

Resource Amassment In The Indian Ocean: Revisiting Hans Joachim Morgenthau

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ABSTRACT

Indian Ocean is the new pivotal of the twenty-first century cauldron, bearing high-yielding economic driving potential analyzed from the sparsely deliberated classical realist vistas of Morgenthau that form an intertwine between accumulation of resources and maximization of power. The aim of paper is to provide new dimensions to the IOR rivalry between the power-players whose dominance remains reliant upon the control of the sea resources. Indian Ocean residues abundant possessions vibrant for the sustenance of human society, economic upheavals and for the purpose of modernizing military capabilities. The present geopolitical settings embedded in the virtues of multifaceted interdependence would not allow for war to be nominated as an appropriate strategy to win the concentrated control of sea wealth. The opinions of leading Indian Ocean connoisseurs on strategy and security have been evaluated qualitatively from different perspectives to form an independent judgment for the study. The paper offers a way-out, stipulating joint development of resources as the rational approach which would foster cooperation, stability of the Sea-Lines of Communications and smooth running of the economic engines, provide useful insights benefits to major littoral and regional states including India, China and Pakistan apart from the foreign stakeholders in the form of United States and Europe.

KATA KUNCI

Realisme klasik, pemaksimalan *power*, politik sumberdaya, Samudera Hindia

CORRESPONDENCE

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ABSTRAK

Samudera Hindia menjadi titik penting baru pada abad ke 21, mengandung potensi penggerak ekonomi hasil tinggi yang dianalisis dari sudut pandang realis klasik Morgenthau yang menghubungkan antara akumulasi sumber daya dengan pemaksimalan kekuasaan. Tujuan dari tulisan ini adalah untuk memberikan dimensi baru bagi persaingan IOR antara *power-players* yang dominasinya tetap bergantung pada kontrol sumber daya laut. Samudera Hindia memiliki harta berlimpah untuk keberlangsungan hidup manusia, peningkatan ekonomi dan untuk tujuan memodernasikan kapabilitas militer. Pengaturan geopolitik saat ini yang melekat pada nilai-nilai saling ketergantungan yang beragam tidak akan memungkinkan perang dianggap sebagai strategi yang tepat untuk memenangkan kontrol yang terkonsentrasi atas kekayaan laut. Tulisan ini menemukan jalan keluar, menetapkan pengembangan sumber daya sebagai pendekatan rasional yang akan mendorong kerja sama, stabilitas *sea line communication* dan kelancaran pertumbuhan ekonomi, memberikan manfaat wawasan yang

bermanfaat bagi negara-negara pesisir dan regional termasuk India, Cina dan Pakistan terlepas dari para pemegang saham asing dari Amerika dan Eropa.

Introduction

The relocation of great powers pivot from one region to another, is a strategic game appraisal of assets, resources and global balance of power.¹ They turn the propellers of their crafts according to the ratio of the riches, and means an area holds to it. Lord Balfour, British statesmen describing the vested interest of resource amassment during the ‘Scramble for Africa’² stated that “spheres of influence we will not admit whereas spheres of interest we will not deny”. Concurring to similar tactic, in the last few years the hub of world’s heed grabbed momentum in the Indian Ocean. The paper sheds light on the Hans Morgenthau-Classical realist paradigm whose one key assumption despite of the growing applicability remains in the covers. It is counselled by Morgenthau that a continuous competition exists for the amassment of resources to remain in power.³

*‘In pursuit of national security, states strive to amass resources.’*⁴

The paper will try to prove Morgenthau’s believes that the real power lies in the resources a country possesses.⁵ For ensuring

states national security, there is the requirement to build up power to deter others that can only be maximized once the required levels of resources are possessed. Hence, the balance of power, particularly the one at sea is contingent on plenty and decent stockpiles of resources. States today practice hard or soft power, or the blend of the two in furthering their core security objectives.⁶ All of these require abundant resources whether they are situated at land or at within the sea beds. Hard power is synonymous to heavy compact up-to-date arsenals which are unlikely to enter production without a flourishing industrial base that is dependent on extensive crude oil products for electricity and machinery. Metallic and petrochemical minerals like copper, uranium and aluminum are abundant in the IOR. The soft power projection would require sufficient economic strength and upgradation which is also highly pertinent on these possessions. The following chart explains that power maximization cannot be attained without Morgenthau’s amassment of resource.




Figure 1.1 showing dependence of statecraft on resources

¹ Nina Silove, "The Pivot Before the Pivot: US Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia," *International Security* 40, no. 4 (2016): 45-88.

² W.D Smith, *European Imperialism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Chicago: Nelson Hall 1982)

³ Antra Saxena, "India’s Policy Towards the Indian Ocean: A Study of Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Concerns," Doctorate Thesis, Dayalbagh Educational Institute (Deemed University) Agra, 2017.

⁴ Peter Baofu, "The Future of Post-human War and Peace a Preface to a New Theory of Aggression and Pacificity" (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2010), 163.

⁵ Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading." *International Studies Review* 4, no. 1 (2002): 73-97.

⁶ Joseph S. Nye, "Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power." *Foreign Affairs* (2009): 160-163.

Research Method

The opinions of leading specialists in the Indian Ocean on strategy and security have been studied to form an independent judgement. The primary sources of data include the yearly proceedings of the International Maritime Conferences held over the years by National Institute of Maritime Affairs (NIMA). Added to that an in-depth analysis of strategy papers, doctrines and postures of major powers provided valuable insight. Qualitative mode of analysis is undertaken throughout the study. Where quantitative figures such as tables and charts are used, a qualitative explanation is provided. The study has considered different perspectives available in the public domain to come up with solutions and avoid little bias in the conclusion for the third largest ocean that is on the verge of becoming the “epic-center of the 21st century”.

Result and Discussion

The demise of Cold War hostilities released the states from the constrictions imposed by East-West military blocs⁷, bringing a reconfiguration of the power nodes in the Indian Ocean.⁸ This allowed the states to exploit new opportunities in the power vacuum left by the fragmentation of bipolar world order. Since then agents of international community are utilizing the best of their tactics, strategies and schemes to gain the maximum out of these waters.⁹ The Indian Ocean, third largest in magnitude extends maritime accessibility due to its

⁷ Hugh Faringdon, *Confrontation: The Strategic Geography of NATO and the Warsaw Pact* (Routledge, 1986).

⁸ Christian Bouchard, "Emergence of a New Geopolitical Era in the Indian Ocean: Characters, Issues and Limitations of the Indianoceanic Order," ed. Dennis Rumley and Sanjay Chaturvedi, in *Geopolitical Orientations, Regionalism and Security in the Indian Ocean* (New Delhi: South Asian Publisher, 2004).

⁹ Robert D. Kaplan, "Center Stage For the Twenty-First Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean," *Foreign Affairs* (2009): 16-32.

centrality to all the major regions of the globe, becoming in the process elated in international security and policy-making. The special focus of geographers and analysts over the years have added towards the prospected ‘ever-growing wealthy destiny of this region,’ inducing regional and aspiring great power states to preserve their influence.¹⁰

Alfred Mahan in the early parts of the 20th Century prophesized the eccentric significance of the Indian Ocean by concluding: “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas. In the twenty-first century, the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters.”¹¹ Robert Kaplan reaffirms the ‘Mahanian principles’ in “Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and Future of America Power” in a world overshadowed by relatively declining United States (US) influence that the Ocean holds the key to bringing any transitions in global power structure.¹² James Stavridis, a four-star US admiral who served as the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has reiterated the strategic significance of Indian Ocean Region (IOR) by providing comprehensive veteran account in “Sea Power, The History of Geopolitics of World’s Oceans,” by articulating the “unmatched characteristics of the Indian Ocean” in geography, power and politics. The ‘beating heart of the Islamic world,’¹³ as Stavridis calls the region, gives access to geostrategic gateway states, such as: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran and

¹⁰ Glenn Ojeda, "Strategic Routes and Wealth Quadrants in the Indian Ocean," *Farmfolio*, August 09, 2018, , accessed November 30, 2018, <https://farmfolio.net/articles/strategic-routes-wealth-quadrants-indian-ocean/>.

¹¹ James Holmes, "Mahan, a “Place in the Sun,” and Germany's Quest for Sea Power," *Comparative Strategy* 23, no. 1 (2004): 27-61.

¹² Robert D. Kaplan, *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power* (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2011).

¹³ James Stavridis, *Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the World’s Oceans* (New York: Penguin Books, 2018), 119.

the Gulf monarchies. The exclusiveness of the Ocean, however is beyond that of the Islamic countries, with the dependency of major global and regional stakeholders.¹⁴ The Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) are vital for the economic and energy driven engines of People's Republic of China (PRC) and India. The two rising 'Asian giants' reliance on Indian Ocean in greater than any other state, in the backdrop of increasing population and demand for additional manufacturing industry, the appetite for energy resources is surging on daily basis.¹⁵ The SLOCs over the years have contributed their share in the economic advancement sustained despite the 2008 Financial Meltdown and the preceding slump in the Asia-Pacific markets.¹⁶ However, challenges in form of arms race and nuclear militarization, particularly the Indo-Pak rivalry pose considerable danger to freedom of the high seas. During the Cold war, Soviets and the Americans showed great interests in these oceanic waters. The former allegedly started the 1979 Invasion of Afghanistan as a cover for accessing the warm waters of the Arabian Sea¹⁷ whereas the latter had US Navy Fifth-Fleet permanently stationed, comprising of rapid-deployment force in form of carriers,

destroyers and submarine-task force augmented after the Carter Doctrine.¹⁸

At present, Pakistan is reinstating its support to China and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has invested in Gwadar port development, in the Balochistan province. India on the other side, has become closer towards US with the "Pivot towards Asia" and is building up nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers as part of 'Vision 2025' to develop its sea power in IO region.¹⁹ Alfred Mahan in *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* jots the elements of sea power. He describes that sea border as a plus point for states. They can establish their own harbors and ports with no fear of blockade. However, the scenario has a very powerful rip-off as it requires states to amass greater resources and force to preserve their independence.²⁰ For Mahan the size of country is not important but is rather the quality of ports and sea bases it maintains. Sea power is vital for influence and resource exploitation across the Indian Ocean Region. The oceans are one of the crucial assets out of all the world resources that are residual to enormous amounts of wealth in form of energy minerals and fisheries. Indian Ocean out of all the five oceans comprises of diverse strengths. It has substantial depositories of oil and natural gas. Added to that, the waters have been recognized to

¹⁴ Christian Bouchard, and William Crumplin, "Neglected No Longer: the Indian Ocean At the Forefront of World Geopolitics and Global Geostrategy," *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, no. 1 (2010): 26-51.

¹⁵ Uday Bhaskar, "China and India in the Indian Ocean Region: Neither Conflict nor Cooperation Preordained," *China Report* 46, no. 3 (August 2010): 311-18. doi:10.1177/000944551104600311.

¹⁶ TNN, "India Had Fastest Wage Growth in South Asia in 2017" *The Times of India*, November 27, 2018, accessed November 30, 2018, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/india-had-fastest-wage-growth-in-south-asia-in-2017/articleshow/66836316.cms>.

¹⁷ Andrew Hartman, "The Red Template: US Policy in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan," *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 3 (2002): 467-489.

¹⁸ Rasul B. Rais, "An Appraisal of US Strategy in the Indian Ocean," *Asian Survey* 23, no. 9 (1983): 1043-1051.

¹⁹ "Indian Navy Aiming at 200-ship Fleet by 2027," *The Economic Times*, July 14, 2018, accessed November 30, 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indian-navy-aiming-at-200-ship-fleet-by2027/articleshow/48072917.cms>.

²⁰ "Press Release: One-day National Conference on Maritime Economy and the Geopolitics of Indian Ocean Rim: Challenges for Pakistan," *Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI)*. Accessed November 30, 2018. <http://issi.org.pk/press-release-one-day-national-conference-on-maritime-economy-and-the-geopolitics-of-indian-ocean-rim-challenges-for-pakistan-2/>.

contain large amounts of uranium,²¹ a vital component in the production of nuclear weapons.

Resource and Indian Ocean

The aspect that needs to be clarified is what can be perceived a resource in perspective of IOR, Indian Ocean Region. By resources the paper do not only signify the minerals and oils in sea but also the islands, bays, choke points that may lead a country towards their capture.

It is in Asia that nations with space, natural resources and great masses of men lie. Any nation that would add to its power, the enormous power potential of China would thereby make itself the prospective master of not only Asia but the world.²²

- ***Islands, Bays and Seas serve as route to resources***

It is an undeniable fact that Indian Ocean routes are equivalent to incandescent gems. The numerous gulfs, bays, choke points and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) cannot be neglected. They in themselves are as imperative as the resources within the oceanic waters of IOR. These strategic waterways have supported maritime global trade for centuries.²³ Under the obtained

²¹ James Conca, "Uranium Seawater Extraction Makes Nuclear Power Completely Renewable," *Forbes*, September 06, 2016, , accessed November 22, 2018,

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2016/07/01/uranium-seawater-extraction-makes-nuclear-power-completely-renewable/#a96b6b3159ae>.

²² Francis P. Sempa, "Hans Morgenthau and the Balance of Power in Asia," *The Diplomat*, May 25, 2015, , accessed November 30, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/hans-morgenthau-and-the-balance-of-power-in-asia/>.

²³ Pragya Pandey, "Emerging Maritime Security Environment in the IOR: Challenges and Responses," *Proceedings of 23rd World Congress on Political Science: Challenges of Contemporary Governance*, Canada, Montreal, Quebec (Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2014), accessed December 1, 2018, http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_34577.pdf.

historical evidences, the sailing began in the fifth




Figure 1.2 :Rise in mineral Prices

century with the trade of materials such as ebony, expensive hardwood, metals, oils and incenses. Free trafficking even in those days was a vital interest for economies to breathe. New ports were opened by Persian Empire in the east of the Gulf. James Stavridis, narrates his lifelong learnings in *Sea Power: History and Geopolitics of Indian Ocean*. He terms the 'Strait of Hormuz' as a 'perpetual flashpoint of collision between civilizations.'²⁴

The islands, bays and seas are assets of this water body. Without the control and mastery of these seas, islands and bays no one can gain access to the beneath lying true resources in the ocean. Oil rigging, coal extraction, fishing, mineral collection all require control of the territory. The British also took the control of Asian resources by first colonizing the territory. It therefore can be summed that trade routes that include the bays, straits and choke points are also a sea resource whose control is necessary for not only for trading but for exploration and command of marine wealth.²⁵

²⁴ Jason Gewirtz, "If Iran Tries to Close This Strait Crucial to the Oil Trade, the US Navy Can Unblock It Quickly - Adm. Stavridis," *CNBC*, July 23, 2018, , accessed November 30, 2018, <https://www.cnb.com/2018/07/23/what-the-us-can-do-if-iran-closes-the-strait-of-hormuz.html>.

²⁵ Tanvi Madni, "India's International Quest For Oil and Natural Gas: Fueling Foreign Policy," *India Review* 9, no. 1 (2010): 2-37.

Waters are considered the easiest pathway to enter a country's dominions. United States, People's Republic of China as well as by India are struggling for the dominance of Asian seas. Out of which China seems the victorious creating its peculiar place in world market. The countries realize the importance of waters with respect to commerce routes, off land assets, economy, and political influence as well as in regard to the growing environmental problems like global warming and climate change which forces states to increase their maximum sovereignty over the remaining marine resources across globe.²⁶ The vitality of this capital is transforming world in the greed to gather 'plenty of it' under its supremacy. Fossil Fuels whose demand is rising with the growing populations are more than treasure are formed with the remains of marine life. The collapse of this cycle will result in death of modern economies which is a stern nightmare for states of international community hence they keep on struggling for the rule of resources to safeguard their national security and survival.

▪ ***Strategic Position and US Power Extension***

The axle of attention in world politics has paused in the IOR because of its geostrategic position. Being not only in heart of the globe but in heart of oceans and world's most important states on borders, the value of ocean is enhancing per day. IOR with its linkage to crucial SLOCs with Middle East, Africa, and Asia has grand strategic, economic and security stature.²⁷ China in South and India in the east are keeping the tradition of Cold war alive. Unlike any other state, USA is the most worrisome entity as it keeps no direct

connection with the region. As mentioned above in Admiral Mahan's elements of sea power that countries with sea borders are in advantage but the quality of ports is of due importance. US is relying on its bandwagon mechanism to stay a participatory in the scenario. One odd happening that took place years ago keeps chances for US creating an excuse for it to stay in Indian waters. The ocean has wartime history but as according to Lindsay Bremner the region got into view with intensity during the Malaysian lost flight MH370 tragedy.²⁸ It is termed as the biggest aviation mystery distinctive modern devices in three years of constant searching could not be identified. Australia, China and Malaysia each funded the craft locating campaign but the efforts could not be much fruitful. The families of 239 passengers have lost hopes of any return of their beloveds as the three states have ended the investigation procedures. No one is sure if the plane was crashed or hijacked. Families are inviting US to provide its assistance in locating the signs of their beloveds. In past years too, Americans maintained their stakes in IOR in similar roles. During Iran-Iraq war the US Fleet force rested in nearby Persian Gulf to overcome any activity by Iran. Being in role of a humanitarian country, it can not only scratch the card for its own national interest instead can too provide help in search and inspection of truth for the satisfaction of victim families. Other than this marine piracy and hijacking can be a concern for which America can sign up a document with the regional states and show its presence IO.

Resource Politics and 'De Ja Vu in Indian Ocean'

Analyzing the yesteryears of the region it seems like history is repeating itself in the Indian Ocean. It was with the discovery of oil in Middle East that in the twentieth century the region gained back the pre-eminence at the strategic chessboard. In

²⁶ Martin Walker, "Indian Ocean Nexus," *The Wilson Quarterly* 32, no. 2 (2008): 21-28.

²⁷ Geoffrey Till and Patrick Bratton, *Sea Power and the Asia-Pacific: The Triumph of Neptune* (London: Routledge, 2013), 243.

²⁸ Timothy Doyle and Graham Seal, "Indian Ocean Futures: New Partnerships, New Alliances and Academic Diplomacy," *Taylor & Francis* (2015): 2-7.

the above discussion, the routes, bays and straits are also entitled as a vigorous resource in ocean. Contemporary Chinese strategy calls for revival of the 'Ancient Silk route' under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that was long disarrayed with the sixteenth century British colonization of Asian states. "The British on the other hand began with a focus on gaining control of as much as of the Indian landmass as they could. They built forts and created a string of bases around the periphery of the country in the 1600s and on into the early 1700s." The British destined to conquer the water resource by developing controlled positions in form of bases. The modern Chinese strategy is looked with suspicion by India and US, under the policy of 'Strings of Chain' which refers to development of several stations all across Asia that traps developing countries into unending cycles of loans and economic deterioration.²⁹ The creation of bases since Hu Jintao's era has been an essential custom of Sino foreign policy. As it is wisely said that the sun never sets on the Brits. Following these pathways seems like with the near creation of artificial moon by Chinese, neither the sun nor moon will set over Sinos. By the end of eighteenth century the only power existing were the British aiming to create the entire ocean as 'British Lake'. Most of nineteenth century is jotted with the blighty chronicles as they well realized the vitality of sea lanes. Chinese today are overshadowing other world nations in almost every walk of life. After British colonialism it seems like Chinese capitalism is colonizing the developing states.³⁰

China with its exceptional rise has proved the world that power can be attained

²⁹ Emrys Chew, "Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: The Indian Ocean and the Maritime Balance of Power in Historical Perspective," *Working Paper*, no. No. 144 (2007)

³⁰ William A. Callahan, "China's 'Asia Dream' The Belt Road Initiative and the new regional order," *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 1, no. 3 (2016): 226-243.

without entering conflicts and wars.³¹ It very wisely made people realize that the more China will grow the more profits will be attained by its trade partners. The domino effect is applicable very wisely here, where fall of one state predicts the failure of the rest. The growing economy of China prophesizes the automatic gains for its other trading companions. This idea has widely aided China in fulfilling its 'String of Pearls Strategy' in Indian Ocean.³² The Asian countries cooperated with China being periphery and semi-peripheral states to survive their economies in international arena and indirectly kept on serving Sino Pearl development interests. The nuclear submarines of China in IO are often attributed threatening by India and United States.³³ The Chinese military and commercial ships in waters are its true depiction of sea power. Sea power when defined accounts for not only the trading traffic of a state but also the military presence. CSCL is Chinese commerce shipping craft particularly built for Indian Ocean in year 2014. The craft is estimated to perform 24/³⁴7 carrying as much as of 19000 containers in each row.

New Delhi's Sprawl in IOR

India is too following the foot prints of China marking to become the second giant economy of Asia. It is quite ahead in its naval advancements. Despite of US firm long timed support it is still facing multiple complexities in matching Beijing's

³¹ Zhang Xiaotong and James Keith, "From wealth to power: China's new economic statecraft," *The Washington Quarterly* 40, no. 1 (2017): 185-203.

³² Gurpreet Khurana, "China's 'String of Pearls' in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications," *Strategic Analysis* 32, no. 1 (2008): 1-39.

³³ Mohan Malik, *China and India: Great Power Rivals* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011)

³⁴ Huang, Linyan, Frédéric Lasserre, and Olga Alexeeva, "Is China's interest for the Arctic driven by Arctic shipping potential?," *Asian Geographer* 32, no. 1 (2015): 59-71.

commerce and marine approach in all ways.³⁵ American support to India is a remedy to abstain it from drawing closeness to its Cold War partner. Russia during its Soviet era had funded and guided India to build its navy in the IO. To avoid any such rehashing this can be a staunch reason for US backing to it. India in past year chose 'East policy' to shatter Chinese growing pearls in IOR.³⁶ The policy missioned at developing closer ties to Asian states to isolate China in its neighborhood however the revealed statistics of year 2018 by IISS, the Military Balance, Delhi is failing to overcome Chinese strategies.

Country	Active Naval Vessels Manufactured/Co-Developed by China*	Big-Ticket Maritime Infrastructure under development by China	Chinese Investment Spending 2005 – 2017 (in \$ bn)+	Status of Free Trade Agreement with China
Bangladesh	46	Chittagong Port	24.1	Biggest Trading Partner, Feasibility Study Started in 2016
Maldives	0	Ihavandhippolhu Integrated Development (IHavan) Project	NA	Signed (2017)
Myanmar	17	Kyaukpyu Deep Water Port	7.4	ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (2010)
Pakistan	15	Gwadar Deep Water Port	50.6	Signed (2007)
Sri Lanka	17	Hambantota Port	14.7	Biggest Trading Partner, Negotiations Started in 2014

Figure 1.3 showing statistics according to IISS Military Balance 2018 (Chapter 6: Asia)³⁷

India's 90 percent of oil and gas transportation occurs from the sea.³⁸ The more its market presence is advancing, the call for more resources is gaining

³⁵ Raja Mohan, "India and the Balance of Power," *Foreign Affairs* (2006): 17-32.

³⁶ Donald L. Berlin, "India in the Indian Ocean," *Naval War College Review* 59, no. 2 (2006): 58-89.

³⁷ Michael Beckley, "The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China's Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion," *International Security* 42, no. 2 (2017): 78-119.

³⁸ Hasan Yaser, "The Emerging Strategic Rivalries in the Indian Ocean Region: An Analysis of Indo-American Ambitions and Implications for China," *Journal of Contemporary Studies*, Winter 2014, Vol. III, no. No. 2 (2014), NDU, Islamabad.

acceleration. It will therefore never compromise to shatter any agent becoming an obstruction in its path of development. Malacca strait in the Indian Ocean therefore is the backbone of Chinese and Indian economies.³⁹ These routes and chokepoints being an extraneous resource in this ocean can any time become bone of contention involving many other states in the scenario. In the unending crisis between Pakistan and India, any strike from the two nuclear neighbors may disrupt the sea lines of communication forcing China to intervene.⁴⁰ India being in combat will automatically call for USA, along with other international stakeholders including Russia and Europe which are likely to reinstate their support for cessation of hostilities. It is to be kept in mind that the powerplay this time is likely to lead to the gargantuan waves of ocean, considering that grand strategies of the major powers compete in the shallow waters of the IO. India in haphazard has reshaped its naval inventory after its recent strikes Pakistan's submarines and intervention in land and water territorial sovereignty. The recent defense exchanges among US and India cannot be ignored. In April 2019, the country has added a Romeo Submarine Chopper helicopter described as one of the best in world's artilleries.⁴¹ The intentions of New Delhi are quite uncertain and circumstances are likely to result in severe clashes.

Who is fulfilling Morgen's Resource amassment criterion?

Hans Morgenthau with his eccentric presumption pursued the states in international system to control the most resources on earth to ensure their national

³⁹ Prमित Mitra and Drew Thompson, "China and India: Rivals or Partners?," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 168, no. 4 (2005): 30-33.

⁴⁰ Lowell Dittmer, *South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China: India, Pakistan, and China* (Routledge, 2015).

⁴¹ Lean Collin, "China-India Rivalry at Sea: Capability, trends and challenges," *Asian Security* 15, no. 1 (2019): 5-24.

security.⁴² He realized well that the staying in power for a state will persistently require it good amount of resources and their utility. Either it is the military accrual today or the economies of states all is ongoing on the resources. China is satisfying the classical notion of Morgenthau with its rational utility and control of IO region.⁴³ It is not only bourgeoning its military with the resources obtained from it but also is widely expanding its soft power through routine commerce via the SLOCs. On one hand it is ensuring its peaceful transportation of business and goods from the precious chokepoints of Malacca strait and Strait of Hormuz while on the other is also obtaining the oils from Middle East that are rigged out from the same ocean. As added above, the commerce ships particularly CSCL initiative, in most of the hours of day are on routes of Indian Ocean, guarded by the Chinese submarines surveilling in the rimland. The Naval Chief of China, Admiral Sunil Lanba has counterchecked the presence of six to eight Chinese naval ships in the northern section of Indian Ocean at any given time as well as submarines. During his visit to United Kingdom, UK in March 2019, he told Britain that 'no nation has invested as much as China in shipbuilding'.⁴⁴ That's not all, Beijing itself has been a long range regulator of Indian Ocean in the South China Sea where it is largely exploiting the islands. The underwater wealth, exclusive economic zone is used by China since the 20th century. The fishery in the water is not only a means of employment, trade, and a protein diet for Sinos. Almost the entire South China Sea is home to Chinese navy, under the claimed draft of nine dash line which declares the entire sea as Chinese sea. There exists other

contending countries who call upon Beijing for their share in the area. Philippines took the petition to International Court of Justice and the decision was made against China. However, PLA navy never stepped back from the furthering its influence in the resource-rich region. Moreover its base policy in almost every Asian country is aiding it largely against India and to sit close to more important assets in world. Hambantota Port project in Sri Lanka, Gwadar Port from Pakistan under the China Pakistan Economic Corridor and the new bond with Maldives, the two states drilling and military exercise in Eastern Indian Ocean is now ringing bell for a new pearl as iHaven Project.⁴⁵

Formerly India had ravishing relation to Male however since 2015 the ties seem to loosen with growing intimacy with Beijing. The red dragon being too giant is wiping the unwanted entities with its long pointed tail making space for its sitting in the entire region of Asia.⁴⁶ The whole behaviorism of China in this time span of 21th century is quite favorable in presumption of Morgenthau. China today resides closest to most of the world resources and US being a non-participatory in IOR is only dependent of alliances. India is trying staunch to overshadow the entity but the resource control of China is quite cumbersome and commanding to counter in any small time to come. Afterall the British Colonialism also lasted for a span of hundred years. The dragon following the footsteps of brits is no ready to back its progress.

⁴² Vassilios Paipais, "Political Realism in Apocalyptic times," *Contemporary Political Theory* 18, no. 1 (2019): 45-48.

⁴³ Michael Klare, "New Geography of Conflict," *Foreign Affairs* 80 (2001): 49.

⁴⁴ Lean Collin, "China-India Rivalry at Sea: Capability, trends and challenges," *Asian Security* 15, no. 1 (2019): 5-24.

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Conclusion

The seabed resources have the potential to provide infinite comforts to 'global commons' by facilitating tremendous economic growth and prosperity. The "highway of the world" as is the massive Indian Ocean SLOCs has been dubbed provides access points to and from the Asia-Pacific to the Europe onwards to the Americas. States should conform their foreign policies with the realization that the conversion of IOR to a hotbed would not be favorable to either parties, the stability and security of SLOC provides a 'win-win situation' to all compatriots.

The paper suggests that freedom of navigation remains to be essential for the growth of the region. It is recommended that regional organization must be utilized to address the perceived threats of littoral states who in the wake of "freedom of navigation" fall prey to great power agenda. For this purpose the auspicious offices of

organizations such as the ASEAN and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) maybe recognized for the purpose of providing diplomatic impetus. Indian Ocean is declared to be troublesome of all the oceans because of presence of nuclear powers, notably India and Pakistan. The international community needs to step in to resolve the mutual animosities which remains to be the main hurdle to regions prodigious destiny.

It is concluded that resource amassment has become a reality where competing strategies of major power are interplaying to augment their interests and authority. Regional states such as Pakistan, India and China which long neglected their maritime sector are investing in capabilities to enhance sea exploration for mineral resources. Despite the predominance of geopolitics in the realm of state affairs, geo-economics continues to have an important standing in the strategic calculations.

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