict and Its Resolution Conference* (Oxford, 2004), 7–17; Mary Crannell et al., "A C2 System for 'Winning Hearts and Minds': Tools for Confrontation and Collaboration Analysis," in *10th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium* (McLean: Command and Control Research Program, 2005), 1–20; Pri Hermawan and Kyoichi Kijima, "Foundation of Subjective Confrontation Analysis," in *Proceedings of the 50th Annual Meeting of the ISSS - 2006* (Sonoma, CA: Journal of the International Society for the Systems Sciences, 2006), 1–11; Khrisna Ariyanto, "Analyzing the Conflict between Football Organizations in Indonesia," *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences* 115 (February 2014): 430–35, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.02.450.

[8] Benjamin, 2004, 397; Howard, 1999, 8; Murray-Jones and Howard, 1999, 5; Howard, 2000, 6; Bennett, 2004, 13; Crannell et al., 2005, 4."

Research Method

To show the appropriateness of confrontation analysis in the international relation affair modelling, we implement this model to the conflict transformation starting from China civil war to the Korean war.

Confrontation analysis is a new approach in this field. We think that explaining a new approach using known well cases is much easier than using purely new cases. China civil war and Korean conflicts are selected since a lot of information is available and the knowledge on these two conflicts is mature and known widely by many international relation scholars. Hence, the information related to these conflicts should not be disputed and doubted. Moreover, these two conflicts show continued exchange and dynamic positions that are suitable for confrontation analysis modeling.

The information on these conflicts is collected from various public sources on the internet. The information is then stretched to identify the chronology of important events. We identify the relevant stakeholders that were involved in the war from time to time. We also identify relevant options that can be selected by each stakeholder. The identification of stakeholders and their options are aimed to construct the basic confrontation table.

Once the confrontation table is established, we discuss each stakeholder's position toward the others' position. We also discuss whether their positions are compatible. When there is incompatibility, we determine whether the disputants prefer the threat to be realized or deterred and switch to accept opponents' positions.

Finally, we discuss whether the dynamic frame leads to the increase or the decrease of conflict escalation. We also analyze the cause of this escalation or this tension relaxation.

Confrontation Analysis Display

Hermans and Thissen (2009) page 810, in their review, characterize confrontation analysis (or drama theory) based on framing (structuring), assumption to exist, model representation, and function.[9] Confrontation analysis is used to frame series of games and the dilemmas that trigger transformation of these games. It is assumed that there are communicating characters with evolving preferences, cards, positions and fallbacks, facing dilemmas. Confrontation analysis represents the conflicting disputants in a card table showing position of actors and threatened future. This tool is aimed to identify and structure actors and games (characters and episodes), and identify dilemmas.

Figure 1 depicts a confrontation map at a time. The map consists of the disputants,

and the nationalists. Just below each disputants' name there are actions that can be taken by them. It is possible for the disputant to have more than one action. The second and the fourth row display the position expected by each disputant. The second row in the figure shows the communist's position. On the one hand, the communist expect support from the other communist countries. On the other hand, they do not want their opponent to get support from Western countries. The opposite version takes place for the nationalist position in the fourth column.

There are math operator symbols in the map, i.e. "+", "-", "0". Symbol "+" reflects that an action is expected to be adopted. On the contrary, "-" symbol represents that an action is avoided by those that hold a position. Indifference toward an action is reflected by the "0" symbol. If the disputants


Fig 1. The map of confrontation at a time

their action, their position toward the actions, and the threat. The first column shows the disputants in this conflict, i.e. the communist

have the same position concerning an action, then, the disputants' position is called as compatible.

The third column represents threat. This column represents all threats possible taken by the disputants. Basically, threat is associated with possible action taken by the disputants. To get a clearer understanding of

[9] Leon M. Hermans and Wil A.H. Thissen, "Actor Analysis Methods and Their Use for Public Policy Analysts," *European Journal of Operational Research* 196, no. 2 (July 2009): 810, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2008.03.040.

what is a threat, we will illustrate the situation in Figure 1. The Communists action is asking for help from the other Communist countries. Similarly, the Nationalists actions are asking the Western countries to assist them. Nevertheless, this action can also become threats for their opponents to persuade them to leave their action. As an example, the Nationalists might threaten to ask the assistance of Western countries, if their opponents also invite outsiders to this civil war. Another illustration can also be seen in Figure 9. When the United States intended to attack the Chinese interior and unleash atomic bombs there, the Soviet Union threatened to retaliate by also using atomic bombs as well as unleashing submarines and far east divisions to join the war.

The arrow symbol represents a stakeholder's preference in any conflict situation. An arrow that leads to threat means that the disputants prefer their opponents' threat rather than accepting the opponent's position. On the contrary, if the arrow direction goes to the direction further away from the threat, then, the disputants prefer to accept its opponent's position rather than the opponent's threat.


Fig 2. Game Theoretic models

Literature Review

What confrontation analysis is?

It is argued that conflict can be won not solely through physical battle confrontation.

Instead, after the second world war, the sequence of "confrontation" in the negotiation table (sometimes also called as peace operation) is more often to take

place.[10] In the case of war-fighting, physical destruction of enemy fighting capacity is decisive, on the contrary, in the case of peace operation, political-psychological factors predominate rather than physical. [11] Brief war-fighting is often followed by a cultural approach to win the hearts and minds of opponents or third parties. [12] This actual fighting is limited to tactical rather than strategic level.

Confrontation analysis is an approach to model the dynamic of position during a conflict. This model maps the position of disputing parties in a table at a time. This map shows the compatibility of the parties' position at a static time. The dynamic of the position comes through "bargaining" between the parties. They "bargain" through doing action and threat to persuade their opponent to concede their preference toward a position.

To persuade their opponent the disputant can have different actions to conduct and even bring other parties to their conflict over time.

Madani and Hipel present genealogy of game theory techniques as depicted in Figure 2. This shows that conventional game theory approach is categorized into quantitative approaches. These approaches require the use of cardinal preferences. On the other hand, the non-quantitative approaches, e.g. drama theory (confrontation analysis) require ordinal preferences information.[13]

The non-quantitative approaches show advantages in terms of action and reaction modelling and analysis. A unique feature of the metagame-founded methods given in the left branch of Figure 2 is they are based upon

the idea of moves and counter moves among decision makers participating in a given conflict in order to ascertain the stability of a given state. [14] In a more specific to confrontation analysis, this tool is aimed to capture the dynamic aspects of conflict based upon the metaphor of a drama or play.[15]

There are also some other differences between confrontation analysis and conventional game theory. Compared to the conventional game theory approach that is relatively well-known in international relations studies, confrontation analysis uses the process of bargaining instead of language identification about human endeavor. In addition, game theory is divided into contract/cooperative and non-cooperative rational behavior in understanding the outcome of social interaction. While confrontation analysis is used to analyze the distinction on both parties' actions in the conflict. Game theory is characterized by clear, stable, and defined strategy and payoff, on the other hand, in the case of confrontation analysis the strategy evolves over time. Feasibility of an action depends on the selection of previous action. [16] The strategy that seems beneficial may turn out to be harmful when the opponent introduces a new action or even threat. The use of threat also reflects the presence of irrationality and emotion. However, both approaches are similar in the objective: to understand the logical implications of assumptions about social behavior.[17]

[10] Murray-Jones and Howard, 1999, 1; Howard, 2000, 1; Crannell et al., 2005,1."

[11] Howard, 2000, 1; Crannell et al., 2005, 2."

[12] Crannell et al., 2005, 2."

[13] Kaveh Madani and Keith W. Hipel, "Non-Cooperative Stability Definitions for Strategic Analysis of Generic Water Resources Conflicts," *Water Resources Management* 25, no. 8 (June 16, 2011): 1952, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-011-9783-4.

[14] Madani and Hipel, 2011, 1952.

[15] Madani and Hipel, 2011, 1952.

[16] Peter Bennett and Nigel Howard, "Rationality, Emotion and Preference Change Drama-Theoretic Models of Choice," *European Journal of Operational Research* 92, no. 3 (August 1996): 603, https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(95)00141-7.

[17] Joel Watson, *Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory*, 3rd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Compan, 2013), 10.

Confrontation Analysis in the Fields of International Relations

There are several studies in the field of international relations studies that utilized confrontation analysis.[18] The confrontation between parties in the Bosnian conflict in 90s is successfully modelled using confrontation analysis by both Murray-Jones and Howard (1999) and Howard (1999).[19] Benjamin (1994) analyses the changing issues, actors and positions over time in the negotiation on the terms and conditions of long-term agreements in the trading of wheat and coarse grain growth between United States and Soviet Union within the period 1976-1991.[20] Bennet (2004) models the positioning between the main stakeholders, i.e. Saddam Hussain (former Iraqi president), United States, United Kingdom, and United Nations, before the 2003 invasion of Iraq.[21] This positioning is used to predict several possible future scenarios.

Crannell, Howard, Norwood, and Tait (2005) model the dynamic interaction in both strategic and operational level. At the strategic level, the United States cabinet outlined a number of missions connected with spreading democracy throughout the world. One of the missions of the US cabinet called "spread democracy through diplomacy".[22] At the strategic level, they model the political-level interaction between the US and European countries. This model shows that the combination of compromise and threat can persuade the opposing factions to accept the US position.

Crannell, Howard, Norwood, and Tait (2005) also use this tool to model the interaction in the operational level between operational commander with national religious, political and ethnic leaders in Iraq, with the leaders of NGOs and international agencies, and so on.[23] Typical interaction between a tactical commander—such as a captain reporting to the battalion commander—and a local leader such as a village sheik. Here the issue is whether a local leader will give intelligence to a tactical commander. They also model the interaction between a tactical commander and the local Iraqi police

Cold War: Chinese Civil War

	Com	threat	Nat
Communist			<--
Ask the support from Communists countries	+	+	-
Nationalist	-->		
Ask the support from Western countries	-	+	+

Fig 3. The map of confrontation at the first stage of Chinese Civil War

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[18] Benjamin, 1994, 397; Howard, 1999, 8; Murray-Jones and Howard, 1999, 5; Howard, 2000, 6; Bennett, 2004, 13; Crannell et al., 2005, 4."

[19] Murray-Jones and Howard, 1999, 5; Howard, 1999, 8.

[20] Benjamin, 1994, 397."

[21] Bennett, 2004, 13."

[22] Crannell et al., 2005, 4."

[23] Crannell et al, 2005, 4.

Results and Discussion

Confrontation model of the Chinese Civil War to Korean War

This section discusses the analysis of the confrontation dynamic which started in the China civil war and ended in the Korean war. Using confrontation analysis, we show the dynamic of this confrontation within eight interaction frames.

Chinese Civil War

The first frame represents the position of conflicting actors in the China civil war at the first stage (the term stage here is used solely for the purpose of this analysis) of Chinese civil war as depicted in Figure 3. These frames show how the war escalated as the consequence of incredible threats of the disputants, and how this escalation decreased when some strong powers threatened to involve further and to deploy mass destruction weapons which might bring the

conflict spread even further across the world and become unmanageable.

For simplification, we exclude any conflict before 1945. Thus, we model the Chinese civil war at the period after the world war ended.

In the first stage of the civil war, the Communist controlled the North, the area that was previously controlled by the Soviet. On the other hand, the Nationalist controlled the South. In this stage, the disputants were limited only to the Chinese. Nonetheless, as depicted in Figure 3, each disputant started to ask the support from their foreign allies.

Later on, the involvement of foreign power in this civil war was realized. It is revealed then that the disputants were also backed up by foreign powers. In this conflict, Western countries, especially the United States supported the Nationalist. On the other hand, the communist was backed up by the Soviet Union and North Korea. We call this situation the second stage of the conflict which is shown in Figure 4.

Cold War: Chinese Civil War

	Com	threat	Nat	SU & NK	US
Communist			<--	<--	<--
Ask the support from Communists countries	+	+	-	+	-
Nationalist	-->			<--	<--
Ask the support from Western countries	-	+	+	-	+
Soviet Union and North Korea	-->		<--		<--
Support the Communist	+	+	-	+	-
Anti-American political approach	+	+	-	+	-
United States	-->		<--	<--	
Support the Nationalist	-	+	+	-	+
Recognize North Korea as a nation	+	-	-	+	-

Fig 4. The map of confrontation at the second stage of Chinese Civil War

Both Figure 3 and 4 show that the conflicting parties have different positions toward an action. For example, in the action "ask the support from Communist countries", the communist (Chinese, Soviet

Union, and North Korea) preferred the adoption of this action. On the contrary, the nationalist and the United States are against the adoption of this action. This made the position of conflicting parties not

compatible.

The incompatibility of position between conflicting parties is worsened by the escalation. Conflict escalated in both stages, the first and second stage. Over time and over stages, the conflict evolved and got worse. Such escalation took place since none of the threat of the disputants deterred the opponents. This is reflected by the arrows that show direction to threat. This means that the disputants prefer the threat to be actualized than accepting opponents' position (proposal). Moreover, the involvement of more parties in the subsequent stage of this conflict also contributes to this escalation and certainly the complexity of the conflict since it also involves the interest of wider parties.

Korean War

Cold War: After Chinese Civil War

	PRC	threat	ROC	SU	US
People Republic of China			<--	<--	<--
Reclaim Taiwan	+	+	-	+	-
Ask for international recognition	+	+	-	+	-
Republic of China (Taiwan)	-->			<--	<--
Ask the support from Western countries	-	+	+	-	+
Soviet Union	-->		<--		<--
Support international recognition for PRC	+	+	-	+	-
United States	-->		<--	<--	
Will not engage in any dispute	+	-	-	+	+

Fig 5. The map of confrontation at the third stage of Chinese Civil War

The conflict ended with the win of the communist (Figure 5). The third stage of the conflict shows that the Nationalist stepped aside from mainland China to Taiwan. Following their victory in conquering most of the China mainland, the Communist established the People's Republic of China. They also asked for international recognition. On the other hand, the Nationalist identified themselves as the Republic of China. They kept asking Western countries for support to deal with the Communist that grew stronger over time. In the case of the United States, the failure in supporting the Nationalist led to the decrease of intention to support the Republic of China.

Initially, the conflict between the Communist and Nationalist in Korea was overshadowed by the Chinese civil war conflict. Nevertheless, the success of the Communist in mainland China brought the international communist to spread further their influence in East Asia by bringing the escalation to Korea. The conflict started when North Korea supported communist insurgency in South Korea. The South Korea government responded to the insurgency by quelling it repressively.

As displayed in Figure 6, the communist countries (Soviet Union, People Republic of China, and North Korea) supported each other's policies. On the contrary, despite worrying about the spread of communism in Eastern Asia, the United States showed their reluctance to involve deeper in the conflict in this region. Moreover, the democracy system

also made them facing a dilemma concerning the suppression of the South Korea government to the insurgent. The situation in Figure 6 then escalated further to the situation shown in Figure 7, i.e. the Communists pushed south, since none of the disputants (and those who backed them) were deterred by their opponents' threat.

Cold War: After Chinese Civil War/Korean War

	SU	threat	PRC	NK	SK	US	ROC
Soviet Union			<--	<--	<--	<--	<--
Support international recognition for PRC	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
People Republic of China	-->			<--	<--	<--	<--
Reclaim Taiwan	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
Ask for international recognition	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
North Korea	-->		<--		<--	<--	<--
Support insurgency in the South	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
South Korea	-->		<--	<--		<--	<--
Quell communist insurgency repressively	-	+	-	-	+	0	0
United States	-->		<--	<--	<--		<--
Will not engage in any dispute	+	-	+	+	-	+	-
Train South Korean armed force	-	+	-		+	+	+
Republic of China (Taiwan)	-->		<--	<--	<--	<--	
Ask the support from Western countries	-	+	-	-	+	+	+

Fig 6. The map of confrontation before the starting of Korean war

The Communist pushing south

Figure 7 shows that North Korea started the invasion of the South. This invasion was supported by neighboring communist countries. The Soviet Union sent their military advisors to support the invasion. The People's Republic of China also sent their military advisors. Moreover, the latter also sent troops to the border with North Korea. The unprepared South Korean troops were scattered. The American troops stationed in South Korea were also unprepared for the incoming war. Consequently, they were pushed back further south.

The invasion simultaneously with the failure of American troops in resisting the invasion triggered the United States that previously was reluctant to be involved in the conflict.

Responding to the situation, the United States sent additional troops to Korea, both from Japan and from the continent. They also sent the seventh fleet to Taiwan strait to prevent the cross of the Communist troops to Taiwan. In addition, the United States also supports the Republic of China guerilla in the China southern border. Moreover, they also imposed economic sanctions on North Korea.

The other parties also responded to the invasion. South Korea asks for assistance from international parties, especially Western countries. The United Nation asked its members to send troops and assist South Korea in defending their soil. On the other hand, the Republic of China also saw this as an opportunity to avenge their defeat in the mainland. Nevertheless, the United States and United Nation rejected Republic of China's involvement since it was feared that their involvement would provoke the People Republic of China to join the war.

Cold War: Korean War

	SU	threat	PRC	NK	SK	US	UN	ROC
Soviet Union			<--	<--	<--	<--	<--	<--
Support NK's invasion	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-
Sent military advisor to NK	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-
Support international recognition for PRC	+	+	+	+	-	-	0	-
People Republic of China	-->			<--	<--	<--	<--	<--
Support NK's invasion	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-
Sent military advisor to NK	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-
Sent troops to border with NK	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-
Sent civil war veteran to NK	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-
North Korea	-->		<--		<--	<--	<--	<--
Invade South Korea	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-
South Korea	-->		<--	<--		<--	<--	<--
Ask the support from Western countries	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+
Ask the support from United Nation	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+
United States	-->		<--	<--	<--		<--	<--
Send 7th fleet to Taiwan strait	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+
Send additional troops to Korea	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+
Supply ROC' guerrilla with military aid	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+
Impose economic sanction to NK	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+
Accept ROC's offer to join the war	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+
United Nation	-->		<--	<--	<--	<--		<--
Ask the members to military assist the South	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+
Republic of China (Taiwan)	-->		<--	<--	<--	<--	<--	
Offer to join Korean war	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+

Fig 7. The map of confrontation at the starting of Korean war

The International alliances pushing back north

Cold War: Korean War

	SU	threat	PRC	NK	SK	US	UN
Soviet Union			<--	<--	<--	<--	<--
Support Chinese deployment	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
Provide air support	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
Sent military equipment to NK	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
Support international recognition for PRC	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
People Republic of China	-->			<--	<--	<--	<--
Unleash the troops to Korea	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
North Korea	-->		<--		<--	<--	<--
Withdraw to the North	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
South Korea	-->		<--	<--		<--	<--
Execute communist sympathizers	-	+	-	-	+	0	-
United States	-->		<--	<--	<--		<--
Invade the North	-	+	-	-	+	+	+
Push to the border with China	-	+	-	-	+	+	+
Impose economic sanction to NK	-	+	-	-	+	+	+
United Nation	-->		<--	<--	<--	<--	
Invade the North	-	+	-	-	+	+	+
Push to the border with China	-	+	-	-	+	+	+

Fig 8. The map of confrontation at the second phase of Korean war

The uncredible threat unable to deter opponents. On the contrary, this leads to the reciprocation of attack. Such circumstance lead to the further escalation of war as depicted in Figure 8.

In the beginning of the war, North Korea troops were able to push the international coalition further deep to the south. Despite this initial success, the movement stretched the supply line which further hindered the support to the troops in the front line. Such an over stretched formation was then exploited by the international alliance to pinch and to further crush the North Korean

troops. Following the devastating defeat, the North Korean withdrawn to the North to a more manageable defending position. The withdrawal of the North Korean troops also triggered the revenge of the South. Many communist sympathizers were executed by the South.

On the other hand, the international coalition saw the withdrawal as an opportunity to eliminate the North Korean troops. Accordingly, they chased them and pushed them to the China border. The coalition was able to seize most of the territory of North Korea. Moreover, the coalition was informed that either the People Republic of China or the Soviet Union would not join the war.

The advance of the international coalition was then responded to by the People Republic of China by setting their counteroffensive in secrecy. They set traps near the China border and waited for the international coalition to enter the trap. When the moment came, Chinese troops ambushed the coalition and crushed them. They then unleashed their troops and pushed the coalition back south.

The stalemate

After unleashing their troops, the Chinese pushed back further south and even crossed the 38th parallel border. Nevertheless, they also faced a similar situation to the attacking North Korean troops previously. The overstretched supply line weakened their fighting ability. This also worsened by continuous air raids by the international coalition that showed their air power superiority. Nevertheless, there was no significant shifting in the front line.

In this stage, North Korea and South Korea troops no longer play a significant role. The remaining strong disputants that involved in the conflict directly were the Chinese, United States, and United Nations. Another power, the Soviet Union fought indirectly by sending their air force to the battle.

To break the stalemate, some radical approaches were suggested, such as the use of the atomic bomb and the attack on China's interior. Fortunately, this idea was never adopted. It was feared that such action would be responded to by the Soviet Union by sending their Far East troops to the war and their submarine fleet to blockade the coalition supply. Moreover, they also possessed the atomic bomb and were able to deploy it. Unfortunately, the involvement of super power parties along with their weapon of mass destruction might spread the conflict across the world. Such circumstance would make the war become unmanageable and trigger the starting of another world war, which was not expected by any main disputants.

Cold War: Korean War

	SU	threat	PRC	US	UN
Soviet Union			-->	-->	-->
Unleash the far east division to the war	-	+	-	-	-
Unleash the submarine fleet to the war	-	+	-	-	-
Use atomic bomb	-	+	-	-	-
People Republic of China	<--			-->	-->
Keep unleashing the troops to Korea	-	+	-	-	-
United States	<--		-->		-->
Attack China interior	-	+	-	-	-
Use atomic bomb	-	+	-	-	-
Impose economic sanction to NK	-	+	-	+	+
United Nation	<--		-->	-->	
Keep fighting in Korea	-	+	-	-	-

Fig 9 . The map of confrontation at the culmination of Korean war

This culmination is depicted in Figure 9. The reluctance to adopt a radical approach is reflected by the arrow direction away from the threat. This reflects that the threat provides deterrence to the disputant. This reduces the escalation and creates stalemate.

Cold War: Korean War

	SU	threat	PRC	US	UN
Soviet Union					
Support China to keep fighting	-	no th.	-	-	-
Persuade China to go to armistice	+	no th.	+	+	+
People Republic of China					
Keep fighting	-	no th.	-	-	-
Go to armistice	+	no th.	+	+	+
United States					
Keep fighting	-	no th.	-	-	-
Go to armistice	+	no th.	+	+	+
United Nation					
Keep fighting	-	no th.	-	-	-
Go to armistice	+	no th.	+	+	+

Fig 10. The map of confrontation at the armistice of Korean war

Prolonged war had consumed most of the disputant resources. The disputants were also too exhaustive to further continue the war. This led to the radical idea to use weapon of mass destruction. Fortunately, the disputants were aware of the consequence of such action which would escalate the war even worse and bring the war globally. Consequently, all disputants were eager to stop the conflict and this further made the position of the disputants become compatible

with each other. This brought the open war to end practically. Figure 10 depicts the decrease of escalation of the conflict that brings equilibrium up to this modern era.

Conclusion and Recommendation

This paper shows that confrontation analysis is able to model the confrontation dynamic that started in the China civil war and ended in the Korean war conflict. The study shows compatibility of conflicting parties or their position (stance) toward the issues. This study also demonstrates the dynamic of action-reaction, in which an act of a party is responded to by the others which increases conflict escalation. The model reveals that initially the war escalated since the disputants' positions were incompatible. The incompatibility was made worse by the preference of the disputants to neglect threats and refuse opponents' position. Fortunately, when the deterrence of threat was credible the escalation was halted. Such a credible threat also "persuaded" the disputant to change their position and stop the open war.

The ability to address the dynamic of conflict and the factors that affect the conflict may help us to identify the solution, including incredible threat, that may turn conflict into peace (or at least avoid open war).

This paper also shows that there is a relationship between conflict in a country with the conflict in another country. For example, the United States support to the Republic of China is affected by the presence of the Korean war. The defeat of the nationalist in the Chinese civil war made President Truman reluctantly engaged the United States in the Eastern Asia conflict. Nevertheless, the outbreak of the Korean war changed his mind and made him send the seventh fleet to Taiwan street. Furthermore, the United States also supported the Republic of China guerrilla in the Southern part of mainland China.

Confrontation analysis has been used by international relation scholars to model the confrontation cases in the western hemisphere. Nevertheless, this tool still lacks the implementation in the eastern case. The ability of confrontation analysis in modelling the dynamic of confrontation in the case of Chinese civil war and Korean war is expected to stimulate its utilization by the eastern scholars.

Confrontation analysis is not aimed to substitute the traditional narrative approach that is commonly used by international relations scholars. Instead this tool acts as a complement. The mapping of compatibility between disputant positions is expected to provide new insights that are difficult to analyze using narrative approach solely. Moreover, the mapping model indeed assists the understanding of disputants' position faster and easier.

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